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THE THEORY OF 

PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS 



CHARLES A. DUBRAY, S.M. 



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A Dissertation 

Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic 

University of America in Partial Fulfilment of the 

Requirements for the Degree Doctor 

OF Philosophy 



Published as Monograph Supplement No. 30, of 
The Psychological Review 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
1905 



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PREFACE. 

The progress which psychological research has made in ' 
modern times, far from dispensing with the need of theories, 
has rather accentuated It. New facts have been discovered or 
more thoroughly investigated, and where the explanation was 
not at hand, and could not be found empirically, recourse to 
theories was rendered necessary. 

Of these theories some are entirely new, and therefore sug- 
gest new philosophical views of the mind; others are principally 
modifications of earlier theories, and adaptations to meet the 
needs of present science; others finally are distinct, yet not 
always conscious, survivals of theories of the past. 

In this revival of past theories, it sometimes occurs that the 
essential, the fundamental basis of the theory is discarded, 
while that which is secondary or less essential is preserved; 
and thus the attempt is made to Incorporate certain elements of 
an older theory in the new. Whenever this happens, it Is inter- 
esting to examine how far this dismemberment of a theory of 
the past and the exclusive preservation of certain portions of 
It Is justified. 

Generally speaking, the modern philosophy of the mind has v/ 

abandoned the Aristotelian and scholastic view of a substantial 
soul ; it has retained nevertheless the concept of psychical dispo- 
sitions. This concept, whatever name may have been given to 
It, was an actual and logical product of the older theory, so 
that In using it the scholastics were perfectly consistent. 

Can we say the same of modern philosophers? Does this 
fragment of an ancient edifice find a suitable place in the modern 
structure? Or is it out of proportion and harmony with the 
new system into which it has been incorporated? Such is the 
question which we shall attempt to answer In the following 
pages. This has necessitated a historical survey, as well as an 
analysis of the theory under discussion. It is not intended, how- 
ever, to test directly the value of the scholastic doctrine concern' 



IV PREFACE. 

ing the soul and its faculties ; nor on the other hand to criticize in 
any thorough-going way modern theories concerning the nature 
of the mind. The primary aim of the investigation is to 
compare the medieval and the various modern systems from the 
point of view of logical consistency. 

Consequently, after ( i ) a brief review of the facts which 
have to be explained, we shall (2) consider how they have been 
accounted for in the past, and (3) how they are accounted for 
at the present time. This will lead us (4) to inquire into the 
concept of psychical dispositions; finally (5) we shall examine 
the logical aspect of the theory. 

It is a pleasing duty for the writer to acknowledge his 
indebtedness to Professor E. A. Pace for the help which he has 
given in the preparation of this study, the numerous suggestions 
which he has made, and for the constant care with which he has 
directed the philosophical studies of the author. 



BIOGRAPHY. 

The author of this dissertation was born November 2, 1875, 
at Villaines-sous-Luce, a small town of the department of Sarthe 
(France) . After attending the primary schools, he entered the 
'Petit Seminaire' at Sees (Orne) where he pursued the study 
of the classics. In 1893 he entered the Society of Mary, and 
after spending one year in England, came to America. He 
studied philosophy two years in the scholasticate of the Society"^ 
in Maryland, and then came to the Marist College, near the 
Catholic University, Washington, D. C, for his theological 
studies. He followed at the University the courses of Holy 
Scripture under Professor C. P. Grannan; of Church History 
under Professor T. J. Shahan, and of Hebrew under Professor 
H. Hyvernat. In 1899 he received the degree of Bachelor 
in Theology and was ordained to the priesthood. Having 
been appointed professor of philosophy at the Marist College, 
he matriculated in the department of philosophy at the Catholic 
University in 1900, and studied philosophy and psychology 
under Professor E. A. Pace, and Greek under Professor G. 
M. Boiling. 



CONTENTS. 

I. Summary of the Facts. 

a) Diversity of conscious states i 

h) Mental development 3 

c) Habit 6 

d) Memory 8 

e) Summary 9 

II. History. 

a) General remarks 11 

b) Early period of Greek philosophy. Stoics. Epicureans 12 

Retention attributed to the soul. 

a) Plato 14 

b) Saint Augustine 15 

c) Leibniz 17 

d) Scottish Philosophers (Reid,Dugald Stew^art, Hamilton) 19 

e) Herbart 23 

/) Beneke 24 

Retention attributed chiefly to the organism. 

a) Aristotle and Scholastics 25 

1 ) General theory of know^ledge 26 

2) Two kinds of knowledge 28 

3 ) Retention 29 

4) Habit and disposition 31 

b) Descartes 32 

c) Locke 34 

d) Malebranche 37 

e) Condillac 39 

Summary 42 

III. Modern Theories. 

a) Introductory. Division of chapter 43 

b) Theory of subconsciousness 44 

Theory of dispositions in general. 

a) Reasons for the existence of dispositions 46 



Vlll CONTENTS. 

b) The word ' Disposition ' 47 

c) Use of the word ' Disposition ' in psychology 49 

A. Psychical theories. (Lotze, Bowne, Lipps.) 50 

B. Psycho-physical theories 55 

a) Ebbinghaus, Hoffding, Wundt, Stout 56 

b) James, Ladd, Baldwin, Rehmke, Goblot, Bergson 8 

C. Physical theories. (Ribot, Richet, Luys, Jodl, Maudsley, 

Sollier. ) 64 

2. Nature of physical dispositions 66 

a) Persisting movement 68 

b) Persisting impression 69 

c) Persisting tendency 71 

3. Summary of modern disposition theory 73 

IV. Existence and Further Determination of Psychical 
Dispositions. 

1. Existence of psychical dispositions. 

a) Necessity of some permanent after-effect 77 

b) Materialism 78 

c) Double series 80 

d) Retention and reproduction 82 

e) Recognition 87 

f) Determination of future 91 

2. Possibility of knowing psychical dispositions. 

a) Objections and answers 92 

b) How we know psychical dispositions 98 

3. Further determination of the concept of psychical dis- 

positions lOI 

a) Dispositions and consciousness 102 

b) Facilitation 103 

c) Disposition and habit 105 

d) Disposition and potential energy 107 

e) Main characteristics of psychical dispositions 109 

V. Logical Aspect of the Theory of Psychical Dispositions. 
Introductory 112 

I. The mind series theory. 

a) Prevalent conception of the mind in modern psychology 112 

b) Series in general 116 

c) Mental series 116 



CONTENTS. IX 

2. Psychical dispositions in the mind series theory. 

a) Knowledge of the existence of psychical dispositions ... . 119 

b) Existence of psychical dispositions 121 

1 ) They cannot exist in actual states 122 

2) Bradley's phenomenalism 125 

3) Dispositions as explanations of the facts 127 

c) Ebbinghaus' ' Gesammtheit ' 133 

d) James' ' Stream of consciousness ' , . . . 137 

e) Conclusion of the preceding arguments 142 

/) Parallelism and Psychophysical Identity 144 

3. Psychical dispositions in the mind substance theory. 

a) Descartes. Interaction 148 

b) Malebranche. Leibniz 150 

c) Aristotelian and Scholastic theory. 

1 ) Unity of man and duality of his constitutive 

principles 151 

2) Faculties (Nature. Division. Relations) .... 153 

3) Dispositions (Modification of faculties. Effects. 

Subject. Subordination) 158 

4) Conclusion 165 

Conclusion 167 

Bibliography 168 



CHAPTER I. Summary of the Facts. 
Diversity of Conscious States. 

Nothing in nature is more varied, more changing than human 
consciousness. Mental states are constantly succeeding one 
another, constantly forcing one another out of the field of con- 
sciousness. Hardly has one appeared before it is hurried into 
the past by another. Of the inner world of consciousness 
especially can we say what Heraclitus said of the universe r 
everything changes and flows : " irdvTa pel." This flowing, this 
succession is so essential to the living human consciousness that 
a persistent idea, one which refuses to retire and interrupts the 
stream, is characteristic of an abnormal mind. 

There is not one stream of consciousness, but there are as 
many streams as there are individuals; and if we compare men 
with one another, we also find the greatest variety of conscious 
states. It seems certain that, of all the individuals who now 
exist or have existed in the past, two could not be found whose 
contents of consciousness at any given time were exactly similar, 
or even two who ever experienced conscious states exactly alike. 
At any given moment, if it were possible to obtain an insight 
into all human consciousness, to make as it were a cross section 
of it, we would perceive an infinite variety of cognitive, affec- 
tive and conative states, each differing in many respects from 
all the others. 

That such differences in the mental states of several indi- 
viduals depend in a large measure upon differences in the envi- 
ronment is obvious. Sensations of sight, of hearing, of touch, 
of pressure, of heat and cold, etc., which affect the mind more 
frequently than does any other state, and which are for the 
most part occasions and determinations of other conscious 
processes, depend essentially on surrounding objects which stim- 
ulate the sense organs. In fact all our states of consciousness. 



2 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

representative, emotional or conative, have their origin in our 
sensations and are determined by them. 

We can therefore to a large extent account for the diversity 
of mental states in several men by external factors. But this 
is far from being an adequate explanation. If two persons be 
placed amid surroundings identical as far as possible, we still 
find a great difference in their states of consciousness. They 
will not see, hear, feel in the same manner. Their sensations 
will be the starting point of mental processes differing in a still 
greater degree. Attention, interest, associations and conse- 
quently the whole experience of the past together with the 
habits of life, must be taken into consideration. 

We find in all persons differences of temperament, of bodily 
and mental condition, of age, sex, etc. There are native endow- 
ments which we receive with existence itself, and which are 
from the very beginning of our life ingrained in our nature, 
and all these influence our conscious states. ' Qiiidqitid recip- 
ittir, per modiim recipientis i-ecipitiir' is an old scholastic axiom 
which we may apply here. When we receive an impression in 
consciousness, it is modified by our own condition. 

But the actual condition of the mind is not determined only 
by its nativ-e endowments; past experiences have imprinted their 
mark on the mind. It is impossible to give a complete expla- 
nation of any mental state in the concrete, as it is de facto 
given, without taking past experience into consideration. The 
present conscious process is very complex in the causes which 
have determined its production and its character. 

In some cases the relation of the present to the past is 
obvious; it is perceived spontaneously. In memory, for in- 
stance, we refer the present idea to another one which has been 
in consciousness before. The very nature of recognition is to 
perceive that the present idea is a reproduction of a past one. 
In other cases it is only by careful study, by long and patient 
research, by attentive and continuous introspection that we can 
discern the influence of one process on another. Even then our 
efforts are frequently unsuccessful, because that influence is too 
complex, and the result of too many factors. In no case can 
it be determined in all its details. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 3 

Thus we see that under the perpetual flux of conscious 
processes something must remain permanently, since the past 
continues to influence the present, and remains a powerful factor 
in the actual appearance and nature of our thoughts. This is 
more clearly perceived if we consider the development of the 
mind. 

Mental Development. 

Man cannot cast off his own nature, character, acquired ten- 
dencies and habits of life, all of which tend to modify his 
views of things. As we incessantly accumulate new experiences, 
our mind is constantly being modified. In many cases this is 
apparent; we are aware that we do not view the same objects 
now in the same manner as we did formerly. Our opinions, 
inclinations, tendencies are changed. In a word, our mind 
develops. 

Mental development depends essentially upon this possibility 
of reviving past experience. And even when this past expe- 
rience is not itself revived, it enters nevertheless as a factor 
more or less important, more or less distinct, in all our mental 
life. If we compare the mental operations of a man with those 
of a child, we can, with J. Sully,'- reduce the differences to the 
three following points : Number, perfection, complexity. The 
adult goes through a number of processes far greater than the 
child, and these processes are more varied. He not only expe- 
riences sensations, but observes, compares, reasons. He atten- 
tively notices the points of likeness and of difference. He 
considers, discusses, deliberates and performs many other opera- 
tions which in the child are either entirely wanting, or are 
found only in an imperfect, rudimentary condition. His opera- 
tions reach also a higher degree of perfection, his sensations 
are more distinct, his discriminations more accurate, his judg- 
ments more certain and more general. All these are effected 
with less effort and more rapidly. They are, however, more 
complex than in the child. The mind has a greater capacity 
and a greater power. It can receive at the same time more 
impressions, and hence the processes of differentiation and of 

' Outlines of Psychology, pp. 41 ff. 



4 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

integration have a much higher complexity. The same impres- 
sion can suggest in the mind by association a multitude of ideas. 
The mind can do more; each one of its actions depends on, 
and is determined by, a large number of circumstances and of 
past experiences, at least in an implicit and unconscious manner. 
The same would also prove true if we compared not the intel- 
lectual, but the emotional and volitional life of the adult with 
that of the child. An increase in the number, the perfection 
and the complexity of the processes would manifestly reveal 
itself. 

Professor Baldwin describes these differences in the following 
terms: "The phenomena of the infant consciousness are simple, 
as opposed to reflective; that is, they are the child's presenta- 
tions or memories simply, not his own observations of them. 
In the adult consciousness the disturbing influence of inner 
observation is a matter of notorious moment. It is impossible 
for me to know exactly what I feel, for the apprehending of 
it through the attention alters its character. . . . There is 
around every one of us a web of convention and prejudice of 
our own making. Not only do we reflect the social formalities 
of our environment, and thus lose the distinguishing sponta- 
neities of childhood, but each one of us builds up his own little 
world of seclusion and formality with himself. . . . The child, 
on the contrary, has not learnt his own importance, his pedigree, 
his beauty, his social place, his religion, his paternal disgrace; 
and he has not observed himself through all these and countless 
other lenses of time, place, and circumstance. He has not yet 
turned himself into an idol nor the world into a temple."^ 

Mental development is not simply growth. It means, it 
is true, an increase, an accumulation, a storing up of ideas in 
the mind; but it means more than that. At the present time, 
when child-study and pedagogy have been the object of such 
patient and fruitful research, the principle has been made 
clearer and clearer that to furnish a mind with ideas is not 
the true method of education, nor the true means of devel- 
oping the mental faculties. Plato himself brings out the same 

' Menial Development in the Child and the Race, I., p. 4. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 5 

principle when he makes Socrates compare the art of education 
to the art of midwifery. The teacher does not infuse science 
into the pupil's mind, he simply directs and encourages his 
efforts. "My disciples," says Socrates, "make wonderful prog- 
ress, as they themselves and everybody can see; and this is 
clear that they make this progress without ever learning any- 
thing from me, but from themselves finding and coming to the 
possession of many beautiful things."^ 

Mental development consists In an increase of power to 
acquire knowledge, both theoretical and practical, to discern, 
judge, coordinate, rather than in the acquisition of ideas. 
"We may say that the mind grows when It increases its stock 
of materials. It develops In so far as its materials are elab- 
orated Into higher and more complex forms. Mere growth of 
mind would thus be illustrated by an Increase in the bulk of 
mental retentions, that Is, in the contents of memory: develop- 
ment, by the ordering of these contents in their relations of 
difference and likeness, and so on."^ 

The mind is developed not only in its perceptive faculties, 
but also In Its conative and affective faculties. The will and 
even the feelings, as well as the intellect, can and must be 
educated. They also are capable of modification, growth and 
perfection. 

The facts of mental development and of mental differentia- 
tion necessarily imply that past perceptions, past operations, 
continue to have an influence on subsequent perception and 
operation. If the tendencies and aptitudes of the individual 
mind change, if the conscious states become more perfect and 
more complex, It Is In consequence of increased exercise, of 
multiplied experiences; these therefore must leave in the mind 
some after-effect. This, as we have said above, is a partial and 
very important reason of the differences In the conscious states 
of several Individuals, even when they are placed in similar cir- 
cumstances. It Is also the reason for the differences in the 
views of the same person at different times of his life. 

' Tliecetetus, cc. VI., VIL, pp. 149 ff. 
^ Sully, Outlines of Psychology, 40. 



6 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Mental development supposes that the mind not only receives, 
but also retains. It must acquire a certain facility for doing 
again what it has done before ; it must have the power of 
recalling to consciousness that which has been given there in 
the past. In mental habit and memory the relations of two 
conscious phenomena that take place at different times are most 
apparent. We must now briefly consider those two factors, 
with which especially we have to deal in the present dissertation. 

Habit. 

In general, the term habit signifies all aptitude, all tendency 
to act in a special manner easily and rapidly; but in a stricter 
sense, it applies only to personal habit, acquired by one's own 
repeated operations. There are innate dispositions to expe- 
rience a conscious state rather than another, to perform certain 
actions, to behave in such or such a manner. They depend on 
our native endowment, constitution, character, and are in many 
cases transmitted by heredity. With these we are not con- 
cerned for the present, but only with habits acquired by the 
individual himself, and which are the results of his own activity. 

Habits are very important in our whole life, organic, mental, 
social and moral. They form in us what has rightly been 
called a second nature. We know that all action which has 
been repeated requires less and less effort. By exercise, the 
various organs of the body acquire strength, skill, dexterity. 
By frequent repetition every movement tends to grow easy, to 
be reproduced automatically without reflection and effort as 
soon as it is suggested. Complex series of coordinated move- 
ments also are facilitated; as soon as the series is started each 
one of its elements follows in turn without distinct conscious- 
ness and attention; it has become 'natural.' 

For mental life also habit is of the greatest importance. By 
practice the senses acquire greater and greater perfection. 
Sight becomes more accurate; we can discriminate tints which at 
first appeared exactly similar; we can form a more precise 
estimate of distances, perspective, figures, etc. The ear distin- 
guishes more readily the pitch, intensity, timbre, harmony of 
various sounds. In the same way, the other senses are 'edu- 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 7 

cated,' adapted, trained, to perform their functions, or at least 
some of them, with increasing perfection and facility. 

Memory and association themselves can become habitual; fre- 
quently repeated associations become stronger; the ties which 
connect several ideas become more steadfast and enduring. 
The more frequently ideas have appeared together in con- 
sciousness, the more apt will they be to recall one another if one 
of them is revived in consciousness. 

We can also acquire habits, both general and special, of 
attention, reflection, introspection. These powers may be 
developed, applied to certain actions rather than to others. 
The higher faculties of the mind can be directed and improved. 
By sustained attention and application it is possible to acquire 
facility in studying sciences for which one felt neither taste nor 
aptitude. A man can always, at least in some degree, change 
his taste and tendencies, and acquire a relative facility where 
before he experienced nothing but dislike and difficulty. 

Repeated effort strengthens the will and increases the power 
of determination; it develops self-control, self-restraint, mas- 
tery over oneself; it gives to the will the power to resist nat- 
ural impulses and inclinations, and to carry out what has been 
resolved. 

Thus in all human faculties, from the lowest to the highest, 
the influence of habit is felt and in all, its effects are essentially 
the same. That which was painful and disagreeable, becomes 
easy, automatic, connatural. That which required many con- 
scious efforts, a constant attention, and unceasing watchfulness, 
is now performed without difficulty, and with scarcely any 
notice. Sometimes attention will even prevent us from doing 
habitual things correctly. Thus, for example, when we have 
some hesitation about the spelling of a word, reflection may 
rather increase the uncertainty. Let the hand write according 
to its own impulse, and frequently the spelling will prove cor- 
rect, because there is an association which has been established 
between the motion of the hand and the word mentally con- 
ceived. Or one hesitating between two spellings may write 
the word according to both, and frequently the eye will, for 
the same reason, tell which of the two is correct. It is difficult 



o CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

in those cases to determine how far the mind and the organism 
respectively contribute to the final result, but it is certain that 
both have a share in it. In some cases the habit is chiefly an 
adaptation of the organs, and in others it seems to be mostly 
mental. In this dissertation we consider mental habits; as to 
organic habits, we consider them only in so far as they refer 
to conscious processes. 

Memory. 

Memory sometimes means a general faculty or a certain class 
of operations; it refers to the power which the mind possesses 
of preserving and reproducing its past experiences. We say of 
a man that he has a good memory, a faithful memory, when he 
readily remembers what he has learned or perceived. We also 
speak of visual or of auditory memory, implying a special 
aptitude to remember colors or sounds ; hence we have the visual 
or auditory types of memory. 

Memory is also taken for the acts themselves of recall or 
reproduction, for the actual exercise of the faculty, and this 
implies three conditions : the presence of an idea in conscious- 
ness, its disappearance, and its recall. In some cases we have 
recognition, and It is an essential element of the complete act 
of memory. Yet we may see the same person, hear the same 
tune several times without recognizing them. The same idea 
may come back to consciousness without our being aware of the 
repetition and without our being able to perceive the similarit}' 
and Identity. 

We can reproduce and recognize mental impressions. After 
days, weeks, or years of absence, they may be recalled again to 
consciousness. Sometimes they present themselves unexpect- 
edly; they flash again into our mind without effort on our part 
when we least expect them and even when we endeavor to keep 
them away. In other cases we try to recall to consciousness 
ideas which were there at some previous time, or we strive to 
make clear and distinct that which has left but a faint and 
obscure idea in the mind. While we do not and cannot revive 
all our past experiences, yet we cannot assign any limits to this 
possibility of reappearance. We can recall impressions re- 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 9 

celved formerly by the senses; colors, sounds, odors, etc., can 
be represented when the stimulus is no longer .present. Pains 
and pleasures, desires and regrets, emotions and passions, the 
most abstract ideas, can also be remembered. Of no state that 
has once been present in consciousness can we say that it has 
disappeared never to return. How this is possible; what con- 
ditions are required; what laws govern memory; what is the 
nature of the state which is revived; and how it is related to 
the preceding state, we do not for the present have to deter- 
mine. But the fact itself of reproduction is most evident; we 
experience it daily, and at every moment of the day; we recog- 
nize in the present state an echo or a consequence of a former 
state; we refer it back to a determined event in our past mental 
life. Memory is thus a fundamental factor of our mental life. 
Without memory, this life would be a disconnected series of 
successive states bearing no relation to one another, and in 
which nothing permanent, nothing constant would be found. 
Intellectual and moral development would be an Impossibility; 
reading, speaking, reasoning could find no place. Since these 
actions essentially imply a connection of the present with the 
past, something of the past must remain In consciousness if we 
are to have the understanding of the present. 

We not only revive past impressions as they have once 
occurred In the mind, but we associate them, we form new com- 
binations and arrangements In consciousness; we modify our 
past. With Ideas which have been given separately in con- 
sciousness, we construct new mental representations; we unite 
parts of mental images with parts of other images. Fancy has 
no limits; it not only can produce fantastic and grotesque repre- 
sentations, but when it Is guided by reason, it becom.es the prin- 
ciple of works of art and Invention. 

Summary. 
We have briefly mentioned the facts which we have to con- 
sider in this work, namely, facts of memory and of mental habit- 
uation. We have confined ourselves to the most general state- 
ments, because the present study is not so much a study of the 
facts as of the theories proposed as explanations of these facts. 



lO CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Additions from memory and habit group themselves unceas- 
ingly around the central nucleus with which we began our 
mental life; they modify it in such a manner that they make it 
even unknowable in itself. What a pure sensation, or any 
other mental state would be, apart from all the revived ideas, 
from associations, from habits, we certainly do not know. 

A multitude of factors contribute to frame and mould our 
conscious life, our mental behavior, our character. And for 
this reason is our character essentially personal, similar to no 
other. To the primitive nucleus of native endowments and 
tendencies, our successive actions have added a much greater 
part; they have modified it and left on it their own imprint. 

That there is a close connection between memory and habit 
is evident. Both are based on the same power of the mind to 
preserve something of the past. In order to be reproduced 
and recognized a conscious process must either remain or leave 
some lasting effect in the mind. The facility of action pro- 
duced by the repetition of actions supposes also that these 
actions affect the mind in a permanent manner. 

Briefly stated, therefore, the question which the psychologist 
has to solve is this: There are certain mental processes which 
certainly depend on past processes. The past in many ways 
influences the present. How shall we account for such an in- 
fluence? How does the past, v.hich as far as we can know 
directly has disappeared, affect the present? 



CHAPTER II. History. 

General Remarks. 

The facts which we have just mentioned have evidently no 
claim to being new. There are sciences which have developed 
only after long periods of time, because the facts on which they 
are based, or which they seek to explain, were not sufficiently 
known. In proportion as human experience increases, and as, 
with the help of more perfect instruments and greater accuracy 
of observation, facts are discovered or become better known, 
new problems offer themselves for investigation, new facts ask 
for explanation. Hence new theories, new hypotheses, which 
could not even have been thought of before, are brought to light. 

But this is not the case with our problem. Ever since men 
have existed, there have been facts of retention and repro- 
duction of knowledge; in their organisms they have treasured 
up habits of skill, strength, dexterity; and in their minds, 
images, learning, science. To these we owe the progress and 
development of our race. Nor could men fail to notice and 
observe these facts which occur every day, and at every moment 
of the day; which can be perceived in others to a certain extent, 
but especially which each perceives in himself. The obser\'a- 
tion of our own actions and states is not, it is true, always easy; 
introspective attention, especially to the details of our mental 
life, is found to be sometimes very arduous, and comparatively 
few men are capable of it. But it is impossible for a man not 
to notice, at least in a general way, that the idea which now 
occurs to his mind is the same as, or at least similar to, the idea 
which had already been there before; or that the repetition of 
certain actions makes it easier to perform them anew. This 
appears the more certain, if we consider that these facts are of 
the greatest importance both for the organic life and the devel- 
opment of the mind. 

u 



12 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

That the ancients had a far less perfect and accurate knowl- 
edge of them than we have now is of course beyond doubt. 
They had no idea of memory experiments and of the accurate 
observations which are made in modern laboratories. But still, 
thinkers perceived enough facts to arouse their curiosity, and 
make them eager to find an explanation of these phenomena. 
Men are not satisfied with perceiving facts. They are, says 
Aristotle, desirous of 'knowing' them, that Is, of understanding 
their conditions and causes.^ Plato means the same thing when 
he tells us that wonder is the most important characteristic of 
a philosopher, and that It is the beginning of all philosophy.^ 
For we wonder when we see that some unexpected event hap- 
pens, or when we know a fact, but are ignorant of the causes 
that produce it. 

We must find, therefore, in the history of philosophy attempts 
to solve the problem of the reproduction of our mental states. 
We shall endeavor to outline briefly some of these attempts, 
without trying to present the views of all philosophers. A 
complete summary would be too long, and is not necessary for 
our purpose. But in order to show how ancient philosophers 
considered the present problem, and what solutions they offered, 
we shall analyze the most characteristic, the most complete and 
most systematic theories, those which have exercised the great- 
est Influence on subsequent thinkers. 

Early Period of Greek Philosophy — Stoics 
— Epicureans. 
We do not find in early Greek philosophy any attempt at a 
systematic treatment of the question. Thought was engaged In 
a broader field of Investigation, that of the primordial con- 
stituent elements of the world, and probably much attention 
could not be devoted to particular questions of psychological 
life. Moreover, the works of those philosophers have not 
come down to us; frequently we are obliged to rely on imper- 
fect testimonies of later writers, or simply to Infer from their 
general doctrine what they must have held on a special point. 

' Metaphysics, I., i, 980a, 22. 
* TheiEtetus, 155 D. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 13 

Memory was commonly explained by the retention of images, 
effluxes, which, being detached from external objects, came in 
contact with the sense organs, and produced sensations. Thus 
for Empedocles, the 'effluvia' (cnroppoaC) proceed from the ob- 
ject, enter the pores {tvopot) of the organism, and sensation takes 
place when they meet the element which corresponds to them, 
for 'the like is known by the like.'^ 

In the atomistic system of Leucippus and Democritus, exter- 
nal objects constantly produce similitudes of themselves, or 
'ei'SwXa'; sensation takes place when this real representation or 
likeness of the objects comes in contact with the atoms of the 
soul. 

We can also dispose at once of the later theory of the Stoics 
and of the Epicureans. According to them also, the soul is 
material.- The Stoics explain sensation by saying that it is the 
impression produced in the soul, either in a strict material sense 
(rvircdcri'^ iv yJrvxH), as with Cleanthes ; or as a change of state in 
the soul (erepoLwcn^ i^^XV'')} as with Chrysippus.^ Memory con- 
sists in preserving those characters, or impressions left by sensa- 
tion. According to the Epicureans also the soul perceives ex- 
ternal objects when their ' etScoXa' or 'simulacra' come in con- 
tact with it, and remembers when it preserves their imprint 
(tutto?)*. We see that this theory of sensation and memory is 
essentially the same as that of Democritus. 

We come now to those writers who have a more explicit doc- 
trine concerning retention and revival of past conscious states. 
We can divide our historical sketch into two parts, one dealing 
with the metaphysical, or the spiritual views, the other with the 
physical and organic theories. Sometimes, it is true, a theory 
assumes both organic and spiritual factors; then we shall clas- 
sify it according to the primary and more essential element In 
the explanation which it proposes. 

' C. Plato, Meno, 76 C. D. Aristotle, De sens, ei sensib., c. z; De gener. et 
corrupt., I., 8, 324 B., 25 seq. 

* Cf. Eisler's K'drterbucli dcr phi]. Begriffen unJ AusJriicke, s. v., Seele, p. 
673 ff. 

= Cf. Diogenes Laert., B. VII. 

* Cf. Lucretius, De Reriim Natura, Lib. IV. 



14 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

I. Retention Attributed to the Soul. 
Plato. 

We do not find in Plato any theory of memory; yet we know 
that according to his teaching, memory, in our present condition, 
is the basis of all true and real knowledge. The soul, before 
being united to a body, existed as a pure spirit, and in that state 
acquired knowledge by the contemplation of the only true reali- 
ties, the 'ideas.' The body is a prison in which the soul is con- 
fined against its will and inclination, and which prevents it from 
contemplating the ' ideas.' We have perceptions through the 
senses, but they do not give us a true knowledge because their 
object is changing, contingent. They produce in us faith 
(ttco-tk), but not science. Still those perceptions are means of 
acquiring real science which consists in recalling to memory the 
knowledge which the soul had stored up in its previous exist- 
ence, namely, the knowledge of the eternal and immutable ideas 
of which all realities are a participation. " Man must acquire 
the understanding of things according to their generic form." 
To attain this end, many perceptions are necessary, which by 
reasoning are reduced to unity; and 'this is a recollection of 
those things which the soul formerly saw, when journeying with 
God, contemning those things which we now say are, and look- 
ing up to what really is.'' Sensations, therefore, are the occa- 
sions on which knowledge is represented to the mind; it was 
present before, but could not be recalled. This is a purely 
spiritual retention, in which the body has no part, since it rather 
prevents the soul from acquiring science. 

There is another memory which preserves the sensations. 
" One would rightly call memory the preservation of the sen- 
sation {aunripiav alaOi^aetot;)." ^ The things which we have seen 
or heard are imprinted in the soul, and we remember them as 
long as the image remains.^ Even these, however, seem to be 
preserved in the soul itself, not in the organism. 

When he tries to give an explanation, Plato has nothing to 

> Phaedr., 249 B. C. Cf. Pliaedo, 72 E, 75 C. 
2 Phileb., 34 A. 
' Theat., 191 D. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. I5 

offer but comparisons and metaphors. Memory is a secretary 
or clerk (ypa/jifiaTeiK;) who writes 'in the souls' the various 
affections and sensations; or a painter who paints {ypd(j)ei.) 'in 
the soul' the images of the things perceived.' Elsewhere the 
soul is compared metaphorically to a tablet of wax, which, in 
various individuals, is of different size, quality, purity, softness, 
etc. On this tablet we impi-ess our perceptions by placing it 
under them, as if we were taking off impressions from rings. 
As long as that image remains — and this depends on the qual- 
ities of the wax — we remember and know ; otherwise we forget. " 
In the same dialogue the soul is compared to an aviary, and 
this again metaphorically: "As before we have constructed I 
do not know what kind of a waxen figment, so now let us make 
in each soul a kind of aviary of all kinds of birds. "^ This is 
empty in the child, but is filled up little by little in proportion 
as its experience increases. 

So, for Plato, both memory {tivrjfi-r]) and reminiscence 
(avdiJivr]aL<;) are faculties of the soul alone. The body, which 
had at least an indirect part in the acquisition of our various 
ideas, seems to have none in their retention and reproduction : 
"When the soul itself without the body, recalls within itself 
(dvev Tov aco/xaTO'; avrr) iv iavTJj) that which it has experienced 
with the body, shall we not call that to remember? — Evi- 
dently. — And when, having lost the remembrance of a sensitive 
perception, or of science, it reconsiders it itself in itself, we also 
call all these reminiscences and memories."^ 

iS^ Augustine. 
In the philosophy of St. Augustine also, it is the soul and 
not the body that remembers and preserves the various impres- 
sions in the form of images. This function is always attributed 
to the 'animus,' not however to the intellect, or 'mens.' For 
between sensuous perception and intellectual knowledge, there 
is a third kind of perception (visio), namely the spiritual, 

' P/iileb., 39 A. B. 
'T/ietet., 191 C. D.; 194 E. 
' Thcict., 197 D. 
* Phileb.. 34 B. 



l6 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

because 'whatever is not a body, and yet is something, can aptly 
be called spirit, and the image of an absent body is not a body, 
although it is similar to it.'^ This spirit, therefore, 'is a fac- 
ulty of the soul inferior to the intellect, and where the simili- 
tudes of things are preserved {ubi corporahum reriim similt- 
tudines exprimiintur) .''- Such retention supposes sensation: 
"They who have had no color sensations have no images of 
color."3 

There is also an intellectual memory which contains our 
knowledge of the various sciences of literature, logic, dialectics, 
etc. It differs from the other because it retains, not the images 
of things, but things themselves that are intelligible and cannot 
be represented by images. Indeed when I hear that there are 
three kinds of questions that can be asked about any object, viz., 
its existence (an sit), its nature (quid sit) and its qualities 
(quale sit), the sounds are perceived by the ear, and their 
images are kept in memory. But none of the senses has ever 
perceived the things themselves which the sounds signify. It 
is not therefore their images but the things themselves that are 
in my mind, in the 'remotest corners' of my memory. As they 
could not enter the soul through the senses, they must have pre- 
existed in the mind. How they came there, says St. Augustine, 
let others say if they can; for me, I confess that I do not know.'' 

Memory, as we have said, is a function of the soul.^ It 
has, however, a seat in the organism, in one of the ventricles of 
the brain. This, at least, is a teaching to which St. Augustine 
refers approvingly and against vi^hich he proposes no objection. 
But he himself neglected entirely the physiological aspect of 
memory. When he tries to explain memory, he finds nothing 
but metaphors. It is a treasury, an immense hall or palace, a 
large, even a boundkss recess. It has fields, cells, storerooms, 
caverns, and no word seems adequate to express its marvellous 

> De Genesi ad lilt., XII., 7. 

« Ibid., XII., 9. 

^Epistola VII. ad Nebridium, III., 6. 

' Confess. L. X„ cc. 9, 10, n; cf. De Trinit., XIV., ch. VII., §io. 

'Cf. also De Musica, L. I., IV., 8, and De Ouantitate anima, c. V., 8. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. i7 

functions. And even — an expression which would sound bold 
to modern ears — 'memoria quasi venter est animi.'^ 

If we now ask: What is it that memory preserves? What 
are those images which it treasures up ? We find a very unsat- 
isfactory answer. The images are not material realities as the 
el'SfflXa of Democritus or of Epicurus, but they are ideal.^ They 
"are perceived by the spirit just as bodies are perceived by the 
bodily organs."^ But exactly in what the images consist, and 
what their nature is, according to Augustine, we can hardly 
understand.* 

Leibniz. 

Coming to the modern period of the history of philosophy/, 
the first author we have to mention Is Leibniz. He says of his 
own theory that it rather resembles that of Plato, and opposes 
It to Locke's system which, he says, is rather Aristotelian. ^ 
There are in our souls innate ideas and principles which are not 
always conscious; they may be merely 'perceptions,' not 'apper- 
ceptions.' Although in some passages he seems to understand 
them as real Ideas and perceptions, yet probably he conceived 
them as dispositions, habits, faculties, by which we readily and 
from the very beginning of our life apprehend such ideas and 
principles." They are more than 'tabula rasa,' since they enable 
the mind to draw ideas out of itself: 'pour les tirer lul-meme 
de son propre fonds.'' 

Owing to the law of preestablished harmony of body and 
soul. Innate Ideas do not become conscious without the help of 
the senses, but there may be no necessary connection between 

' Conf. X., cc. 8, 9, 14, 17. 

^ " Imagines, id est, incorporeas sirailitudines corporum, incorporaliter mandat 
(mens) memorise, unde cum voluerit et potuerit velut de custodia productas atque 
in conspectum cogitationis exhibitas iudicet." Epist. CXLVII. (Paulina;) XVI. 
Cf. Epist. CLXII. (Evodio), No. 4. 

3 De Genesi ad litt., L. XII., 12. 

' Epist. CLXII., 4. 

^ Nouveaux essais. Avant-propos. 

* " Les idees et les verites nous sont innees comme des inclinations, des dis- 
positions, des habitudes, ou des virtualites naturelles, et non pas comme des 
actions." Op. cit., Avant-propos. 

' Op. cit., L. I., Ch. I., §5; cf. ibid., §11., and Ch. III., §iS. 



iS CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

the sensation and the abstract idea which it awakens in the 
mind.' 

All knowledge is preserved in the mind, and this in two ways, 
which are repeated from Locke : contemplation, when we keep 
ideas in consciousness; and memory, when they are recalled 
after a disappearance.^ 

To explain memory, Lebniz rejects and ridicules the theory 
of a mere faculty, which he attributes to Locke. This faculty 
it nothing but a kind of scholastic entity and absolutely unintel- 
ligible. Something of the past impressions must remain in 
the soul, viz., dispositions on which the mind's power can be 
exercised, and this Leibniz calls a disposition or a traced' The 
persistence of these traces is not impossible although they are 
unconscious, and notwithstanding the fact that they may be 
too weak to revive the past idea.* Moreover, they always 
remain in us, so that absolute forgetfulness is impossible. When 
the idea has vanished from consciousness, the germs of it are 
preserved as unconscious perceptions.'' 

Habit is explained on the same principles. Nothing that has 
been entirely ceases to exist: 'le present est gros de I'avenir et 
charge du passe.'" Habits are nothing but past actions them- 

' " C'est par une admirable economic de la nature que nous ne saurions avoir 
des pensees abstraites qui n'aient point besoin de quelque chose de sensible, quand 
ce ne serait que des caracteres, tels que sont les figures des lettres et les sons, 
quoiqu'il n'y ait aucune connexion necessaire entre tels caracteres arbitraires et 
telles pensees." Op. cit., L. I., ch. I., §5; cf. Avant-propos and L. I., ch. III., §18. 

2 Op. cit., L. II., ch. X., §1. 

' " Je m'etonne que vous vous puissiez toujours payer de ces puissances ou 
facultcs nues. ... II faudrait expliquer un peu plus distinctement en quoi con- 
siste cette faculte, et comment elle s'exerce, et cela ferait connaitre qu'il y a des 
dispositions qui sont des restes des impressions passees, dans I'ame aussi bien que 
dans le corps. . . . Et si rien ne restait des pensees aussitot qu'on n'y pense plus, 
il ne serait point possible d'expliquer comment on en peut garder le souvenir; 
et recourir pour cela a cette faculte nue, c'est ne rien dire d'intelligible." Op. 
eh., L. II., ch. X., §2. 

* " Je ne vols aucune necessite qui nous oblige d'assurer qu'il ne reste aucune 
trace d'une perception, quand il n'y en a pas assez pour se souvenir qu'on I'a 
eue." Op. cit., L. I., ch. III., §18. 

'"II n'est point raisonnable que la restitution du souvenir devienne a jamais 
impossible, les perceptions insensibles servant encore ici a en garder les semences." 
Op. cit., L. II., ch. XXVII., §14. 

' Op. cit., Avant-propos. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 19 

selves, persisting virtually, remaining in a latent condition, and 
determining subsequent actions by determining the relations of 
a monad to the others. Hence, says Leibniz, if the theory of 
transmigration of souls was true. If souls could pass from one 
body to another, the same individual would always continue to 
exist in Nestor, Socrates or any other man. He could even 
manifest his identity to anyone who had the power to penetrate 
sufficiently into his nature; for he has kept impressions and 
characters of all that Nestor or Socrates has done. The soul 
is an immaterial being, or spirit, and such a being 'preserves 
impressions of all that has happened to it in the past, and even 
has forebodings of all that will befall it,' although it may not 
be able to distinguish them clearly.^ 

Scottish Philosophers: Reid, Stewart and Hamilton. 
The philosophers of the Scottish school consider only the 
mental side of the phenomena of retention and reproduction. 
Their individual views do not agree in all points, and their 
explanations differ. But they are all at one on the fundamental 
principle : the explanation must be on purely psychological 
grounds; physiology can be of no help, and hence must not 
even be taken into consideration. 

Reid. 

We know, says Reid, that whenever we experience a sensa- 
tion, there is some impression and change produced In our 
organs. The organ In turn produces some change in the nerve ; 
and this some change in the brain. Whatever be the nature of 
these impressions. It is certain that we perceive nothing unless 
they take place, but we can give no reason why It is so. It is 
a fixed law of nature; the Supreme Being has seen fit that It 
shall be so, and this is all we know on the matter.' The 
impressions received In the brain can in no way account for 
memory. In the first place, 'if the Impression upon the 
brain be Insufficient to account for the perception of objects 

1 Op. cit., L. II., ch. XXVII., §14. 

'Essays on the Powers of the Human Mind — Intellectual Potvers, Essay II., 
ch. II. 



20 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

that are present, it can as little account for the memory of those 
that are past.' Moreover, 'there is no evidence, nor proba- 
bility . . . that the impression made upon the brain in percep- 
tion remains after the object is removed.' For the brain does 
not appear more fitted to retain it than the organ and nerve. 
And even if the brain preserved it, then 'sensation and percep- 
tion should be as permanent as the impression upon the brain, 
which is supposed to be their cause.' Granting further that 
actual perception could disappear, even if the impression re- 
mained, then we would have something impossible, viz., the 
same cause would produce two different effects: sensation and 
memory; for memory is '^n operation essentially different both 
from sensation and perception.' It is possible and even 'very 
probable' that memory depends upon the conditions of the 
brain, because nature may have subjected us to this law; but 
after many attempts of philosophers to explain memory on a 
physiological basis, it 'remains unaccountable, and we know as 
little how we remember things past as how we are conscious 
of the present." 

Memory is therefore an 'original faculty' of which no expla- 
nation can be given; it is the immediate perception of the past. 
It is just as difficult to explain as would be the prescience of the 
actions of a free agent. The same argument applies to both 
cases : what is past did certainly exist, and what is future will 
certainly exist. "The past was, but now is not. The future 
will be, but now is not. The present is equally connected or un- 
connected with both." Why we possess the faculty of directly 
perceiving the present through consciousness, the past by mem- 
ory, but not the future — no other reason can be given than the 
will of God.^ 

Dugald Stewart. 

Dugald Stewart agrees with Reid in rejecting 'the various 
theories which have attempted to account for memory by traces 
or impressions in the sensorium.' They are 'obviously too 
unphilosophical to deserve a particular refutation.' As an ex- 
ample of such physiological theories, Dugald Stewart quotes in 

' op. cit., Essay III., ch. VII. 
= Op. cit., Essay III., ch. II. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 21 

a note a passage from Malebranche^ which we will have to 
mention later. The decrease of memory-power, which is the 
common effect of old age, has for its principal cause the lessen- 
ing of the power of attention, which in turn may result from 
some change in the organism. Memory is the 'capacity of 
retaining knowledge in the mind, and a power of recalling it 
to our thoughts when we have occasion to apply it to use.' 
Those ideas which were latent in the mind are revived either 
spontaneously or in consequence of an effort of the will. Not 
all ideas, however, remain in memory; 'by far the greater 
number vanish without leaving a trace behind them,' whilst the 
others 'by their accumulation lay a foundation for our perpetual 
progress in knowledge.' The reason of this difference is ex- 
plained by the dependence of memory upon attention and asso- 
ciation of ideas.^ 

Habit is explained by memory and association. It expresses 
'that facility which the mind acquires in all its exertions, both 
animal and intellectual, in consequence of practice.' It is not, 
as Reid claimed, a mechanical power, which, like instinct, 
operates 'without will or intention, without thought,'* but It is 
explained by the rapidity of the succession of our ideas and 
volitions, which recall one another because they have frequently 
been united and repeated together. All the acts of the will 
which were conscious before the habit was acquired, are con- 
scious even after, but they succeed one another with such ease 
and rapidity that they do not leave any trace, and cannot be 
recalled by memory.^ 

Hamilton. 

The theory of habit proposed by Dugald Stewart is rejected 
by Hamilton, because 'it supposes a consciousness and no 
memory . . . which violates the fundamental law of our intel- 
lectual being.' It is moreover 'altogether hypothetical . . . 
Illegitimate and superfluous.' Hamilton explains habit by the 

' Reclierche de la I'erlte, L. II., P. I., ch. 5 and 6. 

^ Elem. of the PItilos. of the Human Mind, ch. VI., sect. I. 

» Op. ch., ch. v., p. I., sect. i. 

*Reid, Active Poiuers, Essay III., p. I., ch. 3. 

6 Op. cit., ch. II. 



22 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

theory of latency, or unconsciousness of certain mental acts: 
'there are acts of mind so rapid and minute as to elude the ken 
of consciousness.' This is in the main the theory of Leibniz, 
without his obscure terminology. Leibniz, Hamilton says, 
violated the universal usage of language when he called those 
latent modifications 'obscure ideas, obscure representations, in- 
sensible perceptions, perceptions without apperception, etc.,' 
since all these expressions involve the notion of consciousness.^ 

With regard to memory, Reid's theory, according to which 
memory is the immediate knowledge of the past, 'is not only 
false, but it involves a contradiction.' To know an object im- 
mediately is to know it in itself, and therefore this object must 
actually be in existence. A past object can only be known 
'in and through a present object,' or a present state of mind 
which we are conscious of as relative to another which has been. 
Memory is 'at best only a mediate knowledge of the past; 
while in philosophical propriety it is not a knowledge of the 
past at all, but a knowledge of the present and a belief of the 
past.'2 

Knowledge is kept in the mind in an unconscious state, and is 
'lying dormant,'^ so that the mind contains 'far more latent 
furniture than consciousness informs us it possesses.'* Nay, 
'the infinitely greater part of our spiritual treasure lies always 
beyond the sphere of consciousness, hid in the obscure recesses 
of the mind.' We know that we can revive cognitions which 
we formerly had. Therefore, 'that in the interval, when out 
of consciousness, these cognitions do subsist in the mind is an 
hypothesis . . . which we are . . . necessitated by the phae- 
nomena to establish." 

Finally we must seek for an explanation in the mind itself. 
Physiological hypotheses cannot be taken seriously; 'indeed all 
of them are too contemptible even for serious criticism.' But 
on the contrary, retention 'is so natural on the ground of the 

1 Lectures on Metaphysics, Lect. XVIII., XIX. 

2 Op. cit., lect. XII. 
»Lect. XXXI. 
•Lect. XVIII. 

6 Lect. XXX. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 23 

self-energy of the mind that we have no need to suppose any 
special faculty for memory.' Retention is implied in the very 
conception of the mind as self-activity. The reason which 
Hamilton quotes from Schmid is that the mental activity, or 
act of knowledge, being 'an energy of the self-active power of 
a subject one and indivisible, a part of the ego must be detached 
or annihilated if a cognition once existent be again extin- 
guished." Hence the true mystery is not retention and mem- 
ory, but forgetfulness. 

Herbart. 

Leaving the Scottish school, we pass to Germany. Of Her- 
bart we shall say but little. However interesting and impor- 
tant his views on our subject may be, a complete exposition of 
them would lead us too far afield. In order to give a satis- 
factory account of them it would be necessary to enter into the 
details of his whole philosophical system, of which they are an 
essential part. He rejects all innate ideas and faculties, and 
explains retention in a manner which has many points of resem- 
blance with the Leibnizian theory. All conscious states are 
presentations; feelings, affections, emotions, desires, passions, 
are all of the same nature as representative ideas. Ideas which 
are not in opposition with one another, but which are either 
entirely homogeneous and similar in quality, or entirely dis- 
parate, blend together in a single complex presentation. But 
Ideas which are opposed, totally or partially, tend to arrest each 
other, i. e., to exclude each other from consciousness, in pro- 
portion to their respective intensity, and to the degree of their 
opposition. So arrest (Hemmung) may mean simply a dimi- 
nution in the intensity of a presentation, or Its complete exclu- 
sion from consciousness. 

The presentations which, at any given moment, are present 
to consciousness are said to be above the threshold of con- 
sciousness, and those which have been completely arrested are 
said to be below this threshold (Schwelle des Bewusstselns). 
But even those that have completely disappeared from con- 
sciousness still remain in existence, as 'tendencies' or efforts to 

' Lect. XXX.; cf. also, in addition to the places referred to, lect. XXXII. 



24 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

become conscious; and they are ready to reappear as soon as 
the 'arresting' conditions are removed. We are not told ex- 
actly what those tendencies are, but we know that they are 
based on the essential activity of all 'reals,' which consists in 
their self-preservation (Selbsterhaltung) . The rising and 
sinking of perceptions, owing to their antagonistic forces, their 
disappearance and reappearance, can be mathematically deter- 
mined, since it depends on the relative degrees of intensity of, 
and of opposition between, those presentations. Herbart gives 
the principles and laws of this determination.' 

Boieke. 
According to Beneke, none of those psychical products which 
have reached a certain degree of perfection ever ceases entirely 
to exist. Every one of them, ' after it has disappeared from con- 
sciousness, or from within the sphere of active psychical devel- 
opment, is preserved in the unconscious or inner soul, from 
which it may afterwards enter again into the conscious mental 
development and be reproduced.'' That v/hich thus persists out 
of consciousness we call a trace (Spur), if we refer it to the 
mental development which continues to exist innermost; and 
we call it ground-work, germ (Angelegtheit) , in reference to 
those developments which take place on this foundation (Grund- 
lage), or have their starting point in it. Of these traces 'we 
know nothing, except through their actual reproduction.'^ We 
cannot say what place they occupy; "there is no 'where' for 
them " and they are connected with no bodily organ. " For the 
trace is that which comes between the production of a mental 
activity (<?. g., sensuous perception) and its reproduction {e. g., 
as recollection). As these two acts are psychical, it follows 
that we can conceive of these traces only in a psychical form." * 

' Cf. especially Psychologic als Wissenschaft neu gegriindet auf Erfahrung, 
Metap/iysik und Mathematik ; also Lehrbucli zur Psychologic, Sammtliche Werke, 
v., VI. The reader may consult: Stout in Mind, XIII., 1888, pp. 321 ff., 473 ff. ; 
XIV., 1889, pp. I ff., 353 ff. ; J. Ward in Encyclopedia Britannica, art. ' Herbart'; 
Stout and Baldwin in Diction, of Philos. and Psychol., art. ' Herbartianism.' 

^ Lchrbuch der Psychologic als Natur'u.issenschajt, ch I., §27. 

» Ibid., §28. 

* Ibid., §29. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 25 

According to the writers mentioned so far, retention is, if 
not exclusively, at least for the most part, a function of the 
soul. There may exist between their philosophical systems the 
widest differences; even on the present question some speak of 
the persistence of the ideas themselves, others of the persistence 
of traces, others even of mere native faculties. But they all 
agree in placing those ideas, traces, faculties, in the soul itself. 
Physiology throws no light on the problem, for the organism 
can have no direct part in the retention of what has been a 
conscious process. 

But the opinion which bases its explanation on the organism 
has found defenders no less numerous and no less able than the 
other. We must now speak of the physiological theories, i. e., 
of those for which the body is, not the only factor perhaps, but 
certainly the more important factor in retention and reproduc- 
tion of conscious processes. 

2. Retention Attributed to the Organism. 

Aristotle and Scholastics. 

Plato observing that all the objects which we perceive around 
us are concrete, individual, changing, imperfect and at the same 
time that there are in us ideas of the abstract, universal, immu- 
table, infinite, saw no other means to explain the presence of 
ideas In us than by saying that they are innate. That knowl- 
edge which it is impossible for the soul to acquire now is pos- 
sessed by the soul when it comes into the world. Such knowl- 
edge was acquired in a better state and condition In which the 
soul has been, In a suprasensuous, heavenly world, ' eV ovpaviw 
TOTTO),' and is now preserved in a latent state, until it is aroused 
to consciousness by sensuous perception. 

This did not meet with the approval of Plato's disciple, 
Aristotle. Experience does not reveal to us any Innate Ideas; 
they must be rejected. All the knowledge which man possesses 
he acquires little by little, step by step ; even the highest and 
most abstract notions are acquired by the mind In the present 
life. We shall try to analyze Aristotle's views as far as It Is 
necessary for our present purpose. But as we also have to 



26 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

speak of the medieval philosophers, it seems better not to sepa- 
rate them from their master, Aristotle. Their philosophy was 
essentially based on Aristotle's doctrine; he was 'the philoso- 
pher,' and his authority alone was an argument. Although 
they added to Aristotle's philosophy, modified it, adapted it 
to their purpose, yet the main lines are the same. Hence we 
shall speak here of Aristotle and the scholastics, or rather of 
Aristotle and St. Thomas, for to mention all the medieval 
philosophers would be too long and tedious, and would be 
useless. No one will question the fact that St. Thomas was 
of all the greatest, and that he is the best and most widely 
accepted representative of all. Moreover we must notice that 
on the essential points of our problem they were all agreed, 
however great their differences of opinions may have been on 
other questions. 

(a) General Theory of Knowledge. 

Man comes into existence without any knowledge, but only 
with the power to acquire it. How does he acquire knowl- 
edge? As our act of perception is in us and remains in us, it 
follows that the known object must in some manner be in our- 
selves, must come in contact with our cognitive faculty, must 
be in a certain manner present within the knowing subject: 
' Cognitio contingit secundum quod cognitum est in cognos- 
cente,' 'Omnis cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in 
cognoscente.'^ For vision and perception, both sensitive and 
intellectual, two conditions are required: the power to see, and 
the union of the object with that power. For vision (?'. e., per- 
ception in general) takes place only when the thing seen is in 
some manner in the seeing subject: 'Non fit visio in actu nisi 
per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est in vidente.'^ 

What is meant by this 'quodammodo'? The thing itself 
does not enter the mind, but only some form of it; not as the 
eiBmXa of Democritus, or the airoppoai of Empedocles, but as 
a 'species intentionalis.' "The stone itself does not enter the 
soul, but only its form."^ The faculty is of itself indetermined 

' St. Thomas, Contra Gentes, Lib. II., cc. 77 and 98. 
'Sumrna theologica, P. I., quaest. 12, art. 2. 
'2Arist., De anima, III., 8, 431b, 29. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 27 

to perceive several objects, and must be determined by some 
specific form or 'species.' The species is to some extent sim- 
ilar to the object from whose activity it proceeds; not indeed as 
a material copy or a physical miniature of it, but it is ideal, 
mental, intentional. In itself, as a reality, it is like the potentia 
in which it is received and which it modifies: 'quidquid recip- 
itur, per modum recipientis recipitur.' But as a medium of 
knowledge, it is like the object which it determines the faculty 
to know.^ The species is nothing but the stimulation of the 
faculty by the object, expressed in more metaphysical terms. 
The species which determines the faculty and gives it its 'actus' 
was called 'species impressa.' When the act of perception 
itself is performed the idea or representation which is formed 
was called 'species expressa.' It is important to notice that 
the species is not what we know, but only a necessary con- 
dition; we know the objects themselves immediately, once the 
cognitive faculty has received from their action the necessary 
determination.^ 

The difference between cognitive and non-cognitive beings 
consists precisely in this, that the latter have only their own 
'form,' while the former can receive in themselves the 'forms' 
or 'species' of other beings.* And Aristotle tells us that plants 
do not have sensation because they have no principle capable of 
receiving the sensible forms. ^ 

' " Similitudo aliquorura duorum ad invicem potest dupliciter attend!. Uno 
modo secundum convenientiara in ipsa natura, et talis similitudo non requiritur 
inter cognoscens et cognitura. . . . Alio modo quantum ad reprssentationem, et 
haec similitudo requiritur cognoscentis ad cognitum." Quccst. disp. De verit. 
quaest. 2, art. 3, ad 9. 

" Forma lapidis in anima est longe alterius naturae quara forma lapidis in 
materia; sed in quantum repraesentat eam, sic est principium ducens in cogni- 
tionem eius." Ibid., quaest. S, art. 11, ad 3. 

^Cf. Summa tlieoL, P. I., q. I2, a. 9 ; q. 14, a. 5 ; q. 85, a. 2. Qq. disp. De 
spiritual, creaturis, art. 9, ad 6, and De verii., q. 10, art. 8, ad 3, etc. We will 
explain in the last chapter what the scholastics meant by faculties. 

' " Cognoscentia a non cognoscentibus in hoc distinguuntur quia non cognos- 
centia nihil habent nisi formam suam tantum, sed cognoscens natum est habere 
formam etiam rei alterius, nam species cogniti est in cognoscente." Summa tlieoL, 
P. I., q. 14, a. I. 

* De anima, II., ch. 12, 424a, 32 ff. 



20 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

(b) Two Kinds of Knowledge. 

The general theory of knowledge which we have just de- 
scribed applies to both intellectual and sensitive perception. 
But the process and mode of action in both cases is different, 
since the intellect is essentially inorganic, while sensation is 
essentially organic. The essence of a being which can think 
(intellectual knowledge) is different from the essence of one 
which is only sensitive, since 'the nature of sensation is differ- 
ent from that of thought." 

Sensation is a change, a movement in the sense organ which 
derives its sensitive power from the soul which is united to it. ^ 
The 'species' which determines the organ is not an efflux from 
the thing itself, for the organ receives 'the forms without the 
matter, as wax receives the impression of the ring without the 
iron or the gold.'' Hence the 'species sensibilis' is sometimes 
called by St. Thomas 'spiritualis' to indicate that its nature is 
different from that of the material object itself, and that it is 
received not simply in matter but in the 'animated body,' the 
soul being the principle of all sensitiveness. It is also some- 
times called 'materialis' to show that it is not received in the 
soul alone, but also in the material organ. In a word, to-day 
we should call it psycho-physical.* 

The intellectual faculties on the contrary are spiritual in 
themselves, yet depend extrinsically on the organism for the 
exercise of their functions. From sensible images the attentive 
activity of the intellect (intellectus agens, ww ttoit^tiko';), by a 
process of 'abstraction, illumination,' forms the 'species intelli- 
gibilis' which determines the mind itself (intellectus possibilis, 
mC? TradijTiKoi), to form abstract, universal, spiritual concepts. 

' Aristotle, De anima, II., c. 2, 413b, 30. 
2 Op. cit., II., ch. 5, 416b, 33. 

^ ** Kado'Xov 6e Tztpi Trdaijf^ aladf/aeu^ ^el "^a^dv on jj ^kv aladr/ai^ ken to deKTtKOV rUtv 
aioB/jTuv e'lduv av€v r^c vIt/c oiov njjpbt: rov duKTvXiov avev rov aidrfpov Kat rov ^pi'ffov 6e- 
X^Tai TO OTjfieioVj 7jin^avtL 6e to ^^pi'croia' ij to xf^^-i^ovv a?j/^€iov a?.V ovx ^ XP^'^^^ ^ x^^*^^^-^^ 
Op. cit., II., 12, 424a, 17. 

* Cf. Summa th., P. I., q. 78, a. 3 ; Qq. disp. De <verit., q. 2, a. 5, ad 2. Com- 
ment, de anima, lect. 12. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 29 

(c) Retention. 

The species which has determined the facuky, either sensitive 
or intellectual, to its operation, does not entirely disappear after 
the act of perception. It remains as a state (habitus), or 
permanent 'disposition' of the organ of sensation, or of the 
spiritual intellective faculty.^ Aristotle speaks of movements, 
of residua left in the sense organs, which are the condition of 
memory : ' Sensations come to the soul from without, but memory 
comes from the soul which goes back to the movements and the 
impressions left in the sense organs.'^ This impression is com- 
pared by Aristotle to a kind of picture left by the sensation in 
both the soul and the body, the possession of which we call 
memory. "The movement which takes place in sensation, im- 
prints a kind of character (tijtto?) of the sensation in the same 
way as do those who make an imprint with their signet rings." 
Hence the difference of memory in various individuals. Some, 
being too much agitated or in a passion, keep no impression, 
as though the seal were applied to flowing water. Others do 
not preserve any image because of the hardness of the part 
which must receive the Impression, or because on the contrary 
It is too moist and too soft. Recognition is explained because 
the soul considers the Image, not as it is In itself, but as repre- 
senting something else, and being a copy of an object. In the 
same manner, we can consider the picture of an animal either 
as something absolute or as something relative, a representation, 
an image of something else.^ 

The scholastics also teach that the ' phantasma ' Is a ' hab- 
itus,' a disposition, a modification of the sense organs. " Phan- 
tasmata sunt simllitudines indivlduorum, et existunt In organis 
corporeis." (The word ' simllltudo ' must be understood as 
' intentlonalis,' in the same manner as for the species.) Those 

' " Potentia sensitiva per similitudines sensibilium reducitur in actum dupli- 
citer. Uno modo incomplete per modiira dispositionis, quando scilicet species 
sensibiles sunt in ea ut dispositiones. . . . Alio modo perfecte, quando scilicet 
species sensibiles actu informant potentiam sensitivam. . . . Et similiter in intel- 
lectu. . . ." Quodlibeta, 7, art. 2. 

^De anima, I., 4, 408b, 17. 

'Arist., De memoria et reminisccniia, I., 450 a. b. 



3° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

residua of sensation do not belong to the soul alone, but to the 
soul-and-body, to the ' coniunctum." Memory is the ' treasure 
of intentional species.'^ 

Not only are the ' species sensibiles ' preserved in the organ- 
ism, but the ' species intelligibiles ' are also preserved in the 
intellect, and enable us to remember our intellectual concepts.^ 

St. Thomas shows against Avicenna that it is possible for the 
intellect to preserve the ' species.' Indeed if it is possible for 
the body to preserve impressions, why should it not be pos- 
sible for the soul? St. Thomas knew of the metabolism of 
the organism, of its continually undergoing change. Its mate- 
rials are gradually renewed, ' paulatim consumitur et restau- 
ratur ' ; the parts which compose it come and go, ' fluunt et 
refluunt '; they are decomposed under the influence of heat and 
replaced by others, ' materia partium et resolvitur per actionem 
caloris naturalis, et de novo adgeneratur per alimentum.' * 
This being the case, if nevertheless we admit that the impres- 
sions remain in the senses, a fortiori it is possible for the intellect 
which belongs to the spiritual substance of the soul, and whose 
nature is not subject to such changes, to preserve the ' species 
intelligibiles.' 

Consequently the species can be in the intellect : ( i ) 'In po- 
tentia tantum,' i. e., when one has the faculty of intelligence, 
but does not exercise it. (2) 'In actu perfecto ' when they 
actually determine the intellect to an act of perception. (3) 
' Medio modo ' or ' in habitu,' when after its operation, the 
intellect retains in itself the species, to use them when it 
chooses.'^ It must be noticed, however, that the intellect de- 
pends on the senses and on the conditions of the organism, not 

' Comment, in Arist., De mem. et rem., lect. 3. 
^Summa th., P. I., q. 78, a. 4. 

' ** Kal £1' 6y 01 ?.iyot^Teg rfjv tpvxvv tlvai t6ttov e'ldijv ttT^t/v arc ovre b7.7] aW i} vorjrtKij 
oItc ivTeT^fxeia iiXXa dwa/ici ra elS?i." Arist., De anima. III., ch. 4, 429a, 27. 

* Summa th., P. I., q. 119, a. i, ad 2 ; Contra gent., IV., c. 81, ad 4. 

^ " Intellectus enim est magis stabilis naturje et immobilis quam materia cor- 
poralis. Si ergo materia corporalis formas quas recipit non solum tenet dum per 
eas agit in actu, sed etiam postquam per eas agere cessaverit, raulto fortius intel- 
lectus immobiliter et inamissibiliter recipit species intelligibiles." Summa th., 
P. I., q. 79, a. 6; cf. Cont. gent., II., 74; De <veril., q. 10, a. 2 and q. 19, a. i. 

' Cf. Qg. disp. De anima, a. 15, ad 17; Summa th., P. I., q. 79, a. 6, ad 3. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 3^ 

only to acquire knowledge, but even to recall it; so that the 
exercise even of intellectual memory supposes some sense per- 
ception or image. This is the clear teaching of Aristotle and 
St. Thomas, as we shall explain more in detail later on (ch. V., 
p. 155 ff.), and for this reason their theory is principally 
physiological. 

From the preceding remarks we can understand what science 
or knowledge is. A man does not have actually present in con- 
sciousness all that he is said to know ; he knows that which has 
been formerly present to his consciousness, and which he can 
now recall. It is an ' habitual ' state. " Non potest intellectus 
simul multa acta intelligere, potest tamen simul hahitii multa 
scire." ' And this power of preserving our knowledge is what 
we call memory.^ 

{d) Habit and Disposition. 

We have seen that the species were said to remain in the 
faculties as habits or dispositions. Aristotle defines memory 
as the habit {i. e., the possession) of knowledge.^ Habit and 
disposition differ only in degree, the former being more lasting 
and firm, the latter being more easily removed and changed. 
So science and virtue (justice, temperance, etc.) are habits; 
heat, cold, health, sickness, are dispositions. All habit is also 
a disposition, but not all dispositions are habits.^ 

In the same manner St. Thomas holds that habits and dis- 
positions are not two distinct kinds, but that a disposition can 
be strengthened and become a habit.^ Habit has different 
meanings; it may be a state, a condition of body or of soul, a 
permanent modification in the constitution of the being itself; 
or it may be the 'habitus operativus' which inclines to a certain 

^ Summa th., la 2ae, q. 54, a. i, ad 3. 

''■ " Species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili remanent post actualem consid- 
erationem, et harum ordinatio est habitus scientia; . . .; et base vis qua mens nostra 
retinere potest species intelligibiles post actualem considerationem, memoria dici- 
tur." (27. disp. De <verit., q. 10, a. 2. 

^ De mem. et rem., I., 449b, 24. 

' Caieg., VIII., 8b, 25 ff. 

^ Summa th., la 2ae, q. 49, a. i and a. 2, ad 3 ; q. 88, a. 4, ad 4. Qq. disp. 
De malo, q. 7, a. 2, ad 4. 



32 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

action or class of actions. The preservation of the species Is 
called a habit. Operative habit has many points of resem- 
blance with the species; like It, It Is a determination of the 
active faculty to a certain action; like It, it Is, In a way, Inter- 
mediate between the faculty and Its action.^ It has a double 
effect: it removes obstacles, and it impels directly to action.^ 
Its effects are uniformity of action, readiness to act, pleasure 
In acting.^ 

Descartes. 

For Descartes, perception, even sensitive, is the act of the 
soul alone. The means of communication between the external 
world and the soul — a spiritual substance located in the pineal 
gland — are the animal spirits, v/hich are like a pure flame, made 
of the most subtle parts of the blood rarefied by heat In the 
heart.* They are In constant motion; they bring to the soul 
external impressions, and move the body according to the soul's 
command.^ 

The animal spirits leave traces in the organism and these 
explain memory and habit, Imagination and hallucination. For 
' whatever the soul perceives by means of the nerves can also 
be represented to it by the fortuitous course of the spirits,' 
although this representation Is generally weaker than the others; 
It is like the shadow and the picture of them. Sometimes, 
however, the picture Is as vivid as the original, and we take 
our imaginations for realities." 

When the soul wants to remember. It directs the spirits 
toward the traces left by the object. '' Those traces or ' species ' 
which are necessary to memory are not, at least generally, left 
in the pineal gland itself, because they would interfere with Its 

' Summa l/t., la 2ae, q. 71, a. 3. 

2 Qg. disp. De malo, q. 4, a. 2, ad 4; Summa th., la 2ae, q. 88, a. 3. 

^ Summa th., la 2ae, q. 78, a. 2. 

* Les passions de fame, I., 10. 

^ De I'homme (ed. Cousin), Vol. IV., p. 345 ff. 

^Passions, P. I., A. 26. 

' " Lorsque I'ame veut se souvenir de quelque chose, cette volonte fait que la 
glande, se penchant successivement vers divers cotes, pousse les esprits vers divers 
endroits du cerveau, jusques a ce qu'ils rencontrent celui oil sont les traces que 
I'objet dont on veut se souvenir y a laissees." Passions, I., 42. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 33 

normal movements; they are left in the whole brain and even in 
other parts of the body, ' as the habit of a lute-player is not in 
his head only, but also partly in the muscles of his hands." 

From this passage we see that Descartes admitted a close 
relation between memory and habit, and he attributed to them 
a common origin and genesis. The whole brain is the organ 
of memory, but especially its anterior parts. And Descartes 
repeats that all nerves and muscles can be said to serve memory, 
so that, e. g., ' a lute-player has a part of his memory in his 
hands, because the ease and facility of bending and disposing 
his fingers in various ways, which he has acquired through habit, 
helps him to remember those passages for the execution of 
which he has to use them in such a manner.'" 

The traces left in the organism and especially in the brain 
are in themselves purely physical and mechanical. But they 
have a psychical result when the animal spirits, coming through 
the same pores as formerly, act on the soul in the same manner 
as before. Their nature is not clearly explained by Descartes; 
they are described as a facility in opening again, a modification, 
an enlargement of the pores or little canals through which the 
spirits have passed already; so that by being opened frequently 
they become, as we should say to-day, paths of least resistance. 
Hence ' the spirits enter those pores more easily and produce 
in the gland a special movement which represents to the soul 
the same object, and shows that the object is that which it 
wishes to recall.'^ Elsewhere Descartes compares organic 
traces to the folding of a piece of paper, which produces an 
aptitude and tendency to be folded again in the same place and 
manner. " As to the species which are preserved in memory, 
I Imagine that they are nothing else but the folds which are pre- 
served in a sheet of paper after it has been once folded."^ 

Not all vestiges are able to produce memory; for in order to 
have memory It Is not sufficient to have observed a thing in our 
mind and to have kept traces of it In the brain by means of 

' Lettres, Vol. VIII., p. 202. 

^Lettres, Vol. VIII., p. 215, 216. 

'Passions, I., 42; cf. also De I'homme. 

* Lettres, Vol. VIII., p. 201, and Vol. IX., p. 167. 



34 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

which it is recalled, but it is necessary to perceive the relation 
between the former perception and its present reproduction. One 
may be an involuntary and unconscious plagiarist.^ Only such 
vestiges produce memory as are able ' to give the soul to know 
that they have not always been in us, but that they have been 
imprinted formerly as new.' 

How then shall we know that an idea is new, or that it has 
already appeared in consciousness? When an idea appears for 
the first time the mind must make use of a 'pure conception' 
(mentem intellectione pura uti debuisse), by means of which 
it could be aware of the newness of such an idea, for 'there 
can be no bodily vestige of it.' When therefore a man has a 
new idea and is aware that it is new, ' I call this second percep- 
tion reflexion, and it must be ascribed to the understanding, 
although it is so closely united to the sensation that both take 
place at the same time and do not even appear to be distinct 
from each other.' 

In addition to the traces left in the brain and by means of 
which the soul comes to the actual memory of the things it 
has perceived through the senses, there are in the soul itself 
purely psychical dispositions, for there is an intellectual memory 
and there are purely mental habits ' which depend on the soul 
alone.' These are explained by vestiges which remain ' in 
thought itself.' Their nature is quite different from that of 
bodily traces, and cannot be explained by any examples in mate- 
rial things.^ 

Locke. 

Locke distinguishes contemplation, or the actual keeping in 
view of an idea in the mind, from memory, which is the power 

'"Requiritur ut agnoscamus, quum secunda vice occurrit, hoc ideo fieri quod 
antehac a nobis fuerit percepta: sic saepe poetis occurrunt quidam versus, quos 
non merninerunt se apud alios unquam legisse, qui tamen tales lis non occurrerent 
nisi alibi eos legissent." Lettres, Vol. X., p. 158. 

* " Pour la memoire, je crois que celle des choses materielles depend des ves- 
tiges qui demeurent dans le cerveau . . . et que celle des choses intellectuelles 
depend de quelques autres vestiges qui demeurent en la pensee meme ; mais ceux- 
ci sont d'un tout autre genre que ceux-la, et je ne les saurais expliquer par aucun 
exemple tire des choses corporelles qui n'en soit fort different." Lettres, Vol. IX., 
p. 167, Vol. VIII., p. 216. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 35 

to revive Ideas after they have disappeared and have been laid 
out of sight. Then he proposes his theory of memory as fol- 
lows: " Our ideas being nothing but actual perceptions of the 
mind, which cease to be anything when there Is no perception 
of them, this laying up of our Ideas In the repository of memory 
signifies no more than this, that the mind has a power in many 
cases to revive perceptions. . . . Our ideas are said to be In 
our memories when indeed they are actually nowhere, but only 
there is an ability In the mind when it will to revive them 
again."' 

In this passage Locke seems to imply that Ideas leave no 
trace whatever In the mind, since they ' cease to be anything,' 
and the mind Is obliged, 'as It were, to paint them anew on 
itself.' This passage led Lebniz to attribute to Locke the 
opinion according to which memory would be explained solely 
by a power or faculty (faculte nue) of the mind to revive ideas, 
without anything of these remaining In the mind. 

When, however, Locke enters into a more extensive treat- 
ment of the subject, he always implies that some trace of the 
former states has been preserved. Most of the expressions he 
uses are metaphors. He speaks of those traces as ' dormant 
pictures,'^ 'stamps settled In the mind,'^ 'Ideas laid up In 
store," ' printed ' In the mind, ' roused and tumbled out of 
their dark cells Into open daylight.'" " Our minds represent to 
us those tombs to which we are approaching, where, though the 
brass and marble remain, yet the Inscriptions are effaced by 
time and the imagery moulders away."'^ 

These and other similar comparisons show clearly that Locke 
tried to account for the exercise of the ' power ' and ' ability ' 
which belongs to the mind. Other passages suggest even more 
strongly that something is needed besides the mental faculty. 
When we forget ' ideas in the mind quickly fade, and often 

^ Essay Concerning Human Understanding, B. II., ch. X., §2. 

^Ibid., §7. 

»§4- 

*§8. 

'§4. etc. 



3^ CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

vanish quite out of the understanding, leaving no . . . foot- 
steps or remaining characters of themselves,'^ ' without the least 
glimpse remaining of them.'" 

Whether such a complete disappearance ever occurs could be 
questioned (Leibniz Insists that it is impossible, and modern 
psychologists hold the same view), but the point which is made 
clear is that Locke admits some ' footstep, glimpse, remaining 
character ' of an idea which after its disappearance can be 
recalled to consciousness. 

If nothing remained, how could Locke admit that sometimes 
the mind may be merely passive in the reproduction of ideas? 
This is implied when he asserts that, with regard to the revival 
of "the ideas that are lodged in the memory, the mind is often- 
times more than barely passive; the appearance of those dor- 
mant pictures depending sometimes on the will. The mind 
very often sets itself on work, in search of some hidden idea, 
and turns, as it were, the eye of the soul upon it; though some- 
times, too, they start up in our minds of their own accord, and 
offer themselves to the understanding." ^ According to this 
statement our ideas may be voluntarily and intentionally re- 
called, and this explains the principle above quoted that to 
have an idea in the mind is to have the ability to revive it. But 
if ideas can ' start up in our minds of their own accord and 
offer themselves to the understanding,' the mind itself being 
merely passive, how can we say that nothing of them had re- 
mained? We have been told that memory is the power of the 
mind ' to paint ideas anew on itself ' ; must we say now that 
ideas which have totally disappeared paint themselves anew 
on the mind, and that ideas which are absolutely nothing now 
offer themselves to the mind ? 

Locke is not guilty of such contradictions. In our opinion, 
the first passage which we quoted from Locke was misinter- 
preted by Leibniz and by the historians of philosophy who have 
understood it as did Leibniz. They take It by itself and apart 
from the explanations which follow It. Against Locke, Leibniz 

'§4- 

'§7. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS.- 37 

asserts the persistence of some residua, dispositions of the mind 
or unconscious perceptions. These, however, were never re- 
jected by Locke; if he does not admit unconscious perceptions, 
he certainly admits traces and vestiges of past perceptions. He 
simply asserts that the idea which is not present to consciousness 
is actually nowhere. 

He goes further; although in the present chapter' he does 
not pass any judgment on the Cartesian theory, namely, ' how 
much the constitution of our bodies and the make of our animal 
spirits are concerned in this,' yet in another place, ^ he admits 
the theory as more probable. "Habits of thinking in the 
understanding, as well as of determining in the will, and of 
motions in the body . . . seem to be but trains of motions in 
the animal spirits, which, once set agoing, continue in the same 
steps they have been used to, which, by often treading, are 
worn into a smooth path, and the motion in it becomes easy." ^ 

If we are not justified in concluding that Locke certainly 
admitted a physiological explanation of memory and mental 
habit, still less should we be justified in attributing to him the 
other childish theory, which explains memory by a mere word, 
reduces it to a faculty without any object on which it can exer- 
cise its activity, and without anything to connect the past with 
the present conscious state. It was really too easy for Leibniz 
to show the weakness of this supposed theory, and he cannot 
claim much merit for having refuted and ridiculed it. 

Malebranche. 
Malebranche's doctrine of memory and habit is for the most 
part the same as that of Descartes, with the difference, however, 
that as no creatures can be true causes, so there is no action of 
the body upon the soul, or of the soul upon the body. Memory 
is explained by traces left in the brain. " To explain memory, 
it is sufficient to understand this truth that all our perceptions 
are linked with changes that take place in the fibers, in that part 

'§5. 

^B. II., ch. XXXIII., §6. 

'The question considered in this passage is not memorj', but habit, both 
organic and mental, so that probably it applies also to memory. 



SS . CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

of the brain where the soul is particularly located; if we suppose 
such a principle, we at once explain memory (parce que, ce seul 
principe suppose, la nature de la memoire est expliquee) ."^ 

"As soon as the soul acquires new ideas, new traces are im- 
pressed upon the brain, and as soon as the object produces new 
traces, the soul perceives new ideas." But this must be ex- 
plained on the general theory of occasionalism. The soul has 
no knowledge whatever of the existence of the brain-vestiges; 
nor do these vestiges contain the ideas, with which they have no 
relation ; nor finally does the soul receive its ideas from organic 
impressions, since it is not conceivable that the spirit receives 
anything from the body. When therefore the soul wants to 
move the arm, the arm is moved, although the soul does not 
even know what is necessary for that motion. In the same 
way when the animal spirits are disturbed and agitated, the 
soul feels an emotion, and yet it is not even aware of the exist- 
ence of the animal spirits in the body.' 

We cannot present here the interesting views of Malebranche 
on the connection or correlation (liaison) of the traces in the 
brain with the ideas in the mind, or of the traces among them- 
selves.-'' We must note that the main cause why traces (and 
consequently corresponding ideas) are associated together, is 
that they have been impressed upon the brain at the same time. 
(This is still to-day one of the laws of association.) "The 
animal spirits, finding the path of all simultaneously produced 
traces open, proceed along them, because they can pass there 
more easily than in other parts of the brain; this is the cause 
of memory and of bodily habits." ^ The vividness of the images 
depends on the distinctness and on the size of the traces in the 
brain, ^ and therefore also on the qualities of the brain which 
are different at different ages of life.'^ 

With regard to the nature of those traces, Malebranche says 

' De la recherche de la -verite, L. II., P. I., ch. V., §111. 

'Loc. ciU, §1. 

»Cf. loc. cit., §1. and §11. 

*Loc. cit., §11. 

^Op. cit, L. II., P. I., ch. I., §111. 

'Loc. cit., ch. VI. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 39 

that they consist in the facility which the brain fibers retain 
of receiving again the same modifications that have been 
formerly impressed by the course of the animal spirits, as the 
branches of a tree, when they have been for some time bent in a 
certain way, take the same shape again more easily. Further 
explanations Malebranche declines to give, and alleges the rea- 
son — which seems to be an undisguised avowal of his inability 
to do so — that ' it is better for each one to explain it to himself 
by some mental effort; because the things which one finds in 
that manner are always more agreeable and strike us more 
vividly than those which we learn from others.' 

Finally, in the same chapter,^ Malebranche gives his theory 
of habits, which, as we have noticed above, is essentially the 
same as his theory of memory. The spirits do not always find 
the paths which they have to go through wide open and free 
from obstruction ; hence one may experience some difficulty in 
moving one's fingers to play some musical instrument, or the 
muscles which are used in pronouncing foreign v/ords. But 
little by little, by repeatedly passing through the same paths, the 
spirits open them and lessen the resistance. In consequence, 
' it Is clear that in some manner memory can be said to be a 
kind of habit,' so that ' if there were no perception correlated 
to the course of the animal spirits and to those traces, there 
would be no difference between memory and the other habits.' ^ 

Condillac. 
Condillac insists on Locke's principle that ideas, being modi- 
fications of the soul, cease to exist as soon as they cease to 
modify the soul, i. e., as soon as they are out of consciousness. * 
" I have frequently heard questions like the following: What 
becomes of the ideas with which the mind is no longer occupied? 
Where are they preserved? Wherefrom do they come when 
they are represented to us anew? During these long intervals 

^Loc. cit., ch. v., §111. 

'There are also spiritual habits which Malebranche admits for religious 
motives. Cf. e. g., Morale, P. I., ch. II., III., VIII., etc. 
* Logique, P. I., ch. IX. 



4° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

of time when we do not think of them, where do they exist? In 
the soul? In the body?" But such questions and the answers 
which they sometimes receive from metaphysicians have no 
reasonable meaning. One must not imagine that ideas are like 
things which we keep in store, and that memory is an immense 
warehouse. It would be just as reasonable to inquire about 
the various successive shapes of some material substance and 
ask, "where is the sphericity of this body when it assumes 
another shape? Where is it preserved? And when the body 
becomes round again wherefrom does this shape come back to 
it?" Ideas are like sensations, states (manieres d'etre) of the 
soul; ' they exist as long as they modify the soul, and exist no 
longer as soon as they cease to modify it.' And indeed where 
would they be? In the mind? They have disappeared from 
consciousness and from the mind. In the body? They have 
never been there. Where are they? Nowhere; but they will 
reappear as soon as the movement with which they are corre- 
lated is reproduced. The case of the ideas which are out of 
consciousness is similar to that of a piano or a harpsichord 
which has stopped sounding. Where are its sounds ? Nowhere 
certainly; but let the fingers strike the same keys, and the same 
sound will be reproduced. This comparison of the harpsichord 
is kept up all through this ninth chapter to explain sensation 
and memory. 

The causes of retention and reproduction of ideas are the 
traces left in the organism, especially in the brain. " The mul- 
titude of our ideas supposes in the brain such a large number 
and variety of movements that it is not always possible for them 
to be reproduced with the same ease and exactness." 

In another place, ^ sensation is said to occur ' when a move- 
ment takes place in one of the organs and is transmitted to the 
brain ' ; illusion, ' when the movement begins in the brain and 
is propagated to the sense organ ' ; and finally, memory, ' when 
the movement begins and ends in the brain . . . and because 
the movement which is the physical and occasional cause of it, 
is reproduced in the brain.' 

These traces are represented as habits and ' facilities of cer- 

' Traite des sensations, P. I., ch. II., 38. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 4^ 

tain parts of the brain for moving themselves ' — ' On a des 
idees dans la memoire comme on a dans les doigts des pieces da 
clavecin.' But they exist also in other parts of the body, for 
they must be found wherever we find the ' occasional causes ' 
of the ideas which we remember, and thus e. g., ' the memory 
of a tune which one plays has its seat in the fingers, in the ears 
and in the brain.' In what those traces consist we do not 
know. Some have conceived the nerves as strings under ten- 
sion, capable of vibrating; but this is pure imagination. Nor 
can the Cartesian theory suffice. " They have failed to notice 
that if the brain-substance is soft enough to receive traces, it 
will not be firm enough to retain them. And they have not 
considered how impossible it is for an infinite number of traces 
to persist in a substance in which there is an uninterrupted action 
and circulation." We have to acknowledge the fact that habits 
are left in the brain, without being able to explain it. We can- 
not even understand how our sensations of sound and light are 
produced, since, to that effect, it would be necessary to know 
the essence of the soul, the mechanism of the eye, of the ear, 
of the brain, the nature of the rays which strike the retina, and 
of the air which strikes the drum of the ear. How then can 
we account for memory? How can we hope to explain habits 
In the brain, when we cannot even explain the habits of our 
fingers? " We must be satisfied with knowing that the same 
mechanism, whatever it may be, causes, preserves and repro- 
duces the ideas.'" 

We cannot here show the development of cerebral traces. 
As the brain became better known, the nature of the impres- 
sions which it receives and preserves, was described more accu- 
rately. In the eighteenth century Hartley and Bonnet espe- 
cially contributed to the rapid growth of physiological science. 
Nor shall we speak of the materialistic theories of the French 
philosophers, authors of the Encyclopedie. They explain not 
only memory, but also the whole psychical life as a mere product 
of the organism." 

' Logique, I. clt. 

^An account of them can be found, e. g., in Burnham, 'On Memory,' Amer. 
Journal of Psychol., 1889, p. 72 ff. Also J. Soury, he systeme nerveu.x central, 
Paris, 1809. 



42 charles a. dubray. 

Summary. 
Summing up now in a few points the results of our investiga- 
tion, we can reduce the theories proposed in the past to explain 
retention and reproduction, to the following: 

1. Some philosophers seem to have been discouraged by the 
difficulty. After stating the facts, they declare that an explana- 
tion is impossible. Memory is a native faculty of the mind, 
and no reason for it can be given. 

2. When an attempt is made towards an explanation, we fre- 
quently are offered metaphors instead of a theory. It seems 
as though the writers could not express their thought otherwise 
than by figures and comparisons. 

3. A more positi\e and more direct answer is for the most 
part expressed in terms of metaphysics. This was, it is true, 
the tendency of the age, but it cannot be doubted that the 
absence of more concrete notions and laws is also responsible 
for the use of this language. 

4. We find also a physiological theory, which offers some- 
thing easily understood, but it is on the whole very vague, not 
only as an explanation of psychical facts, but even in its physi- 
ological aspect; hence the frequent use of metaphors. 

Let us now turn to recent theories and see whether some 
more satisfactory hypothesis will be found, whether anything 
new has been devised, or whet.her the ancient philosophers knew 
all that it is possible to know on the present question. 



CHAPTER III. Modern Theories. 
Introductory. 

Division of Chapter. 

When we try to solve the problems of memory, imagination, 
association and habit, the fundamental question that confronts 
us is this: What is that 'something' which remains after an 
action has been performed, and enables it to exercise an influence 
over subsequent actions? In our physical, physiological, sen- 
sitive, intellectual, moral life, our actions do not stand by them- 
selves as independent units; each of them is conditioned by 
those that have preceded it. A process that takes place to-day 
will be repeated more easily to-morrow; an idea which comes to 
consciousness and soon disappears may come back after days, 
weeks, years of absence from consciousness. What is the per- 
manent link which unites two transitory actions or states of 
mind? 

As we have noticed already, the question of interest to us 
now is not that of merely organic habit, but that of the revival 
and facilitation of conscious processes. Our ideas are pre- 
served, not indeed as though they were laid by and stored up 
as the miser's treasure, but rather ' as a circulating capital, 
which now appears, now disappears, but never ceases to be of 
use.'^ In the Interval which elapses between the occurrence 
and the return of an idea to consciousness, when, although 
unconscious. It nevertheless exercises some activity, determines. 
Influences, modifies new processes, what has become of the Idea 
itself? It, or at least something of it remains; but what is the 
nature of that Inalienable capital? 

Several answers are suggested. ( i ) The idea itself may be 
preserved, but only in a subconscious state, ready however to 
make its reappearance in consciousness under favorable circum- 

' E. Chartier, ' Sur la memoire,' Revue de metaphyslque et de morale, VII., 
1899, p. 302. 

43 



44 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Stances. (2) To this view is commonly opposed what has 
been called the theory of traces or dispositions, according to 
which an idea, once it has left consciousness, ceases completely 
to exist as an idea, but leaves some persistent effect, a trace, a 
disposition, which makes its return possible. This theory again 
is proposed in different ways. («) The idea may leave in the 
mind itself a permanent modification of a purely mental char- 
acter, (b) As all conscious process is accompanied by an 
organic process, we may conceive of the connecting link between 
two ideas as being partly physiological and partly psychical. 
(c) Finally we may attribute memory to the organism alone, 
and explain it by merely physiological traces. Organic traces 
themselves, in this last and in the preceding theory, may be 
explained as persistent movements, fixed impressions, or perma- 
nent dispositions. These are the different views which we have 
now to present. 

Theory of Subconsciousness. 
The theory of the persistence of the ideas in subconsciousness 
is advocated by J. Ward.^ There are three degrees of mental 
states: (i) A center or focus of consciousness; (2) a wider 
field, any part of which may at once become the focus; (3) 
subconsciousness, in which ' presentations have not the power to 
divert attention, nor can we voluntarily concentrate attention 
upon them ' before they cross the threshold of consciousness. 
This threshold of consciousness ' must be compared to the sur- 
face of a laiie, and subconsciousness to the depths beneath it, 
and all the current terminology of presentations rising and sink- 
ing implies this or some similar figure. ' We have seen that 
St. Augustine uses many comparisons and metaphors similar to 
this when he speaks of the knowledge preserved in the hidden 
recesses of the mind, till it comes to the front and places itself 
in greater evidence before the soul.'* 

' Art. ' Psychology ' in Encyclopedia Brilannica. 

' " Admonemur esse nobis in abdito mentis quarumdara rerum quasdam noti- 
tias, et tunc qnodammodo procedere in medium, atque in conspectu mentis velut 
apertius constitui quando cogitantur." De Trinitate, L. XIV., c. VII. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 45 

Subconscious presentations are too weak ; they lack the inten- 
sity necessary to change the distribution of attention in an appre- 
ciable degree and to make them definite features. Yet ' they 
may tell on conscious life as sunshine or mist tells on a land- 
scape, or the underlying writing on a palimpsest." It is not 
assumed, however, that all presentations are imperishable; hence 
we must admit a distinction between obliviscence, from which 
an idea may spring again to consciousness, and complete obliv- 
ion into which many ideas lapse, and from which there is no 
recall. Memory therefore is simply the moving forward of 
presentations which had been kept in the background or below 
the threshold; it is the emerging to the surface of ideas which 
had sunk into the depths of the lake of consciousness. 

Similar views are held by A. Fouillee,^ who applies to the 
theory of functional dispositions, the same criticism as Ward. 
All structural dispositions of molecules in the nervous elements 
are ' constant systems of motion ' ; and on the mental side also 
there is constant activity, unbroken exercise of functions. But 
these functions may be exercised in consciousness without suffi- 
cient intensity to become distinct. " We are thus brought back 
to the hypothesis of an infinite number of degrees of conscious- 
ness, which, when they are too weak, are only subconscious. 
They produce a result in consciousness taken as a whole, and 
are its elements separately indiscriminated." 

This is the same theory which, at least in its essential fea- 
tures, had been upheld by Herbart, and before him by Leibniz 
in his famous distinction between perception and apperception. 
Hence we might say with a French writer whom we have 
already quoted,^ that we can think of some object without being 
aware of it; for " if we are justified in affirming that the archi- 
tect does not always actually build, as, for Instance, when he Is 
lying in bed and asleep, or when he Is eating, we cannot say that 
the geometrician is not actually a geometrician (n'est pas 
geometre en acte) even when he is sleeping or eating; for 

' P. 48. 

' VEvolutioniiisme des idees-forces, p. 65. 

' E. Chartier, ' Sur la mcmoire,' Revue de metaphysique et de morale, VII., 
p. 30. 



4^ CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

thought does not necessarily manifest itself by visible and tan- 
gible actions, as is the case with the act of building. And as 
it is possible that the architect may build without thinking of it, 
if he happens to move his compasses whilst thinking of some- 
thing else, so it is possible for the geometrician to be actually a 
geometrician without thinking of it, or more exactly, without 
being aware that he is thinking of it." Galileo, after his dis- 
covery, was at all times the man who held that the earth 
revolved around the sun. When the trend of his ideas did not 
" make him aware that he was thinking of it, he was thinking 
of it in the same manner as he breathed or walked, or as the 
sailor keeps his balance on his legs (tant qu'il n' etait pas amene 
par d'autres pensees qui impliquaient visiblement celle-la, a 
penser qu'il y pensait, il y pensait comme il respirait, comme il 
marchait, et comme le marin se balance sur ses jambes) ." 
There is in us a current of actual thought, subconscious, con- 
stantly present, constantly active; there is an actual, yet uncon- 
scious, or unthought of, thought. 

Theory of Dispositions in General. 
Reasons for the Existence of Dispositions. 

Most psychologists reject the preceding theory, according to 
which, ideas would be stored up in the mind, and would lie 
dormant below the threshold of consciousness. "If the image 
has left consciousness, it has left the mind, as far as we know."^ 
An unconscious idea or presentation seems to be a contradiction, 
since the only way according to which we can take cognizance of 
a presentation is through the consciousness of it. That an idea 
may be preserved without clear and distinct consciousness, not 
in the focus, but still within the field of consciousness, all admit. 
But as soon as it disappears below the surface, as soon as it is 
no longer visible, then we have no right to call it an idea or a 
presentation. It is a trace, a disposition, which makes it pos- 
sible to reproduce the idea. Breathing, walking, are uncon- 
scious actions, but we can, if we choose, become aware of them. 
The geometrician, on the contrary, if he reflects on himself, 

'Baldwin, Handbook of Psychology, I., 153. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 47 

will frequently find that he is not thinking at all about 
geometry. So also it is true that Galileo was at all times 
the same man who had affirmed on many occasions and was 
ready to affirm again the earth's motion; but must we say 
that he was always thinking of it, in the same manner as he 
was always breathing? The true statement is that he was in 
the 'disposition' to think of it, but so far as we know, had no 
actual thought of it. " To have an idea in memory means that 
from former presentations we have acquired the disposition to 
revive similar presentations in imagination (durch vorausge- 
gangene Vorstellungen yfj J^' J-^" ... die Fahigkeit oder 
Disposition DA erworben haben, inhaltsahnliche Phantasievor- 
stellungen Jo A^,' A J' zu erleben)."^ We cannot conceive of 
an idea sinking into subconsciousness as we think of a stone sink- 
ing below the surface of the water in a lake ; the idea is a process, 
a function, not a substance. Even if we admit that a disposi- 
tion can be only 'a fainter discharge of function' (Ward), 
when the function, whether on the mental or on the organic 
side, is discharged too faintly to arouse consciousness by draw- 
ing the attention to itself, too faintly even to be capable of 
being perceived under the influence of voluntary attention, then 
it no longer deserves the name of idea or presentation. It is 
a trace, a disposition, a link between two ideas, of which one has 
entirely disappeared as idea and the other has not yet appeared. 
To call it presentation has no plausible meaning.- 

We come therefore to a more common view which has justly 
been called the theory of ' dispositions.' In order to have a 
clearer understanding of it, let us first consider what the word 
disposition itself signifies. 

The JVord ''Disposition.' 

The word disposition has more than one meaning; etymolog- 

ically it signifies a placing apart, asunder (dis-positio, Greek 

SidOea-K), and conveys the idea of a distribution of the parts of 

a whole, or of an arrangement and order of material things. 

' Hofler, Psychologte, 165. 

^Lipps, Grundtliaisaclicn des Seelenlebens, p. 77. Cf. Stout, Analytic Psychol- 
ogy, Vol. I., p. 24 ff. 



J 



4^ CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Aristotle defines it ' the arrangement of that which has parts 
either according to place, or according to power, or according 
to form and species.'^ 

In this sense disposition supposes plurality and implies a 
classification or arrangement of several things according to some 
norm or principle, and frequently also for a given purpose. We 
speak, of the disposition of books on a shelf according to their 
size, binding, subject-matter, etc. Thus also we speak of the 
disposition of trees in an orchard, of the various parts of an 
army, of the houses in a city. In that sense St. Augustine 
makes disposition the principle of order: ' Ordo est parium dis- 
pariumque rerum sua cuique loca tribuens dispositio.'^ 

In a slightly different sense, disposition becomes a synonym 
of distribution, destination, or definite settlement. Thus we 
say that one has made the disposition of his goods, of his prop- 
erty; that he has disposed of them in favor of such or such a 
person, meaning that he has himself given them over, or, at 
least, that he has manifested his will to have them disposed of 
in that manner. The idea of will becomes more prominent 
when the word disposition is used to express a law, a command, 
and especially a divine dispensation and order. 

The natural tendency, fitness and aptitude which results from 
the very constitution and essence of a thing, and from a certain 
arrangement of its parts, or which is itself the principle of a 
certain arrangement and distribution of parts, or the source of 
activity, is also called a disposition. We can say with Newton 
that ' refrangibility of the rays of light is their disposition to 
be refracted or turned out of their way, in passing out of one 
transparent body or medium into another.' We can speak of 
the disposition of plants to grow upward, etc. Applied to man, 
disposition frequently means the natural condition of his body, 
such as health and disease; but especially his mental and moral 
aptitudes, either in general, as temper, character, abilities, or 
in a more restricted sense, as the present humor, caprice, fancy. 
Thus we speak of an amiable, irritable, happy, melancholy . . . 
disposition. We say that a man has a disposition to undertake 

^ Metaphys., IV., 19, 1022b, i. 
^De civitate Dei, XIX., 13. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 49 

a special work, to make progress in a special branch of knowl- 
edge, to enter this or that line of business; that he is of a 
friendly disposition towards his fellowmen or towards a special 
individual. We mean by this a special arrangement of the 
faculties and tendencies, a special combination of what we con- 
ceive as being the elements which make up the mind, or the 
moral and social man. This signification is found not unfre- 
quently in Greek philosophers for the word SiddeaK. 

It must also be noted that the Greek form itself is used in 
modern languages, but with a more restricted meaning. Ap- 
plied to the body, it signifies a special condition which predis- 
poses to a certain disease, and especially an hereditary or innate 
condition, which remains latent for some time, and then mani- 
fests itself by some pathological affection. One may have a 
consumptive, a gouty diathesis. Applied to the mind, it is 
restricted mostly to degeneration, and to the liability, under 
special circumstances, to become insane. 

From what precedes, we see that the word disposition is taken 
sometimes in a passive sense to express an actual state, an 
arrangement of parts; sometimes also, as referring more espe- 
cially to an activity which is yet potential, but tends to produce 
a given result, to reach a determined end. From the primitive 
signification of order and distribution has been derived the sig- 
nification of a special tendency. and activity, till finally the orig- 
inal meaning is sometimes lost sight of, and disposition becomes 
simply aptitude, tendency or habit. 

Use of the IVord Disposition in Psychology. 
When we explain the revival of past conscious states by the 
theory of dispositions, it is meant that some modification has 
been produced, that some new state has been brought about in 
the mind itself, or in the organism, whose processes are the con- 
ditions of mental processes. But it is also meant that this 
actual condition tends to a definite end, the reproduction of the 
past state. It is something potential, and we conceive it as a 
factor concurring in the production of subsequent processes; and 
the more we repeat a certain process, the deeper the modifica- 
tion becomes; hence the stronger the tendency and habit. 



5° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

This is the reason why other words sometimes used have 
been criticized and rejected as insufficient. We frequently 
speak of traces, residua, vestiges; but a trace (Spur), says 
Lipps,^ has nothing to do with the reproduction of the process 
of which It Is a trace. On the contrary, the word disposition 
indicates what we must admit here, namely the tendency to 
reproduce a past state. 

Wundt distinguishes the trace or "Spur" from the dispo- 
sition, because the disposition not only facilitates the production 
of certain processes, but is itself of a nature akin to the process 
that is to be reproduced." The eye which has seen an object 
in an intense light preserves an after-image as a result of the 
impression, and this is a 'Spur'; the eye which frequently 
compares and measures distances acquires a greater and more 
accurate power of judging spatial relations, and this Is a 
'Disposition.' 

The terms trace, residuum, ' carry a structural connotation, 
an actual marking or path-making being supposed In the brain. 
The theory of the Disposition Is coming to give a more func- 
tional interpretation to the facts, and that term is displacing 
these.'' In revival due to association, there must be some- 
thing for the actual perception to act on, 'an appropriate trace 
of past experience constituting a preparatory disposition for 
future experience.'^ 

In the following pages the word disposition will be used more 
frequently, yet other terms already mentioned may also be used 
in the same sense. 

(rt) Psychical Theories. 
Some writers propose an explanation of the facts of memory 
and mental habit, which is almost exclusively psychological. 

' Grundthaisaclien des Seelenlehens, TJ. 

'"Die 'Spur' wird von der blossen functionellen 'Disposition' als eine Art 
der Nachvvirkung unterschieden, die nicht nur die Entstehung gewisser Vor- 
gange erJeichtert, sondern selbst einen bleibenden, noch dazu mit dera zu er- 
neuernden Vorgang verwandten Zustand darstellt." Grundzuge zu der Physi- 
ologisc/ien Psycliologie, HI., 565. 

' Baldwin and Stout, in Diction, of Pliilos. and PsyclioL, s. v. Trace. 

* Stout, Manual of Psycliology, 83. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 5^ 

Not indeed that they deny the existence of organic processes 
accompanying mental processes, nor that they reject the exist- 
ence of organic dispositions left by these processes, but the 
mental series seems to be sufficient in itself, and once given a 
conscious process it can be reproduced by the mind's own 
power. The first writer of this class whom we have to con- 
sider is Lotze. 

The ' unworthy ' surrendering of the spiritual to the changes 
in the material substratum would have for its consequence the 
incoherence of the mental life. Hence Lotze does not hesitate 
to assert that ' the mind itself has the power to preserve 
acquired impressions independently of the permanence of their 
physical conditions, and to connect them together according to 
laws which need not have anything in common with the modes 
of action of nerve-forces.' Indeed the opposite view, even if 
it is possible and tenable, must be rejected, because the present 
viev/ is ' more in harmony with our mental needs.' We can 
think of memory, of association, of the course of imagination, 
as being explained ' without the cooperation of the central 
organ.' We can suppose that the activity of the brain may 
cease, and yet memory remain uninterrupted. Even if it is no 
longer possible to receive external impressions, we have no 
reason to assert that it will be a hindrance to the unlimited per- 
manence of those already acquired.^ 

However, it is not meant that representations are absolutely 
independent of the brain, for there is an interaction between 
mind and body. Although memory could be accounted for by 
the mind's power alone, yet the brain processes contribute to 
make the representations brighter, clearer and more distinct. 
But those accessory (or simultaneous) oscillations (Mitoscilla- 
tionen) of the central organ, which accompany the psychical 
train of representations, are not its cause, but rather its conse- 

' " Wir legen . . . die Annahme zu Grunde . . . dass in dem Augenblicke in 
welchem man den Einfluss der letzteren (der Centralorgane) unterbrochen 
dachte, kein Grund fiir die Unterbrechung, kein Hinderniss fiir die unbeschrankte 
Fortdauer des Erinnerungslaufes eintreten wiirde, obgleicli die Empfanglichkeit 
fiir alle aussern Eindriicke verloren ware." Medicinisc/ie Psychologic, §36, No. 
399- 



52 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

quence. " It is a kind of resonance which the activity of the 
mind calls forth in the material substratum, in order to add to 
the vividness of its representations " (No. 401 ) . 

Furthermore the theory of physiological traces is possible, 
but ' unlikely,' and ' leads to inextricable difficulties ' (No. 
411). Although there is an influence of cerebral changes on 
the train of thought, ' the assumption of a special organ of 
memory, even if it is conceived simply as a means of support 
for the soul's own power of remembrance, is exposed to greater 
difficulties than is commonly believed.' The objection taken 
from the unceasing change and renovation of the brain ele- 
ments has not yet been satisfactorily answered.^ Moreover 
if we admit that an atom of the brain can preserve countless 
impressions without confusion, why should the soul, a simple 
being also, be denied the same power? 

As to pathological cases in which loss of memory corresponds 
to a certain disease or wound in a determined part of the brain, 
Lotze sums up his explanation as follows : Consciousness has no 
need of being linked with the function of an organ so strictly 
that it must cease or become abnormal, if the organ happens to 
be diseased. But there are impressions which can alter the 
inner condition of the mind, and these can stop or alter con- 
sciousness. - 

Professor Bowne also rejects all physiological theories; not 
only recognition, but ev'en retention and reproduction are inex- 
plicable on physiological grounds. In fact, it is just as impos- 
sible to explain them on a psychical theory ; for ' this power of 
reproduction and recognition has no analogue elsewhere. All 
attempts to tell how it is possible overlook the essential features 
of the fact, while the various faculties invented for its expla- 
nation are abstractions from the fact itself.' "How the mind 
can do this, we do not pretend to know. We have to be content 

' Mikrokosmus, B. III., c. III., §5, p. 365. 

'"Nicht das Bewusstsein braucht erzeugt zu werden durch ein Organ, mit 
dessen Beschadigung es verginge; aber es kann als eine eingeborene Fahigkeit 
der Seele von unzahligen Seiten her durch Eindriicke gehemrat werden, vvelche 
den inneren Zustand der Seele ungiinstig verandern." Mikrokosmus, p. 370; 
cf. p. 368. Medicinische Psychologic, 1. c. No. 411 fif. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 53 

with knowing that it does it, although we cannot construct the 
process."^ 

Remembering is a faculty of the mind alone; and although 
strictly speaking the brain can no more be called the organ of 
memory than the organ of thought, yet such an expression can 
be used, not indeed to mean 'that the brain does the remem- 
bering and thinking for the mind, or that the mind uses the 
brain to think or remember with, but' only that thought and 
recollection are cerebrally conditioned.'^ 

Memory, as in Reid's theory, is an independent power of the 
mind, and in the mind itself; it must be conceived simply as the 
faculty to reproduce and recognize the past. Bowne seems to 
reject all theories of traces or dispositions. " Our possession 
of a knowledge of which we are not conscious means only that 
we can reproduce that knowledge upon occasion. In no other 
sense is past experience latent in us."^ Yet it is difficult to 
stop at this point without admitting the persistence of some- 
thing by which the general power and faculty of the mind is 
determined. Although the past ' is not carried in the mind 
at all,' still are we not obliged to say that it has worked a per- 
manent effect, namely, the determination and specification of 
the faculty? Different states leave different modifications, and 
it is difficult to see how one who admits the mind's power to 
reproduce the past could forbear admitting mental traces of 
past conscious states. 

Lipps'' gives an extensive treatment of the theory of dispo- 
sitions. In order that an idea q be able to recall to the mind 
an idea p, it is necessary that p should have been given once in 
the mind, and should have left there some after-effect. This 
after-effect must be conceived neither as a persistence of the 
presentation itself, nor as a trace or disposition left in the or- 
ganism.' We have seen, however, that according to Lipps, the 

' Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 87. 

'Metaphysics, p. 397. 

'Introduction to Psychological Theory, p. 87. 

* Grundthaisachen des Seelenlebens ; cf. Sach-Register. 

' " Wir konnen diese Nachwirkung als Spur der eheraaligen Vorstellung 
p bezeichnen, wenn wir dabei nicht an materielle Spuren denken, vvozu wir 
psychologisclier Weise kein Recht liaben, und niclit en eine Fortexistenz der 
Vorstellung selbst, nur in unbewusstem, gehemmtem, gebundenem, iiberhaupt 
reducirtera Zustande, was im Grunde keinen Sinn gibt." Op. cit., p. 77. 



54 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

word 'Disposition' is to be preferred to the word 'Spur.' The 
psychical disposition is in itself of a nature ' completely un- 
known ' ; it is a ' mental state,' the existence of which we can 
know only through its effects. 

Dispositions are not independent of, but they are contained 
in, one another, and they combine so as to produce a new result. 
Thus a disposition to A and a disposition to C may give also a 
disposition to B, which is contained partly in A and partly in C. 
If I have experienced a sensation of red and a sensation of 
yellow, both leave a disposition in the mind, and I can acquire 
a disposition to the color orange which is akin to both red and 
yellow, although perhaps I have never actually perceived that 
color. ^ 

All our ideas are closely related, and these relations are {a) 
of quality (as harmonic sounds, symmetry) ; {b) of quantity 
{e. g., if the intensity be increased, it makes the soul more atten- 
tive) ; (c) of order (in space and time) ; {d) of a more general 
character (as pleasure and pain). Of all relations between 
ideas, dispositions are left in the mind.- 

Dispositions are but the faculties modified in such a way that 
they no longer need for the exercise of their activity any stimu- 
lation from external objects; an inner stimulus alone is suffi- 
cient. This inner stimulus is an idea which bears a relation of 
similitude or contrast to the former idea which it recalls.^ 

A disposition has a latent potential energy of its own which 
it gives forth when it is excited. If near a piece of hot metal 
M you bring a piece of cold metal M', M will communicate a 
part of its heat to Af; but the total heat of M + M' is not 
greater than the heat which formerly was in M ; and a fortiori 
the heat in M' is not greater than that which was in M, because 
M' contributes nothing of its own to the actual sum of heat. 
If, on the contrary, you place near the red hot M an explosive 
or easily combustible substance S, S will receive some heat from 
M, but will give out far more than it has received; the amount 
will be increased, because .S will at the same time release its own 

' op. cit., pp. 77, 95, 96. 
^Op. cit., p. 85. 
'Pp. 95, 104. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 55 

latent energy. Now, to use this imperfect comparison, we 
must say that the mental process of reproduction takes place 
in this last manner, and ' we can speak of the explosive char- 
acter of reproduction.' A disposition has in itself a latent 
mental energy-of-representation which it gives out when stim- 
ulated by other representations. Hence a new reason to prefer 
the word 'Disposition' to the word 'Spur,' for 'disposition' 
implies that there is more than a mere transmission of energy. 
The disposition itself contributes somewhat to the final result.^ 

{b) Psychophysical Theories. 

The close relation which exists between the functions of 
retention and reproduction in consciousness and brain processes 
has been recently the object of many fruitful investigations. 
Studies and experiments in physiology have shown how nerves- 
once stimulated can keep for a long time permanent modifica- 
tions produced by a former excitation. Cerebral localizations: 
have been more accurately determined, especially with regard 
to memory, and the reseaixhes on the ' diseases of memory ' 
have contributed largely to show the dependence of mental on 
physical retention. Hence the organic aspect of memory has 
been insisted upon. 

But many psychologists, while fully recognizing the impor- 
tance of physical factors and conditions, insist on their insuffi- 
ciency, and on the importance of the mind's activity in memory. 
They either claim that, parallel to the physical series of changes 
and dispositions, we have to admit also changes and dispositions 
in the mind itself; or that at least the higher acts of conscious 
memory, especially recognition, must be explained on a psycho- 
logical basis. 

If we assume that there is a perfect, unbroken parallelism 
of the mental and of the organic series, and if memory has 
essentially a mental side, then we must say not only that to 
organic processes mental processes correspond, but also that to 
organic dispositions there are corresponding mental disposi- 
tions. We do not consider here retention in the organism, nor 

ip. 107. 



56 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

dispositions to certain movements, but retention which enables 
us to bring back to consciousness sights and sounds, feelings and 
emotions, etc. And so we may say that 'this higher mode of 
retentlveness supposes that something has been ingrained In the 
mental and nervous structure ' ; and we are justified In speaking 
of the ' plastic energy of the mind.'' 

Ebbinghaus argues as follows:- If physical dispositions are 
necessary to explain the reappearance of certain processes in 
the physical series, how can we account for the reproduction of 
mental processes without psychical dispositions? Is not the 
causal nexus as necessary to account for mental phenomena as 
it is for physical effects? Does a mental action suddenly spring 
out of nothingness, and after some time return again Into 
nothingness?^ The dispositions are not, It Is true, knowable 
directly In themselves, but they must necessarily be admitted as 
causes and effects of directly knowable conscious states. They 
are not similar to conscious presentations, ' but nevertheless 
must be acknowledged as something psychical.' 

Hoffding's position Is similar.* " When we speak of traces, 
residua or dispositions, which remain after the sensations and 
presentations have vanished from consciousness, we assume that 
there must be on the mental side something analogous to the 
conservation of energy In the material world." These dispo- 
sitions are unconscious, and therefore cannot be introspectively 
perceived by us. 

Wundt' admits both in the nervous system and in the mind 
the existence of ' functional dispositions,' which enable us to 
revive past impressions. A disposition in the nervous system 
does not consist in the continuance of the function, but In the 
possibility and facilitation of Its return. Psychical dispositions 
must be explained In the same manner; the only actual presen- 

' Bain, Senses and Intellect, pp. 337, 468. 

^Grundziige der Psychologie, B. I., §5, p. 53 ff. 

'"Derselbe Zwang, der aus den oben erorterten Thatsachen sicherlich zur 
Ansetzung nervoser Naclivvirkungen, Dispositionen, u. dergl. fiihrt, fiihrt offenbar 
ebensogut, wenn Geistigkeit ein Begleitphanomen des Nervosen ist, zur Ansetz- 
ung geistiger Dispositionen, die eben das gesuchte Unbewusste bilden." 

* Psychologie, p. 194. 

^ Grundzugc der Physiol. Psychol., III., pp. 330, 331. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 57 

tations are the conscious presentations. Those that have dis- 
appeared from consciousness remain only as ' psychical disposi- 
tions of an unknown nature,' which are left for the revival of 
those functions. What they are in themselves we do not know ; 
nor can we hope ever to know, since the limits of conscioijtsness 
are at the same time the limits of our inner experience. / 

Stout devotes several pages of his Analytic Psychology ^ to 
the theory of psychical dispositions. In the present state of 
psychology there is at least a practical justification for positing 
' unconscious or undiscriminated mental factors for the explana- 
tion of conscious process ' (20) . Against Ward he states\hat 
when a process is reproduced, ' the preexisting fainter activ*ky 
can only be regarded as a physiological disposition correlated 
with a psychical disposition, and not as an actual functional 
activity correlated with an actual presentation ' ( 26) . And we 
cannot adhere strictly to physiological language, when we con- 
sider the reproduction of conscious processes, we cannot refer 
to a physiological disposition ' without at the same time refer- 
ring to it as a psychical disposition.' Hence the conclusion that 
when we want to separate unambiguously the purely psycho- 
logical evidence concerning the Interconnection and mode of 
operation of residual traces from corresponding physiological 
data and hypotheses, it Is best to use the term ' psychical dis- 
position.' If, on the contrary, we desire to consider exclusively 
the physiological side, the term ' physiological disposition ' is in 
place. And finally, if both are taken into account, it is appro- 
priate to speak of ' psycho-physical dispositions.' 

We have already quoted Fouillee as advocating the theory 
of subconscious Ideas in his Evolutionmsme des Idees-forces. 
Elsewhere, however, he speaks also of traces and residua. " 
The retention of ideas Is essentially and Indivislbly psycholog- 
ical and physiological ; it is not merely an organic process with 
an accidental addition of consciousness. A thing deprived of 
cognitive powers can indeed preserve motions, impressions, 
traces, but this is an altogether external preservation, and not 

' Pp. 21—26 and passim. 

^ ' Le mecanisme de la memoire,' Revue des Jeux mondes, 15 Mai, 1885, p. 
367, 368, 369 ff. 



58 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

that retention at once mechanical and mental in which memory 
consists. ' Even interpreting these statements as referring to a 
persistence of function in the organism and of the idea in sub- 
consciousness, we see that the author teaches that memory 
requires something which is left not only in the organism but 
also in the mind itself. 

Other thinkers take a somewhat different view; for them 
also both the organism and the mind concur in the production 
of the complete phenomenon of memory, but not in a parallel 
manner. In the first stages of memory, i. e., retention, asso- 
ciation, reproduction, they lay the main stress on the physical 
traces left in the brain, although they may not overlook entirely 
the mental side. But memory is essentially conscious. It also 
essentially includes the recognition of an idea and the reference 
of it to the past. For the explanation of these last facts, physi- 
cal dispositions become manifestly insufficient, and memory must 
be attributed to the mind. 

Thus Professor James' writes that ' the cause both of reten- 
tion and recollection is the law of habit in the nervous system, 
working as it does in the association of ideas.' And again: 
"The machinery of recall is the same as the machinery of asso- 
ciation, and the machinery of association, as we know, is 
nothing but the elementary law of habit in the nervous centers " 
(654). So that memory is 'altogether conditioned on brain- 
paths; its excellence in a given individual will depend partly 
on the number and partly on the persistence of these paths' 
(659). But although ' retention is no mysterious storing up 
of an idea '; although ' it is not a fact of the mental order at 
all,' but ' a purely physical phenomenon, a morphological fea- 
ture,' nevertheless "the recall or recollection ... is a psycho- 

' "L'etre qui ne sent pas peut sans doute conserver tantot des mouvemens, 
comme I'eau qui ondule, tantot des empreintes ou residus, comme le sable du 
rivage; mais ce mode de conservation tout exterieur n'est pas cette conservation 
indivisiblement mecanique et mentale sans laquelle on ne peut parler de souvenir 
proprement dit. . . . La conservation des souvenirs n'est pas pour nous, comme 
pour MM. Ribot et Maudsley, un phenomene physiologique qui n'aurait qu'ac- 
cidentellement un reflet psychologique ; elle est un phenomene indivisiblement 
psychologique et physiologique" (370). 

'Principles of Psychology, I., 653. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 59 

physical phenomenon with both a bodily and a mental side. 
The bodily side is the functional excitement of the tracts and 
paths in question; the mental side is the conscious vision of the 
past occurrence, and the belief that we have experienced it 
before" (655). 

Professor Ladd describes at length the physical conditions of 
memory ' which are to be found in certain biological laws, as 
well as also in specific qualities of the nervous substance of the 
cerebral centers. '^ He holds that "properly speaking, the re- 
tention of states of consciousness, whether of ideas or of pres- 
entations of sense is not a faculty or power of the mind. . . . 
It is only in the facts and laws of conscious reproduction that 
any trace of the activity of the mind, as memory, can be found. 
. . . Of unconscious retention and reproduction of ideas as an 
activity of mind, there is none."^ The physical basis of these is 
to be found in the modifications produced in the nervous ele- 
ments, especially in the nerve-cells. But "none of these physical 
conditions immediately concerns the very mental activity which 
constitutes the essence of conscious memory. What is ex- 
plained, if anything, is simply why I remember one thing rather 
than another, granted the mind's power to remember at all. 
This power is a spiritual faculty, wholly siii generis " ; and 
memory is ' a mysterious actus of the mind connecting its pres- 
ent and its past '(§ 23 ) . 

In his Handbook of Psychology,^ Professor Baldwin reviews 
the different theories of retention and reproduction. He rejects 
as false, or at least as psychologically unfounded, the theories 
which explain retention by a storing away of ideas in the mind, 
by a psychological habit or disposition, by subconsciousness. 
He maintains the 'physiological theory of retention' (p. 157). 
But assuming the fact of retention ' it is easy to see that this 
purely physical modification does not account for the revival 
of an image in consciousness. The essential element of memory 
is lacking ' (p. 164) . 

' Psychology, Descriptive and Explanatory, P. II., ch. XII., p. 241. Cf. Ele- 
ments of P/iysiological Psycliology, P. II., ch. X. 
^Elements of Pliysiotogical Psychology., I. c, §14. 
^Senses and Intellect, ch. IX., X. 



6o CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Rehmke rejects all psychical traces, residua, dispositions, 
because they would be something mental and yet unconscious. 
He explains retention by changes and modifications in the 
brain ; but recognition, which is an essential part of memory, 
is not based on physiological traces; it is purely psychical.^ 

" There is no physiological theory of memory, writes E. 
Goblot,^ but a physiological theory of association." Indeed 
' most psychologists to-day admit that the preservation of our 
knowledge is a physiological property of the brain cortex ' 
(489) . After the disappearance of the conscious fact, nothing 
remains but a purely organic modification of the cortical sub- 
stance, so that ' association really exists only between the 
organic actions which correspond to ideas' (490). On the 
contrary, memory cannot be explained by any cerebral autom- 
atism; it cannot be reduced to a mechanical action, because 
' it is judgment, discernment, perceived relation ' (492) . 

Bergson's theory of memory includes, as the title itself of 
his book indicates (Matiere et memoire. Essai sur la relation 
du corps a I'esprit), a general view of mental life, and of the 
relations of mind and body. It is in many respects a departure 
from the views commonly held by psychologists. The work, 
both on account of the criticism of some of these views and of 
the new constructive aspects which it presents, is worthy of the 
most serious consideration. For this reason, we shall devote 
a few pages to its analysis. 

The theory held by Bergson is essentially dualistic. Mind 
and body are two distinct realities; their respective functions 
are of different nature. But they are united; they help and 
complete each other; and for this reason we mention the theory 
here since the organism and the mind concur in the explana- 
tion of memory and habit. 

The body is and can be nothing but an instrument for action, 
?'. e., movement. This applies also to the nervous system; the 
brain has no function essentially different from the functions 
of the spinal cord. It is neither a cause nor a direct con- 

^Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie, 255, 512. 

' ' Theorie physiologique de I'association,' Revue pliilosophlque, Vol. 46, 1898, 
P- 493- 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 6l 

ditioti of conscious processes. It analyzes the received move- 
ment and selects the movement of reaction. " But in both cases 
its role is exclusively to transmit and divide movement." It 
is like the central office of a telephone. Hence the complexity 
of the brain is the source of the diversity of the movements of 
reaction (pp. i6, 17) . 

Perception cannot belong to the body, since it cannot be 
reduced to movement; and materialism cannot be accepted. 
Still the nature of perception is to be practical, to be entirely 
' turned towards action, not towards pure knowledge.' The 
source of many psychological confusions and errors is precisely 
In making It purely representative. Perception is the represen- 
tation of our possible actions on things; it appears at the precise 
time when a movement received In matter does not issue In a 
necessary reaction. Where the reaction follows necessarily 
there is no consciousness; where the movement of reaction Is 
arrested perception takes place (17, 18). Perception comes 
from a ' kind of question directed to our motor activity.' It Is 
a practical choice: " Percevoir consclemment signifie choisir, et 
la conscience consiste avant tout dans ce discernement pratique" 

(35.39)- 

Memory is of two kinds, which It is important to distinguish. 
One has all the characters of a habit. It Is acquired by repeti- 
tion. Including decomposltion-and recomposltlon; it Is stored up 
In mechanisms of the body which it has organized, and the 
movements of which have become automatic. It ' plays ' the 
past without representingx it. Such is the case with a lesson 
learned by repeating It several times.^ This memory does not 
refer to the past, except In so far as it actually preserves the 
'Intelligently coordinated movements which represent its accu- 
mulated efforts' (79). To this retention corresponds a recog- 
nition 'dans I'lnstantane,' of which the body alone is capable. 
Thus If a man is not acquainted with a cit}', he hesitates; sev- 

^ " La legon une fois apprise ne porte aucune marque sur elle qui trahisse ses 
origines et la classe dans le passe; elle fait partie de moii present au meme titre 
que mon habitude de marcher ou d'ecrire; elle est vecue, elle est ' agie,' plutot 
qu'elle n'est representee; — je pourrais la croire innee s'il ne me plaisait d'evoquer 
en meme temps, comme autant de representations, les lectures successives qui 
m'ont servi d I'apprendre " (77). 



62 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

eral alternatives offer themselves to his movement. When he 
becomes acquainted with it, he wallcs automatically, machine- 
like, without a distinct perception of the objects before which 
he passes (93). 

The second kind of memory, on the contrary, has none of 
the characters of habit (76) e. g., the memory of one of the 
readings by which I have learnt my lesson. It is an individual 
past event; its very essence is to bear its own date, and there- 
fore it is impossible to repeat it. This memory, if it was acting 
apart from the influences of the other, would register in the 
form of mental images, all the events of our life, with their 
respective places and dates, all their details and circumstances, 
without any practical end, but as mere representations (68, 
164). This is the 'true' memory, coextensive with con- 
sciousness. 

Whereas memory-habit is organic, memory proper is spir- 
itual. To say that images are preserved in the brain — exclu- 
sively an instrument of movement — is meaningless (161). 
Memory is ' absolutely independent of matter ' (194) ; it is a 
'spiritual manifestation' (269). 

How then shall we explain the fact that the brain plays an 
important part, even in memory? How shall we account for 
cerebral localization? Action and consciousness, present and 
past, organic habit and mental memory, organic recognition by 
familiarity and conscious recognition, are not sets of independ- 
ent processes, but the members of each pair help and complete 
each other. The concrete present, as we know and experience 
it, is not a mathematical point, but has a duration.- It is essen- 
tially sensori-motor, being a perception of what has just passed, 
and a determination of the immediate future (148, 149) . The 
immediate past is sensation; for a sensation supposes a multi- 
tude of stimulations, distinct and successive in nature, but col- 
lected together in consciousness (e. g., ether vibrations for 
vision; air vibrations for hearing) . So that all perception sup- 
poses memory. "Nous ne percevons, pratiquement, que le 
passe, le present pur etant I'insaisissable progres du passe ron- 
geant I'avenir" (163). 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 63 

Memory proper consists ' not in a regression from the pres- 
•ent to the past, but on the contrary in a progress from the past 
to the present' (268, cf. 164 ff.). Our mental life can be 
compared to a pyramid, the apex of which represents the pres- 
ent, and is in contact with a plane representing action. The 
mind can place itself at different sections of this pyramid, and 
according as it places itself farther from the apex, it enters its 
past with its details. At one extremity we should ' dream ' 
our own existence and exercise only our memory. At the other 
extremity, remaining in the present (action), we should ' play ' 
our past existence, instead of representing it to ourselves. In 
normal life, we place ourselves between these two extremes, 
sometimes nearer to action, and sometimes nearer to reverie. 
In abnormal cases the mind is at one of the extremes (164- 
169). 

Thus organic (habit) and mental memory complete each 
■other. Cerebral mechanisms are the terminus of the series of 
past representations, their link (point d'attache) with the real, 
i. e., with action. If this union be severed, the image is per- 
haps not destroyed, but it is unable to act on the real and there- 
fore to realize itself (75). The past is 'powerless,' and it 
must borrow its vitality from the present perception (155). 
In order to be revived an image must come back from the 
heights of piire memory down to the precise point where action 
is accomplished (166).^ 

What is localized in the brain is not the image itself, but the 
motor mechanism without wliich the past and of itself power- 
less image could not become real and present ( 1 1 1 ) . The 
brain does not preserve images, but ' simply chooses, in order 
to bring to distinct consciousness by the real efficacy which it 
confers upon it, the useful memory (souvenir), the memory 
which will complete and enlighten the present situation with a 

' " Tous les faits et toutes les analogies sont en faveur d'une tlieorie qui ne 
verrait dans le cerveau qu'un intermediaire entre les sensations et les mouve- 
ments, qui ferait de cet ensemble de sensations et de mouvements la pointe extreme 
de la vie mentale, pointe sans cesse inseree dans le tissu des evenements, et qui, 
attribuant ainsi au corps I'unique fonction d'orienter la memoire vers le reel et 
de la relier au present, considererait cette memoire meme comme absolument 
independante de la matiere." P. 194. 



64 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

view to the final action ' (197). It senses to i-ecall the useful 
image, but still more to keep away all others for the time being 
(194, 195). This theory of localization is the only one that 
is able to explain the facts ( 1 1 1 ff.) . 

From these views the author draws conclusions on the union 
of body and mind, which need not be analyzed here. For our 
present purpose the main point is that memory is an essentially 
mental fact, which however cannot be exercised without the 
help of the organism. 

(c) Physical Theories. 

The writers whose views we have mentioned so far agree in 
this, that a mental activity is absolutely and essentially neces- 
sary to memory. For some, the mind is the only factor of 
memory; even retention must be attributed to it. For others, 
both mind and organism concur in retention and reproduction. 
Others finally insist on physiological dispositions; but as these 
are not sufficient for memory, which includes recognition, they 
also insist on the necessity of a mental activity to complete the 
phenomenon of memory. We have now to mention others for 
whom memory is primarily and essentially an organic function, 
secondarily and accessorily a mental one. They either over- 
look the fact of recognition, or consider consciousness as an 
unnecessary, accidental adjunct of organic memory. If they 
admit a mental activity, they allow it only a very small, unim- 
portant function; it is a superaddition to that which is already 
complete; or it is a form hitherto imperfectly known of phys- 
ical energy. 

Ribot^ rejects all 'psychological residues,' and admits only 
modifications of the nervous centers. " Memory is a general 
function of the nervous system. Its basis is the property of 
those elements to retain a modification which they have received 
and to form dynamic associations." Retentiveness depends 
chiefly on nutrition of brain elements and on blood circulation; 
so that retention and reproduction which are the essence of 
memory are fundamentally biological phenomena. Conscious- 

^ Les maladies de la memoire, ch. I., p. 27 ff. and conclusion, p. 163 ff. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 65 

ness, recognition, localization in the past, are but a complement, 
a perfection. Hence we have the use of such expressions as 
'organic memory' which differs from psychological memory 
only by the absence of consciousness. " La memoire organique 
ressemble en tout a la memoire psychologique sauf en un point, 
I'absence de la conscience " (7). One is thereby reminded of 
Malebranche's statement already quoted, in which, however, the 
term' ' habit ' is used for ' organic memory.' " If there was no 
perception correlated to the course of the animal spirits and to 
the traces left by them, there would be no difference between 
memory and the other habits." 

Richet speaks of memory as being ' a physiological phenom- 
enon,' and asserts that it Is "the fixation for a protracted time 
of an excitation which has set the cerebral nervous system into 
motion for a very short time. Briefly stated, memory is the 
prolongation of an excitation." ^ In the same manner, Luys 
calls memory the organic phosphorescence of brain elements. 
It is ' a true synthesis of one of the primordial properties of the 
nervous elements.' " " The elements of the cerebral substance, 
unconscious agents of the manifestations of our psycho-Intel- 
lectual life, work silently at the operations which they accom- 
plish in common. . . . They concur simultaneously to produce 
the phenomena of memory, and separately give off reminis- 
cences, as illuminated bodies give off the luminous waves which 
they have stored up in their substance." All this Is a ' mar- 
vellous power of the cerebral cells.' 

Jodl holds that all trace Is ' physical, material, organic' 
Memory, i. e., ' the conservation of received impressions, their 
transformation Into potential energy and their permanence In 
this form,' is 'a common function of organic matter.'^ 

Edridge-Green, in his work on Memory and its Cultivation 
proposes an entirely physiological theory; he distinguishes two 
kinds of memory: sensory and motor. 

' ' Les origines et les raodalites de la memoire,' Re<vue philosophigue, XXI., 
p. 581. ' De la memoire elementaire,' ibid., XL, p. 545. Cf. Essai de psychologie 
generate, esp. ch. 7. 

^ Le ceweaii et ses foiictioris, P. II., 1. II., esp. ch. i, p. m. 

' Le/irhuc/i der Psychologie, p. 463 ff. 



€>6 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Maudsley and Carpenter admit only physiological residua, i. 
e., 'some modification of the nerve element, whereby the nerve 
circuit is disposed to fall again readily into the same action.' 
Such disposition appears in consciousness 'as recognition or 
memory.' Psychology can be of no help in this matter, and 
when it describes memory as a faculty of the mind, 'it does no 
more than present us with a name in place of an explanation.' 
There are only organic dispositions which, stimulated from 
without, constitute recognition, z. e., cognition with memory of 
former cognition ; and, stimulated from within, constitute recol- 
lection.' 

Dr. P. Sollier's theory of memory' is also essentially physical. 
After a historical review he devotes three chapters to the anal- 
ysis of the act of memory: fixation, conservation; evocation, 
reproduction ; recognition, localization. The fifth chapter is 
a theory of memory, its evolution, seat, mechanism. All these 
are and must be explained by the properties of the nervous 
system, by the ' trace-disposition ' left in the brain, and by the 
brain's specific energy (cf. esp. p. 194, and summary, 202). 
Psychical manifestations must be reduced to brain activity. 
"All that we know of the mind, though it be little, manifests it 
as a form of energy, and consequently as belonging to the order 
of physical phenomena." " Outside of the nervous system 
there is no psychical energy." If we want to know the mind, 
what we have to study is the conditions of production, propa- 
gation and conservation of nervous energy. " The problem of 
the soul, in the main, is probably nothing but a problem of 
physics and mechanics " (cf. conclusion, 217, 218). The best 
point of view to be taken is that of ' pure physics,' rather than 
that of physiology, and Sollier's favorite comparison is taken 
from electricity. 

Nature of Physical Dispositions. 
We have seen that psychical dispositions are declared, by 
those who admit their existence, to be of an unknown nature; we 

'Maudsley, Physiology of Mind, ch. IX., pp. 513 ff. Carpenter, Principles of 
Mental Physiology, ch. X. 

^ Le probleme de la memoire {Essai de psycho-mecanique) . 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 67 

must be satisfied with knowing their effects and comparing them 
with physical dispositions with which they have some analogy. 
Such is not the case with physiological traces ; these are described 
at length, and the various theories which have been proposed 
can be reduced to three. ^ We can conceive of those traces: 
(i) as a movement persisting in the brain; (2) as a trace, a 
residuum, a fixed impression, persisting in the brain; (3) as a 
tendency to a certain function, persisting in the brain. We have 
noticed in the preceding pages that there is no clearly defined 
limit between the three theories of psychical, psychophysical 
and physical dispositions. Each one easily merges into the 
others, and sometimes it is difficult to know where a writer 
belongs, because he is, so to speak, on the border line of two 
theories which we have distinguished for the sake of clearness 
in our exposition. Here also we must notice that the division 
of the views concerning the nature of physical traces is perhaps 
more theoretical than real. " As held by recent writers, says 
Burnham, they are closely related and merge into one another. 
The movement and the trace may cause the functional disposi- 
tion. The functional disposition itself may, in the last resort, 
be due to persisting movement " (/. c, 574). Or, as Fouillee 
expresses it, ' au point de vue philosophique, il suffit de com- 
biner les deux formes du mecanisme, mouvemens persistans et 
residus persistans, pour obtehir des modifications stables de 
structure cerebrale, qui entraineront une disposition a repro- 
duire certains mouvemens determines' (lac. cit., 367). Con- 
sequently to mention a writer as advocating one form or an- 
other must not be understood exclusively, but as meaning that 
he Insists more on a special point of view, although he may not 
exclude, and may even positively admit the others. Moreover, 
it must not be overlooked that many illustrations and many 
expressions are evidently metaphorical, and must not be taken 
literally as a strict interpretation of the facts. 

' Cf. Fouillee in Revue des deux mondes, 15 mai, 1885. Burnham in Amer- 
ican Journal of Psychology, 1889, p. 571. Ladd, Outlines of Physiolostcal Psy- 
chology, p. 420. 



68 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Persisting Movement. 

The theory of persisting movements seems to be implied in 
comparisons that are sometimes proposed to illustrate the fact 
of memory. Thus memory is compared to a tuning-fork which 
continues to vibrate for a long time. It has been shown exper- 
imentally that the nervous elements have the same property.^ 
An electric current passing along a wire leaves no trace what- 
ever of its passage; all has ceased in twenty thousandths of 
a second after the current has passed. But there is a great 
difference, if instead of a wire, we make the current pass 
through the nerves or the spinal cord. " Any excitation, what- 
ever it may be, leaves behind it a more or less protracted vibra- 
tion which persists for a long time after the real duration of 
the excitation. ... A short excitation determines a very long 
vibration of the nervous substance." We may say, although 
the expression is not correct and accurate, that there remains 
a 'latent vibration, which implies a greater excitability of the 
nerve, as a result of preceding excitations.' This phenomenon 
can be compared to memory, which is also 'the prolongation 
of an excitation.' 

Luys develops the same theory.^ He applies the term 'phos- 
phorescence' to 'that curious property which the nervous ele- 
ments possess of remaining for a longer or shorter time in the 
state of vibration into which they have been thrown by the 
arrival of external excitations.' We find an analogy in phos- 
phorescent substances which, after having been illuminated by 
solar rays, continue to shine after the source of their light has 
disappeared. For we know that ether vibrations, in the form 
of luminous undulations, can be prolonged by phosphorescent 
bodies for a longer or shorter time, surviving the cause which 
has produced them. Niepce de Saint- Victor has shown by his 
experiments that luminous undulations may be garnered up in 
a sheet of paper and remain as silent vibrations, ready to reap- 
pear even after months, if the paper is treated by means of 
special appropriate reagents. IVIoreover the daily practice of 

' Cf. Richet, ' La memoire eleraentaire,' Rev. philosophique, XI., 540 ff. 
^ Le cerveau et ses fonctions, P. II., 1. II., pp. 105, 106 ff. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 69 

photography shows that certain substances can preserve per- 
sistent traces of the light vibrations which have affected them. 
The nervous elements also have the property of preserving some 
kind of prolongation of the impressions (ebranlements) which 
have set them in motion. They are gifted with 'a sort of 
organic phosphorescence; they are capable of vibrating and 
storing up external impressions, of remaining for some time ■ 
in a kind of transitory catalepsy in the state of vibration in 
which they have been incidentally thrown, and of producing 
a revival of the first impressions after a certain lapse of time.' 
Many examples and experiments are reported by Luys to show 
that in some cases there is a prolongation of the nervous vibra- 
tion and of the corresponding sense perception. 

Taine^ compares the stimulation of the brain cells to a dance 
which is continued and propagated from similar cell to similar 
cell. Even after the stimulation has ceased, the dance con- 
tinues fainter and fainter in the background of consciousness.^ 

Persisting Impression. 
The second theory which explains the physical basis of 
memory by the retention of a persisting impression, residuum, 
trace, is implied in many of the metaphors which are used. 
Thus we have seen the mind compared by Plato to a wax tablet 
on which our experience is written. We have mentioned Aris- 
totle's ' TUTTot ' and Locke's inscription on tombs. We also have 
the famous ' tabula rasa,' representing the mind before it has 
acquired any knowledge. ^ Taine uses a similar expression. 
The mind is like a stereotype-plate the size of which is different 
in various individuals; or rather it must be compared to a col- 

1 De I'intelligence, P. I., 1. IV., ch. I., §VIII. 

^"Une cellule des bureaux inferieurs qui rayonnerait dans I'ecorce par dix 
cordons, chacun de cent cellules, aurait mille repetiteurs dans les hemispheres, et 
I'on concevrait comment, au deuxieme, au troisieme, au dixieme, au centierae 
plan, une danse precedente se prolongerait sous forme d'image, sans faire ob- 
stacle i la danse actuelle, c'est-a-dire a la sensation du premier plan" (p. 311). 

* " ^Off AmmtiEL Kd)g eon ra votjTa 6 vnvg a?.V EvT£?iex€'tii oi'Jei', Tvplv av vo^- del 6 
ovTuq CiOTTep kv yim/iimTcLt i^' fiijSiv vn-dpx^i- kvTcXtxc'a y€ypa/jfihior." Aristotle, De 
anima, III., 4, 429b, 30 ff. 

^Dc I'intelligence, P. I., 1. IV., ch. I., §VIII., p. 313. 



70 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

lection of such plates. Every brain cell receives and preserves 
impressions, and these combine with one another, so that we 
have a multitude of representations, in the same way that the 
same letters by their various combinations can form a multitude 
of words.' Hence the brain cortex is like a ' printing office ' 

(315)- 

Another illustration of the same view is the comparison with 
a phonograph." The brain keeps the trace of past impressions 
as the tinfoil of the phonograph keeps the records of the sounds, 
by minute and almost imperceptible changes produced on its 
surface, so that ' it would be neither too inaccurate nor too 
strange to define the brain a phonograph infinitely perfected, a 
conscious phonograph.' 

Richet, as we have seen, advocates the theory of persisting 
vibration, which, however, may be ' entirely latent ' ; but he also 
speaks of 'permanent' and 'indelible' traces^ which are left 
in the psychic nerve cell. Whereas the muscles and the organic 
nerve cells do not retain any permanent modification after they 
have been stimulated, the psychic nerve cell is forever modified 
in its constitution, and ' this modification can be effaced only by 
the death of the cell ' (565). It keeps an echo or resonance 
(retentissement) latent, prolonged, indefinite, of the excitation 
which has indelibly modified its constitution (567). 

We can also mention, as pointing to the theory of persistent 
modifications, expressions which are frequently used, such as 
paths of least resistance, trodden, beaten paths, etc., metaphors 
which were used even by Descartes and Malebranche.'' 

' " Deux groupes relies de la sorte peuvent etre compares a un cliche plus ou 
raoins etendu, cliche d'un mot, cliche d'une ligne, cliche d'une page; la lettre 
entraine le mot, qui entraine la ligne, qui entraine la page. Des lors on comprend 
a quoi servent les cinq cents millions de cellules et les deux milliards de fibres 
de notre ecorce cerebrale; grace a leur multitude, notre memoire est pleine de 
cliches. . . . Quatre cents millions de lettres font mille volumes, chacun de quatre 
cent mille lettres; si un cerveau humain contient quatre cents millions de cliches 
mentaux, cela lui fait une riche bibliotheque de reserve, et il lui reste encore cent 
millions de cellules pour les usages courants." 

'Guyau, 'La memoire et le phonographe,' Rev. philos., IX., p. 319. 

' ' Les origines et les modalites de la memoire,' Rev. philos., XXL, 561 ff. 

* E. g., cf. James, Principles of Psychology, L, 107 S., 653 flf. Taine, he. cit., 
299. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 7i 

Persisting Tendency. 

The third theory, that of functional disposition, implies that 
there is in the nervous centers, once they have been stimulated, 
a tendency to perform again the same function, to repeat the 
same process. The point of view is not so much the present 
as the future, not so much the actual change or modification 
as the future process which it tends to reproduce. Thus Wundt 
speaks of the functional disposition acquired by the eye which 
has been accustomed to measure distances. These dispositions 
' do not consist in a persistence of the function itself, but in 
the facilitation of its return.'^ Ribot speaks of ' dynamic asso- 
ciations ' which are established between the nerve cells. ^ Pro- 
fessor Baldwin^ says of the physiological habit which explains 
retention, that it Is ' a matter of modification of brain and nerve 
structure or function.' The organism Is disposed to reproduce 
its former function ; ' the execution of movements, at first diffi- 
cult, becomes easy, then semi-automatic, and often irresistible.' 

The best analogy to explain memory, according to Dr. 
SoUier,* is that of the physical phenomena of electricity. The 
comparison Is used In many places In his work. The author 
does not mean that these two classes of phenomena have the 
same nature (216). If he insists on such analogies, 'It is 
not to establish the least resemblance of nature of the psychical 
with the electrical phenomena ' ; it is only to show ' that we can 
find in the purely physical world forces capable of modifying 
matter so as to impart to It new qualities, without apparently 
modifying its form or molecular structure, — qualities which are 
transitory, and which, after their disappearance, leave it in Its 
former state' (53) . We cannot give the details of these analo- 
gies, we can only mention the most important, {a) In most cases, 
activity leaves a trace-disposition (51). {b) The brain is com- 
pared to a storage battery; both are accumulators of energy 
(168). (c) This energy Is released and made use of, under 

' GrundzUge der Physiol. Psychol., III., 565. Cf. Criticism of Wundt by Volk- 
mann, Lehrbuch dcr Psychologic, I., 407. 
^ Les maladies de la memoire, ch. I. 
'Senses and Intellect, 157, i6z. 
' Le problime de la memoire, passim. 



72 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

conditions which are in many points similar (172). (d) We 
find in both cases a certain resistance on the part of the accumu- 
lator (195). (e) Phenomena of resonance are observed in 
both orders (206). Hence lastly, Dr. Sollier insists in many 
places on the ' potential ' of the brain centers, which increases 
with their functioning (108 ft.). "The increase, the accumu- 
lation of successive activities is an increase of potential, analo- 
gous to that which is produced in an electric accumulator " 
( 195). " The evocation of images does not depend so much 
on the play (mise en jeu) of a determined molecular state, as 
on the quantity of potential which at a given moment is at the 
disposal of the brain centers " ( 1 1 1 ) . 

Other writers more explicitly still combine the three theories 
of persisting movement, impression, disposition. They hold 
that these are only stages and degrees of one and the same com- 
plete explanation. Jodl describes the physical 'Spur' as a 
' physical impress, a determined position and grouping of the 
molecules in the nervous centers ' ; also as ' a functional dispo- 
sition, a latent state of energy (Kraftzustand) .'^ Hoffding 
speaks of it as a tendency to repeat the same process, resulting 
from a certain state of the molecules, by which they are enabled 
to be excited more easily out of their state of equilibrium.^ 

Ebbinghaus uses the following comparison.^ A new cord used 
for the first time to tie up a trunk is stiff and difficult to knot; 
after it has been used several times this becomes easier. Some 
change therefore has been produced and remains. This modi- 
fication evidently does not consist in the permanence of the 
' being-knotted ' in a weaker form, but in structural modifica- 
tions, which, although they bear no similitude to knots, make 
the cord more flexible and easier to knot. In like manner the 
after effects of nervous processes consist in structural changes. 
These changes depend on functions of which they are effects and 
results; they are the cause of the reappearance of these func- 
tions, although they are of a different nature. 

' Le/irbuc/i der Psyc/iologie, 463 ff. 

^ Psycliologie, 194. Cf. also Rehmke, hchrhuch der aUgem. Psychol., 259. 

' Grundziige der Psychologie, 52. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 73 

We have mentioned Taine's illustration of cell dances. A 
conscious state may have disappeared ten or twenty years ago. 
It may not have been I'ecalled once during the interval, so that 
It seemed to have altogether vanished. Yet it can be revived; 
the dance of the cells has not been going on uninterruptedly; 
after several minutes, or several hours, it has been transferred 
to the most remote cell-groups where finally it has ceased to 
exist. But a stereotype-plate (cliche) has been preserved, that 
is, ' a modification of structure in a remote group of cells and 
fibers, an organic predisposition, i. e., the predisposition to 
vibrate according to a given order, and consequently the neces- 
sity, for the nervous current which will reach that group, to 
flow in the path already open.'^ This group may for a long 
time remain inactive, far from ' the broad way which our 
usual impressions follow.' Having so few chances to be ex- 
cited and caused to vibrate, it may remain unnoticed for years; 
and It is only by chance that a cerebral current being directed 
there, the cells will again " enter Into dance." When this 
happens the nervous current follows the trodden path. "Every 
one of the cells begins its dance In the preestablished order; and 
this order and succession of dances, propagated from group to 
group through the cortex, comes forward from the background 
to the foreground." 

Summary of the Modern Disposition Theory. 

It has been shown in the preceding pages how widely ad- 
mitted by modern psychologists Is the theory of dispositions. 
We have presented it especially In its relations to memory; but 
it is clear that it Is also the basis of habit. So-called organic 
memory it nothing but the habituation of the organism to cer- 
tain functions, and requires physiological dispositions. Psycho- 
logical or conscious memory is the basis of mental habit; it is 
explained by dispositions left either in the mind itself or in the 
organism, whose processes condition the mental processes. 

A disposition, whatever name it may receive, trace, residuum, 
vestige, etc., whether we make it psychical or physical, implies 

^De I'intelVigencc, I. c, 314. 



74 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

two things: an actual state and a potential relation or tendency 
to reproduce a past process or function. It supposes a persist- 
ing modification of movement or of structure and also a ten- 
dency to some effect as its correlate. "Jeder Disposition 
kommt . . . ein actuelles Correlat zu."^ 

Stout speaks of the correlate or an organic disposition in a 
different sense, to signify, not the effect which It tends to pro- 
duce, but the corresponding psychical disposition. Even if a 
psychical disposition is ' a fainter discharge of function,' it 
does not follow that we can call it a ' presentation ' existing in 
subconsciousness, because in order to be ' presented,' a certain 
intensity may be necessary. And if molecular movements per- 
sist in the brain it does not follow that their ' correlate ' in the 
mind is the same idea which corresponds to a fuller and intenser 
discharge of function. " The preexisting fainter activity can 
only be regarded as a physiological disposition correlated with 
a psychical disposition, and not as an actual functional activity 
correlated with an actual presentation."' 

It Is true that we must not overlook the actual state, condi- 
tion, movement, which Is an essential constituent of a dispo- 
sition. But we must also avoid the other extreme of admitting 
nothing but such an actuality, and of neglecting the tendency 
which results therefrom to reproduce an Idea which has not 
persisted all the time. 

Thus the modern Idea of disposition Is not that of a ' naked ' 
or of an ' hypostaslzed ' possibility, but rather an Idea of 
causal relation existing between an actual and more or less 
permanent condition of a subject as the basis of the disposition 
(DIsposItionsgrundlage) , and its results or function (Disposi- 
tlonscorrelat) as effect. The effect must therefore have a 
double cause, the 'DIsposItionsgrundlage' and the stimulus 
which is required to actualize it. The stimulus is a sensation, or 
the presence of some idea in consciousness.^ And so, " In the 

' Hofler, Psychologic, 21. 

^Analytic Psychology, p. 26. 

'Cf. Stephan Witasek, ' Beitrage zur speciellen DIspositionspsychologie,' 
Archiv fiir systemat. Philos., III., 1897, p. 273 ff. Hoffding, ' Ueber Wiederken- 
nen, Association und psychische Activitat,' Vierteljahrschrift f. wissents. Philos., 
XIII., p. 420. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 75 

attempt to recollect, . . . whether the revival actually takes 
place . . . depends on the excitability of a preexisting dispo- 
sition. . . . The mere retention of a presented content in con- 
sciousness involves the continued excitement of a psycho-physical 
disposition, and is conditioned by its excitability, which in turn 
is partly conditioned by the supply of nutrition to the brain. "^ 

We cannot close this chapter without referring to the defini- 
tion of disposition given in Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy 
and Psychology, the article being signed by Baldwin and Stout. 
We must notice that the word disposition is sometimes used 
in a much broader sense than the one we have considered, to 
mean even those aptitudes and tendencies which arise from our 
very nature, temper, character, circumstances of life, and which, 
give our mental life a particular direction and impulse; they are 
in many cases transmitted to us by heredity. In that sense it 
is possible to speak of dispositions of representations, judgment, 
feeling, desire; dispositions to the comical; innate, natural 
dispositions, etc.- But it seems better to restrict the meaning 
of the term disposition to express those tendencies which are 
the result of personal activity. In the other cases it is prefer- 
able to use the word predisposition, which has ' an innate char- 
acter,' and refers 'to the permanent elements of character and 
endowment, recognized as ingredients in temperament.' A 
predisposition is 'an inherited tendency to act in certain ways 
. . . , an inherited disposition.' 

Hence disposition, if applied to the nervous system is ' the 
tendency of a nervous centef, system, or element to function in 
a particular manner, either from native endowment or from 
previous functioning.' In accordance with what has been said, 
however, this definition can be further restricted to the result 
of previous functioning, excluding the native endowment which 
is a predisposition. A disposition ' has functional reference,' 
and is used to translate the German ' Bahnung ' ' which includes 
the actual canalization or anatomical path-making which results 
from continuous nervous discharges in the same direction.' 

' Stout, op. cit., 23, 24. 

'Cf. Hofler, Psychologie, §12, 21. Lipps, Grundtliatsachcn dcs Scelenslebens. 



76 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Applied to mental life, a disposition is 'an effect of previous 
mental process, or an element of original endowment, capable 
of entering as a cooperative factor into subsequent mental 
process.' (We have again to remark that, according to Baldwin 
himself, the element of original endowment seems to be strictly 
speaking a predisposition.) The two elements of a disposition 
are clearly indicated in the definition; it Is some permanent effect 
of previous activity, but also a capacity to determine further 
activity'. " On the mental side, the characteristic thing about 
disposition is its preparatory influence in the determination of 
subsequent states of mind." It is really a ' cooperative factor,' 
although it be actually at rest without manifesting its latent 
energy, which, however, it is ready to give forth when it has 
the opportunity. ' It represents impulse or habit under arrest. 
Considered with reference to the event towards which its deter- 
mining influence is directed, it enters into expectation '; which 
is the 'belief that future experience will be of a definite sort, 
based upon past experience.' If we consider the development 
of an acquired disposition, we can say that ' the typical rise and 
gradual growth of an acquired disposition is a function of 
accommodation through a series of exercises.' 



CHAPTER IV. Existence and Further Determina- 
tion OF Psychical Dispositions. 

I. Existence of Psychical Dispositions. 

Necessity of Some Permanent After-Efect. 

If we admit that reproduction is not the reappearance of the 
same presentation which had sunk beneath the threshold of con- 
sciousness, that it is not merely the coming forward of that 
which had been hemmed in and kept in the background, but that 
it is truly a reproduction, or production anew, then we must 
admit some one of the above-mentioned theories of traces or 
dispositions which are effects of previous, and co-factors in, sub- 
sequent mental processes. For we must admit that something 
really remains of a past mental state. The man who does not 
know is not the equal of the man who knows, although the 
latter may not actually have his knowledge present to conscious- 
ness.^ There is a difference between the man bom blind and 
the man who has experienced sensations of sight but now keeps 
his eyes closed; between the man whose ear has never been 
trained to discriminate musical sounds and the musician who is 
not actually listening to such sounds. Not to know a thing 
and not to think of it are widely different, says St. Augustine, 
because a man can know without thinking of what he knows. 
Can we say of a musician that he does not understand music 
because he is now thinking of something else? Or because he 
may be actually thinking about geometry, is that a reason to 
assert that he understands geometry ?- 

Even if the actual contents of consciousness in two individuals 
were of the same nature, and extended to the same number of 
things, still there would be a very great difference between those 
persons, because one has the possibility of recalling to conscious- 
ness a multitude of ideas, images, feelings, emotions, which have 

' Cf. St. Thomas, Quaest. disp. De veritaie, q. lo, art. 2. 
2 De Trinitate, 1. XIV., c. VII. 

77 



7S CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

no access to the consciousness of the other, and because of the 
ability of each to perform certain actions which are impossible 
for the other. Even if it were possible in such a case that the 
actual conscious states of both should be similar, no one would 
assert that they are exactly equal, because their respective 
' powers ' differ. The possibility of recall and representation 
is therefore something real, having a real, actual basis, and 
depending on past experience. This real basis is what we call 
disposition. 

The primary object of this dissertation is not to prove the 
existence nor to give a complete explanation of psychical dispo- 
sitions, but to examine the logical aspect of the theory. Still 
we must briefly indicate the principal reasons why purely 
organic dispositions seem insufficient, and why psychical dispo- 
sitions seem necessary to the complete interpretation of the 
facts. 

Materialism. 

If the mind is assumed to be nothing but a function of matter, 
if all the phenomena of our conscious life are reduced to some 
form of material activity and energy, then, of course, the ques- 
tion of psychical dispositions is at once discarded; a disposition 
is merely the tendency of the nerves to repeat the same vibra- 
tion, to undergo the same modification which produced the 
former conscious state. It does not fall within the limits of 
the present investigation to discuss the position of materialism. 
The assertions that thought is but a function of matter, that 
consciousness can be reduced to physical motion, that matter 
and its properties explain all our inner life, have been thor- 
oughly criticized. The famous tenet that ' brain secretes 
thought as the liver secretes bile ' would hardly find adherents 
among serious thinkers of the present time. We may say that 
materialism in this crude form is commonly abandoned to-day. 
It ' testifies rather to a man's respect for the mechanical order 
of things than to his powers of reflection.'' 

What takes place when, for instance, at the sight of an 
enemy, or the hearing of an insult, a feeling of anger Is 

'Fullerton, A System of Metaphysics, p. 260, published before in Psychol. Rev., 
March, 1902, p. 172. ' 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 79 

aroused in me ? The expansion of the optic nerve in the retina, 
or that of the auditory nerve, is stimulated and undergoes 
changes, modifications the nature of which is but imperfectly 
known. This visual stimulation is transmitted by means of the 
optic nerve to the optic center in the brain. There certain 
reactions are produced; the circulation may be affected, and 
blushing will result from the affluence of blood to the face. 
Motor nerves may be stimulated, the final result being the move- 
ment of the arm dealing a blow at the enemy. However im- 
perfectly known these processes and the multitude of others 
which we do not mention, may be, yet some of them can be per- 
ceived and accurately described by the physiologist. What he 
is ignorant of to-day he may come to know in the future by 
closer observation and the use of more perfect instruments. 
Although there are certain processes which he cannot observe, 
he Icnows that these consist essentially of movements occurring 
in such a place, with an intensity which we conceive as meas- 
urable. Nor are the physiological processes knowable to one 
only, but to as many as can observe them. 

But there is something else which the offended person alone 
can feel, something which is inalienably his own and the percep- 
tion of which can be shared by no other. It is the internal, the 
conscious series of phenomena, the vision of a certain person, 
the hearing of a certain sound, the recognition of an enemy or 
the perception of an insult, the various ideas which are then 
suggested, the passion or emotion which ensues, etc. These 
sensations, feelings, memories, are also real, as real and more 
real to ourselves than the movements which correspond to them 
in the organism. And yet it is impossible to reduce them to a 
motion of material particles, to localize them in a definite part 
of the brain or of the nervous system, to measure them. More- 
over they can be perceived only by the one individual who is the 
subject of them. ' In dem vorgefundenen Objekt nennen wir 
psychisch, was nur einem Subjekt erfahrbar ist, physisch, was 
mehreren Subjekten gemeinsam erfahrbar gedacht werden 
kann.'^ Physical facts are 'public property'; psychical facts, 
' private property. "- 

'Miinsterberg, Grundziige tier Psychologic, p. 72; cf. pp. 65-77. 
''Royce, Outlines of Psychology, ch. I., p. 2. 



So CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

These are brief indications of the reasons why modern psy- 
chology admits two series of facts which it recognizes to be 
distinct. "To regard as identical classes of experiences which 
are evidently dissimilar is inexcusable, and to dismiss as non- 
existent all classes of sensations except those which fit into a par- 
ticular series, arbitrarily narrows the meaning of the word ' ex- 
istence' to a special use. Both in science and in common life 
we constantly speak, of colors, sounds, and odors. We mean 
something when we do so. To declare such things to be non- 
existent is palpably contrary to common sense and to the ac- 
cepted usages of speech." If we confine ourselves to the study 
of nervous processes and to those special events in which they 
have their inception and in which they terminate, " what be- 
comes of sensations, memories, thought-processes? A whole 
world of things seems to be left wholly out of account, ignored 
as though it were non-existent. Shall we outrage common sense 
by insisting that these are but another name for the nervous 
processes themselves, and hence do not require independent 
investigation?"^ 

Double Series. 

There are therefore in ourselves two distinct series of facts, 
the mental and the physical, which, so far at least as they are 
known to us from experience, must be acknowledged to be irre- 
ducible. We do not have to inquire now into the relations 
which exist between the two series. One may say that they run 
strictly parallel to each other, never coming into contact, that 
they are perfect strangers having nothing in common. Or one 
may say that both can enter as successive factors in the same 
series of events. Or again one may assert that they are mani- 
festations of the activity of two distinct substantial principles, 
or that they are merely ' aspects ' of one and the same reality. 

But even in monistic theories the mental and the physical series 
are opposed to each other as irreducible. The terms them- 
selves which are used indicate sufficiently such an opposition. 
Parallels are necessarily distinct, and have such a direction that 

' FuIIerton, A System of Metaphysics, p. 254. 
^Ibid., 2+7. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 8 1 

they can never meet. Two ' aspects,' two ' sides,' two ' faces ' 
even of one and the same reahty cannot be identical. The 
inside is opposed to the outside, the subjective to the objective 
point of view. Even in monistic theories therefore it is pos- 
sible to admit psychical and physical dispositions, since we have 
to explain the sequence of the phenomena which form each 
series. These two series 'are on two utterly different plat- 
forms,' writes Clifford, the first author who advocates the 
so-called 'mind-stuff theory,' "the physical facts go along by 
themselves, and the mental facts go along by themselves. 
There is a parallelism between them, but there is no interfer- 
ence of one with the other."^ 

Bain also, according to whom we must speak of 'one two- 
sided phenomenon,' of one 'two-sided cause,' of the mental and 
the physical proceeding as ' undivided twins,' admits neverthe- 
less that ' these two phenomena (of mind and body) have very 
little in common; they participate only in the most general 
attributes, namely, quantity, co-existence and succession, and 
even as regards these their participation is limited.' There is 
a 'very broad difference' between them.- 

For Spencer, mind and nervous action are ' as the subjective 
and objective faces of the same thing.' The 'true conclusion' 
is that 'one and the same Ultimate Reality ... is mani- 
fested to us subjectively and objectively.' Nevertheless " the 
very distinction of Subject and Object ... is itself the con- 
sciousness of a difference transcending all other differences. So 
far from helping us to think of them as of one kind, analysis 
serves but to render more manifest the impossibility of finding 
for them a common concept — a thought under which they can 
be united. . . . Can we think of the subjective and objective 
activities as the same? Can the oscillation of a molecule be 
represented in consciousness side by side with a nervous shock, 
and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to 
assimilate them. That a unit of feeling has nothing in common 
with a unit of motion, becomes more than ever manifest when 
we bring the two into juxtaposition."^ 

^Lectures and Essays, 'Body and Mind,' Vol. II., p. 33. 

^Mind and Body, pp. 122, 133. 

'Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., §§62, 273. 



82 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Many other passages from these and other writers could be 
quoted, but those which we have produced sufficiently show, 
whatever be the logical consistency of the position, that even 
where the mental and the physical are declared to be ' one and 
the same reality,' they are nevertheless spoken of as absolutely 
different; they ' have very little in common,' are ' on utterly 
different platforms'; and each one 'goes along independently 
by itself.' Psychical dispositions are admissible in these theo- 
ries in order to explain the mental series. 

The terms commonly used to express the relations of body 
and mind would lead us to assume that there are psychical dis- 
positions. In the physical series which corresponds to the men- 
tal, we have certain modifications and changes which are results 
of past functions and partial determinant causes of subsequent 
processes. To both physical processes which are respectively 
the origin and the result of the disposition correspond mental 
processes. Hence if we are to have a complete parallelism 
between the two series and to give an independent explanation 
of each, we must also admit mental dispositions, corresponding 
to organic dispositions and accounting for the continuity and 
the connection of the mental series, as the organic disposition 
accounts for it in the organic series. We have seen above that 
this is the argument used by Ebbinghaus: psychical dispositions 
are necessary to account for the causal nexus of mental states in 
the same manner as physical dispositions are necessary in the 
physical series. But leaving theories for the present, let us 
examine the facts themselves, and try to find what sort of dis- 
positions their explanation requires. 

Retention and Reproduction. 

Memory as a psychological faculty includes: (i) retention; 
(2) reproduction; (3) recognition and localization in time — of 
a past conscious process. With the first two conditions mental 
habit is intimately connected, while it rather tends to exclude the 
third. The term memory, as we have seen, has sometimes 
been used in a much broader sense to include all retention of 
impressions in organic matter. To this usage it is justly ob- 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. S3 

jected that ' the idea of consciousness is so deeply involved in 
the connotation of the word that it should be restricted to its 
ordinary, limited use.'^ Ribot's 'organic memory' is no 
memory at all, but merely habit, as Malebranche had more 
wisely called it. The same must be said of Luys' ' unconscious 
reminiscences,' which, since they are unconscious, cannot be 
called reminiscences. The modification and tendency of the 
nervous system to reproduce the same processes it has gone 
through "is no more fitly called 'organic memory' than are 
the molecular alterations produced by generations of use in the 
wood of an old Cremona."^ 

If we consider the first two stages of memory, retention and 
reproduction either of simple or of associated processes, it 
cannot be denied that the organism is an important factor. In 
view of the recent investigations on memory, its diseases, its 
different localizations in the brain, and also on the ability of the 
nerves to preserve traces of received impressions and dispo- 
sitions to renew them, we can no longer with Hamilton and 
others already mentioned neglect physiological explanations as 
being ' too contemptible even for serious criticism.' On the 
contrary, " most psychologists admit to-day that the retention 
of knowledge is a physiological property of the brain cortex. 
The psychical fact which has ceased to be conscious has ceased 
to exist; that which remains is a purely organic modification." 
The lesson which the school boy has learnt is not in him in the 
form of unconscious ideas while he is playing with other boys; 
and yet he knows it and soon- will prove that he does by reciting 
it. What he has in himself is a disposition which consists in 
' an acquired property of his cortical substance.'^ 

Even if I have made no effort to commit an idea to memory 
it may recur unexpectedly after long years of absence, and for 
this reason it is doubted whether an idea which has once been 
present in the mind can ever be forgotten. It may remain 
dormant for a very long time, and suddenly without apparent 

'Burnliam, 'On Memory,' .Imer. Journal of Psychol., 18S9, p. 269. 
*Ladd, Elcm. of Physiol. Psychology, §21, p. 55+. 

'Edm. Goblot, ' Theorie physiologique de I'association,' Rev. philosophique, 
Vol. 46, 189S, p. 4S9. 



§4 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

reason flash into consciousness again, perhaps with greater 
vividness and greater accuracy of details than many other fre- 
quently repeated ideas. Numerous cases are on record of the 
revival, after many years, of impressions which had scarcely 
been noticed when they were first received. This happens espe- 
cially and more strikingly in certain pathological cases. ^ We 
can never say of any impression that it has utterly and forever 
vanished so as never to recur.^ 

When an idea has once been in the mind, whether we inten- 
tionally have tried to store it up or not, it may be revived; and 
for this result, according to some psychologists, it is sufficient 
to admit the permanence of physiological dispositions. All our 
mental states have their necessary conditions in brain processes, 
and therefore when, owing to a stimulation from without or 
from within, the physical disposition is excited and the cerebral 
process repeated, the corresponding mental process is also re- 
vived. And if the impression received in the organism has 
been modified by blending and associating with others, the re- 
produced process also will be modified in consequence, both in 
the organic and in the mental series. Thus the so-called asso- 
ciation of ideas is nothing in reality but the association of 
organic processes and dispositions. Mental habit is reduced to 
organic habit; the facilitation in the reproduction of mental 
actions, the tendencies of the mind, are nothing but the conse- 
quence of the organic functions with which they are correlated. 

We need not stop to consider the objection which is some- 
times urged, that the brain is not able to store up a sufficient 
number of impressions to explain all our ideas with their infinite 
number of associations and combinations. The known prop- 

>Cf. Taine, De I'intelligence, P. I., 1. II., ch. II. 

^ " Une multitude d'objets et d'evenements oublies reparaissent a I'improviste. 
L'esprit subitement peuple de leur foule remuante, ressemble a une boite de 
rotiferes desseches, inertes depuis dix ans, et qui tout d'un coup saupoudres d'eau, 
recommencent a vivre et a fourmiller. . . . On ne peut pas assigner de limites a 
ces renaissances, et Ton est force d'accorder a toute sensation, si rapide, si peu 
importante, si effacee qu'elle soil, une aptitude indefinie a renaitre, sans mutilation 
ni perte, meme a une distance enorme." Pp. 131, 134. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 85 

ertles of the nervous elements seem to furnish a satisfactory 
answer.^ 

A difficulty which the theory of physical dispositions has to 
meet arises from the fact of metabolism. The elements of our 
body are little by little renewed ; they are in constant flux. The 
building up by assimilation of external particles of matter 
and the breaking down by giving back to the inorganic world 
other particles which were a part of our body is a process that 
never ceases. The nerve elements are not exempted from the 
general law, but are constantly coming in and going out. 

It is true that the change takes place slowly, gradually, and 
as all the nerve cells communicate with one another, and none is 
isolated and independent, we may say that a disposition left in a 
certain group is not lost, but persists even after the whole group 
has been destroyed. It is communicated to the newly introduced 
elements by those which remain, for all form the same con- 
tinuous network, or what Taine calls a ' cordon continu.' If 
from time to time a new stimulation reinstates the primitive 
process, the aptitude to reproduce it is given a new force and 
can thus be perpetuated without loss. Otherwise it is difficult 
to conceive that such an aptitude does not grow weaker and 
weaker, and finally disappear. But we have seen that it is 
doubtful whether a sensation ever so completely disappears that 
it cannot be revived even after a very long interval. Taine's 
rotifers, it is true, are reanimated by a few drops of water 
sprinkled upon them, after being apparently lifeless for many 
years; but in the meantime they have not changed. It is more 
difficult to conceive that after many years of inactivity the cells 
in the remotest corner of the brain, having been changed sev- 
eral times successively, have nevertheless kept the disposition 
acquired by one of their predecessors to reproduce the ' former 
dance,' and that they have not lost any of the 'characters' and 
'types' which were impressed on them. However the difficulty, 
great as it may be, is not perhaps insuperable. The properties 
of the nervous system are but imperfectly known. The theories 
on the nature of its activity, of the traces left and of their inter- 

'Cf. Baldwin, Senses and Intellect, pp. 157 ff. Bain, Aliiid and Body, ch. V. 
Ribot, Sollier, etc., op. cit. 



S6 CHARLES A. DVBRAY. 

communication are more or less plausible hypotheses, but they 
are not conclusions established scientifically in all cases. Sci- 
ence, as it becomes more perfect, discovers more marvellous 
properties of the nervous substance; perhaps nervous retention 
and communication will also receive full and complete expla- 
nation. 

The same objection may be urged from a slightly different 
point of view. It is a well known fact that in old age it hap- 
pens that early impressions occur with greater vividness than 
later impressions; the earliest seem to be the most lasting. An 
old man may forget recent important events, and have a perfect 
remembrance of impressions, sometimes insignificant in them- 
selves, which date back to early childhood. Aristotle explained 
the absence of memory in children and in old persons by saying 
that their organ of memory is in constant flux, increasing in the 
former, in the latter decreasing.^ To-day we are told that 
the brain substance in the child is softer and more plastic, and 
receives impressions more easily. Moreover, as the characters 
printed on it are few, it follows that it preserves them more 
distinctly and can reproduce them more vividly. This is true; 
but in the old man who now remembers, the brain elements 
have lost their plasticity and their aptitude to easily receive 
impressions. They have lost their facility for entering again 
into vibration and repeating their 'dances.' And yet it is to such 
elements that former residua and traces have been transmitted. 
The various materials of the brain have been renewed several 
times. Former dispositions must have been communicated to 
the new elements which are hard, inflexible, and have entered 
into numerous different combinations and dynamic associations. 
They must have been transmitted through long successive gen- 
erations of brain cells, and they are reproduced now in all their 
vividness, while strong impressions, received directly from the 
actual sensations themselves, are feeble and soon obliterated. 
It is indeed difficult, if retention is a function of the brain alone, 
to explain how the same brain matter keeps a stronger dispo- 
sition to reproduce a long forgotten idea, the vividness of which 

' De mem. et rem., 450b, 5 flf. Cf. above, p. 29. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. §7 

should have weakened in the process of transmission, than to 
reproduce recent and more striking ideas. 

The main objection, however, against the theory which makes 
of retention and reproduction a cerebral function is that the 
excitation of an organic disposition can never give anything 
but an organic process, which is toto coelo different from the 
mental state. The fact to be explained is the return to con- 
sciousness; and if the brain does not produce thought, if the 
action of body on mind be denied, how can we explain conscious 
reproduction with purely physical dispositions? "There is 
needed a parallel reproductive activity in the mind itself. 
However wonderfully the nascent-motor excitations might 
work, the product would be non-existent for the mind unless it 
build it up within and for itself."^ For this reason, many psy- 
chologists, as we have seen, require psychical dispositions even 
to account for retention and reproduction. 

Recognition. 

Even if we could account for simple reproduction by admit- 
ting only organic dispositions, would it be the same if we con- 
sidered the two other stages of memory, recognition and its 
complement, localization in time? Without recognition, simple 
reproduction would be of no avail to us. We might acquire 
habits of reproduction, a tendency to perform the same actions, 
to go through the same processes, and yet not even be aware of 
the repetition. Recognition includes a comparison of the pres- 
ent with the past. It is the consciousness of a reexperience, 
not only the absence of a feeling of newness, or a certain vague 
familiarity with the object presented, but the positive identifica- 
tion of the present with a definite past state of consciousness. 

The fact of recognition is frequently overlooked by those 
who make of memory a purely organic function, or it is passed 
over in a few words which contain no explanation. They tell 
us how an experience can be reproduced, and immediately take 
it for granted that it must be recognized. Thus Maudsley 
holds that "to recollect is to revive these experiences in the 

' Bovvne, Mctajthysics, p. 396. 



8S# CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

highest centers, the functions of which are attended with con- 
sciousness; to stimulate by external or internal causes, their 
residua, aptitudes, dispositions, or whatever else we may choose 
to call them, into functional activity. Stimulated from without, 
they constitute recognition, that is, cognition with memory of 
former cognition; stimulated from within, they constitute recol- 
lection.'" According to Guyau also," if the phonograph record 
was endowed with consciousness, it would, from the fact that 
they are repeated, recognize old tunes already played. 

Yet the two facts must be distinguished; we may have repeti- 
tion de facto, and the experience may be new for consciousness. 
We know that in many cases a state of consciousness which is 
repeated may not be recognized as a repetition. The same book 
may be read, the same tune listened to, and yet appear to be 
new. The image of a past presentation may return to con- 
sciousness, and the fact that it is an image of some object 
formerly known, be unnoticed. Ideas, expressions, sentences, 
verses, tunes, etc., may occur to consciousness with the apparent 
novelty of a discovery, and nevertheless be the reproduction of 
past experience. A trace had been left by the former presen- 
tation, which now, being stimulated, gives actual repetition 
without recognition. " It is an assumption made by many 
writers that the revival of an image is all that is needed to con- 
stitute the memory of the original occurrence. But such a 
revival is obviously not a memory, whatever else it may be; it 
is simply a duplicate, a second event, having absolutely no con- 
nection with the first event except that it happens to resemble 
it. . . . Psychical objects . . . simply recurring in successive 
editions will remember each other on that account no more 
than clock-strokes do. No memory is involved in the mere fact 
of recurrence."^ 

The theories of recognition are numerous;^ to explain and 
discuss them is outside the plan of the present study. But we 
must notice that exclusively physiological solutions are obviously 

^Physiology of Mind, p. 515. 

^ Revue philos., IX., 319 ff. 

' James, Principles 0/ Psych., I., 649. 

* See Baldwin, Diet, of Phil, and Psych., where they are exposed methodically. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. §9 

•inadequate. Even were they sufficient to explain the reproduc- 
tion and the frequency of certain ideas, they would not suffice 
here. Recognition means more than that; one must not only 
have the same idea, but also perceive its relation of likeness, 
agreement, similarity, identity with a past Idea. As cognition 
is essentially a mental act, so also is recognition ; and how could 
the mind identify the present with the past experience, if it had 
not kept in itself some vestige or trace of the past experience? 
To quote again Professor Bowne : " Repetition Is not memory. 
Reexperience is not recognition. If then the brain were a store- 
house of ideas, and should continually present them before the 
mind, there would be nothing to suggest to the mind the fact 
of reproduction, unless the mind had an Independent power of 
recognition In Itself. . . . The brain-register alone could never 
bring us to a knowledge of the past unless the mind had in 
itself an Independent power of memory."' Hence Professor 
Ladd calls all the attempts to explain the recognltive activity by 
physiological conditions ' hollow and vain.'' 

Even if the facilitation of the nervous process could impart 
to the mind a certain sense of familiarity In consequence of 
which the object would reappear with some kind of 'Bekannt- 
heitsqualltat,' this would not yet be recognition, /. e., the Identi- 
fication of the present Idea with one that is passed and remem- 
bered as such individually.^ I may be aware of the facility 
with which the present process a occurs to consciousness; this 
would lead me at most to Infer that it must have occurred 
before. But it would not lead me to the positive act of refer- 
ring a to an Individual past state A which has been present at 
such a given time, under such or such determined circumstances. 

Recognition is an essentially relative knowledge, and the 
fttndamentiim relationis cannot be merely in the organism, but 
must be found in the mind itself. Whatever be the nature of 
the psychical action known as recognition, whether we Insist on 

' Introd. to Psychol. Theory, p. 84. 

^Psychology, Descriptive and E.xplanatory, p. 399. 

'On the ' Bekanntheitsqualitat.' See Hoffding, Psychologic, 166 ff. Also 
Vierteljahrschrift f. iviss. Phil., Vol. 13 and 14. Cf. Criticism by Rehrake, Lehr- 
huch der allgemeinen Psychologic, 498 ff. 



9° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

attention, on reinstatement of apperceptive relations, on cona- 
tion, feelings, expectation, etc., it remains true that the perma- 
nent link between two transitory cognitive acts, referred to one 
another as cognitions, cannot be anywhere else than in the cog- 
nitive faculty itself. 

We should be led to the same conclusion if, instead of taking 
recognition and identification, we considered the act of discrim- 
ination. Such an act is more complex, for it implies repro- 
duction and recognition, and then comparison. To say of the 
present sound that it is louder, more acute than a preceding 
sound, or of a color that it is darker or brighter than another 
perceived in the past, supposes that some disposition has been 
left in the faculty which is able to discern, to pronounce on 
the agreement or on the difference. If I compare three sensa- 
tions of hearing JBC which have taken place in the past, with 
the present one D, and notice the individual qualities by which 
they differ, this supposes the recognition of the qualities of 
ABC, as this only can enable me to point out the differences. 
Of the corresponding series ahc of processes in the brain and 
the nervous system I hardly know anything; and did I know all 
about them, it would be of no avail; such processes are material 
and not cognitive. The disposition uniting abed, cannot ex- 
plain my present mental act; but the mental processes themselves 
must have left some disposition in the mind. 

For the same reason the perception of a causal connection 
between successive mental states requires psychical dispositions. 
In a series ABCDE ... I may perceive that E, the present 
state, comes from Z), which is passed, that D was the result of 
C, etc. How is this possible if these states have left no trace 
in the mind? 

A physical event takes place at a given time ; still it does not 
In Itself and for Itself bear its own date, but only for the mind 
that knows it. The mind alone can perceive the similarity of 
the present with the past; the mind alone can refer Its own states 
to a definite period of the past; the mind alone can perceive the 
causal nexus between processes. In a word, the mind alone 
recognizes and localizes events in time, and this implies the 
existence of dispositions in the mind. If in the series 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 9'' 

Ml M, M3 M4 Afg Me . . . M„ (mental) 
P—P,—Ps—P—P,—Pe P. (physical) 

the physical processes alone are connected by dispositions, I 
understand the greater facility with which they occur; I under- 
stand also — if I admit some kind of causal relations between 
the two series — that the corresponding mental states which they 
condition are reproduced and facilitated by repetition. I may 
even understand in this last hypothesis a certain sense of ease 
and familiarity. But if there is nothing to unite M^ M2 Af ., M4 
. . . Af „ ; if there is no mental disposition, I cannot understand 
that these former states are known to me as having occurred 
so long ago, under such circumstances. I cannot understand 
that the present M,, is recognized as a rep^etition of iV/g M^. 
. . . Mj. Recognition is exclusively in the mental series, and 
therefore must be accounted for within that series. Neither 
cognition nor recognition are found in the physical series. If 
Ml Mo Mg . . . A/„, are sparks of consciousness correspond- 
ing to Pi Po P3 . . . P„, and vanishing at once entirely and 
forever, leaving no trace or disposition, it seems impossible that 
dispositions left by Pj P, Pg . . . P„ should enable me to rec- 
ognize or discriminate the mental processes, or to perceive their 
causal relation. 

Determination of the Future. 

The argument is not always so cogent if, instead of consider- 
ing the disposition as resulting from the past and explaining the 
present, we consider it as resulting from the present and prepar- 
ing the future. In some cases, it is true, this point of view 
would not differ essentially from the preceding one and would 
lead to the same conclusions. I may now resolve to go and visit 
a friend at a given time in the future. When I execute my 
determination, a process of memory, and to some extent of rec- 
ognition, takes place, for my present idea is recalled to con- 
sciousness either by spontaneous recurrence or association, or by 
a voluntary effort. Such a process, as we have seen, requires 
the presence of some trace in the mind itself. 

But in other cases there is no conscious revival of the idea 
before the determined action takes place. The man who before 



92 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

going to sleep makes up his mind to awaken at a determined 
time the next morning and succeeds in doing so, has not recalled 
his resolution to consciousness before the act takes place. More 
striking perhaps is the fact of post-hypnotic suggestion. I tell 
a hypnotized subject: in a week, on such a day, at such an hour, 
you will perform such an action. Then I arouse him, and at 
the appointed time the idea suggested by me, which has not been 
recalled in the interval, all of a sudden flashes into his mind, 
and he executes my command. 

Such facts have not received as yet a complete and satisfac- 
tory explanation. Psychological as well as physiological theo- 
ries are inadequate and are open to many difficulties. Perhaps 
the brain centers are capable of receiving a determined tension; 
then the resolution or the suggestion is like the winding up 
of a watch in order to make it run for a certain time, or 
rather like the setting of an alarm clock in order to make it 
ring at a certain hour. Its immediate effect would be to 'set' 
the brain centers so as to make them produce the desired effect. 
But can the brain centers keep time so accurately? And if 
instead of 'one' I say 'ten' weeks, how does such a slight change 
in my sentence have the marvellous result of making ten times 
longer the interval that elapses between my suggestion and its 
execution? In both cases, the disposition, if it is purely physio- 
logical, seems insufficient to account for the difference in the 
result; so that the mind has probably something to do in the 
revival of the suggested idea. 

Whatever be the value of this last consideration, the other 
reasons given above explain why so many psychologists postu- 
late psychical dispositions. These dispositions seem necessary 
to account for the facts of conscious reproduction, and espe- 
cially for those of recognition. Let us now try to see what 
they are. 

2. Possibility of Knowing Psychical Dispositions. 

Objections and Answers. 

Some psychologists, while admitting the existence of psy- 
chical dispositions, deny the possibility of ever knowing what 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 93 

they are. They are, writes Lipps, of a 'completely unknown' 
nature; and Wundt adds that in the physical world we can in 
the future hope to understand better that which is now obscure, 
but for psychical dispositions there is no such hope, since they 
are unconscious, and the limits of consciousness are at the same 
time the limits of our inner experience. 

Others reject the theory of psychical dispositions; they admit 
that if we consider it in regard to the facts it seeks to account 
for, it is sufficient and offers a satisfactory solution. But if v/e 
consider it in itself, a great objection against it is its obscurity. 
It accounts for the phenomena by something at least as obscure, 
if not more obscure, than the phenomena themselves. Once 
we have stated it nothing more can be said of it. Thus 
Rabier: "Nous croyons volontiers que cette opinion est vraie, 
et elle peut etre adoptee concurremment avec celle que nous 
allons proposer tout a I'heure {i. e., physiological habit) . Elle 
a malheureusement un grave defaut, c'est que, quand on I'a 
enoncee, on a dit tout ce qu'il est possible d'en dire."' And 
Baldwin similarly: "As a description of the actual facts this 
is true" . . . , but "we do not at all explain the activity of 
memory. When we have called it a habit, a disposition, a 
permanent tendency of mind, what more can we say?" We 
can know psychical dispositions neither by analogy with the 
conscious states themselves nor by analogy with physical dispo- 
sitions. In the former case we would fall into the theory of 
unconscious representations, since a fundamental disposition can 
only consist in a slight persistence of function. On the other 
hand, physical dispositions mean "combination or arrangement, 
a readiness of parts for a given result. But in speaking of 
presentations as functions, we cannot employ such a meaning."^ 

How far is this objection justified? We evidently must 
admit that we can have no direct knowledge of psychical dispo- 
sitions. We call them psychical, not because they are conscious, 
but because they are found in the mental series, linking together 
states of consciousness, being an after-effect of one, and a tend- 
ency to reproduce another like the first. But the knowledge 

^Psychologic, p. 159. 

'Senses and Intellect, pp. 153-153. 



94 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

which we have of physiological dispositions is not more direct 
and immediate than that of psychical dispositions. No one 
has ever observed those molecular groupings, those different 
movements, those feeble vibrations and oscillations, etc., which 
are supposed to account for the tendency to reproduce certain 
processes in the organism. They are possible, and may be to 
a certain extent necessary, but they have never been and can 
never be observed directly. Neither the brain when it acts nor 
its conditions of activity can be perceived by us; it is only by 
analogy that we can infer the nature of some of its states and 
activities. The same is true of psychical dispositions; we are 
not conscious of them, but we must admit them as causes and 
effects of conscious states immediately known to us. 

But it is urged that the preservation of some after-effect in 
the nervous system once it has been stimulated has been scien- 
tifically demonstrated; experiments have shown that all excita- 
tion leaves an echo or resonance (retentissement) which makes 
further excitation easier. True; but has not our own inner 
experience shown that a mental state also exerts an influence 
upon a following mental state; that once it has been present in 
consciousness, there also remains a certain echo of it, which is 
not the persistence of the representation in consciousness any 
more than the echo is the continued uninterrupted sound? 
Those functions of retention which are attributed to the brain 
have an essentially psychological origin. They have been 
assumed as explanations of conscious reproduction. 

We can, it is true, describe a physical disposition, and this 
is impossible for psychical dispositions; but here again we must 
be cautious. We have indeed numerous descriptions of the 
mode according to which the brain preserves impressions, but 
most of them are fanciful, and evidently must not be taken 
literally. The brain becomes a phonograph, a piano, a print- 
ing shop, a book, a wax tablet, a dancing hall, an electric accu- 
mulator, etc. Such comparisons used by serious thinkers show 
the difficulty of conceiving and of expressing how the brain 
retains. Metaphors in such great number and such great 
variety are indications of this difficulty, and frequently are used 
to cover the obscurity of an answer. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 95 

When an attempt is made at a scientific explanation, then 
we are offered different molecular arrangements, various mo- 
tions and vibrations, and, as a result of all these, tenden- 
cies to certain functions. All these hypotheses are very plaus- 
ible, but they are simply conjectures. Organic habit is an 
undeniable fact, but can we not say of it what was objected 
to the theory of psychological habit? "When we have called 
it a habit, a disposition, a permanent tendency . . . what 
more can we say?" The same questions arise: On what is 
it based? "Is it an ultimate law, or can it be reduced 
to simpler principles?" What is the nature of the law of 
habit? What is the 'tendency of a nervous center, system, or 
element to function in a particular manner, either from native 
endowment or from previous functioning' ? There is 'an actual 
canalization or anatomical path-making which results from con- 
tinued nervous discharges in the same direction'; and a 'pref- 
erential determination of a function, relatively to other func- 
tions, as to its pathway of discharge.'^ This description may 
be the best that can be given in the actual state of science, but 
is it perfect? We easily picture the whole thing to ourselves, 
but how far is it a complete explanation of reality? We think 
of a torrent which forms its bed little by little, of a road which 
is enlarged and made more even; but we must beware of the 
fallacy which makes us conceive as true explanation that which 
our senses can easily represent. The 'Bahnung,' canalization, 
or furrowing of the brain might explain the facilitation if we 
admitted something like the 'animal spirits' of old, — this purest 
and subtlest essence of the blood, — which are constantly run- 
ning through the brain, and from the brain to the body, and 
from the body to the brain. But physiology has not yet deter- 
mined with certitude what is the nature of the nervous current. 
Some expressions frequently used in speaking of organic traces 
would lead us to believe that the nervous current is the motion 
of material elements which can enlarge their paths. The apti- 
tude to repeat processes exists in the nerves and in the brain; 
canalization and path-making are attempts to explain it, but 

' Baldwin, Senses and Intellect, toe. cit. Diet, of Pliil. and Psychol., s. v. 
Disposition; Facilitation. 



96 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

as far as scientific conclusions go, such terms are metaphors and 
only illustrations. 

But again one may insist that although tendency as such in 
the material world may be mysterious, still we can give an 
intelligible explanation of its actual basis: a different arrange- 
ment and combination of parts must influence the activity of 
the whole group, and hence tend to a given result. In speaking 
of psychical dispositions, this is impossible since the mind has 
no parts. In such an objection we seem to forget that we 
deal with a mental series the nature of which is different from 
that of the physical series. Of course we cannot speak of it in 
terms of matter; we cannot speak of parts and of their arrange- 
ment. But does this prevent the mental series from being real? 
Is not a conscious state as real as a motion of matter? Yet 
it has no extension; it cannot be measured; it is admittedly irre- 
ducible to material activity. Hence if both conscious and mate- 
rial processes are real and yet of different nature, is it to be 
wondered at that the disposition between two conscious acts 
is different in nature from the disposition between two material 
processes? Is the reality of the psychical disposition to be 
denied because we cannot reduce it to an arrangement of parts? 
We might just as well deny the existence of the conscious state 
because it cannot be reduced to material motion. 

It is also objected that physical dispositions can be known 
from their antecedent and from their consequent, from the 
process which gave them rise and from the process to which they 
tend. But this again is forbidden us in the case of psychical 
dispositions, since they are an unconscious link between two con- 
scious processes. Although the disposition of the nerve may be 
actually of an unknown nature, we may hope to know it later 
when observation has more accurate and more powerful means; 
at least we conceive of it as knowable and observable. We 
moreover have some knowledge of it from the knowledge 
of its cause and of its result. Psychical dispositions will 
forever remain unconscious, and we have no hope of ever ob- 
serving them. Should our powers of introspection increase a 
thousandfold, they would not enable us to discover that which 
is out of consciousness. Finally, in matter we can think of 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 97 

functional dispositions which are a slight persistence of the 
function, but in the mind the same assumption would lead us 
to the admission of unconscious presentations which are impos- 
sible and contradictory. 

In answer let us examine how far we can know physical dis- 
positions in the above-described manner. The future artist on 
the piano is now taking one of his first lessons; his fingers move 
awkwardly on the keyboard, his movements are full of hesita- 
tion; he has to consider attentively what key he must strike, 
with what hand, with what finger. Even when that has been 
decided upon, the finger performs with difficulty the movement 
which is commanded, mistakes are frequent, the wrong note is 
struck more than once. Compare this with the same indi- 
vidual's motions after he has become a skilful player; how sure 
they are, how graceful; no more hesitation; one can hardly 
perceive the quick motions of the fingers, and yet they always 
strike the right keys and in the right manner. Certainly a 
wonderful aptitude and disposition has been developed. But 
what is its nature? Shall the antecedent and the consequent 
playing manifest it to us? When the artist is not playing, his 
disposition and skill remain with him. We know that he has 
played, and this is the antecedent; we know that he can play 
if he chooses, and this is the consequent. But the disposition 
itself, what is that? It is insisted that it must be a 'slight per- 
sistence of the function.' Yes, but of what function? Cer- 
tainly not of the piano-playing function, which therefore throws 
no light on the disposition in se. Two exercises on the piano 
are linked together by an organic disposition resulting from the 
first and facilitating the second. It may be "quite beside the 
mark to urge . . . that the effect of training a group of mus- 
cles is not shown in the persistence of slight movements during 
Intervals of apparent rest. The absence of. molar motions is 
no evidence of the absence of molecular motions."' True, but 
there is a certain confusion In this explanation. We seek to 
explain the disposition between two 'molar' motions, and we 
are told that It consists of 'molecular' motions. It may be so, 

' Ward, art. ' Psychology ' in Encycl. Brit., p. 48. Cf. Baldwin, op cit., I. c; 
Fouillee, Evolulionnisme des Idees-forces, p. 65. 



98 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

but when we say that the disposition is a faint persistence of 
the function, we must mean, if we want to explain anything at 
all concerning the nature of disposition, that it is the persist- 
ence of the same or of a similar function, and this is evidently 
false. Molecular motions are widely different from molar 
motions. 

This seems to be the weakness of the whole theory of uncon- 
scious presentations, of 'infinitesimal presentations so faint as 
to elude discrimination,' as Ward describes them. What re- 
mains in the organism after an excitation is supposed to be a 
slight persistence of it, and what remains in the mind is also 
supposed to be a slight, indiscriminated persistence of the cor- 
responding presentation. This is purely gratuitous; we have 
just seen what we must think of the persistence of the organic 
function. Now, if to arouse in the mind a presentation, we 
must have in the brain correlative processes of a certain nature 
and of a certain intensity, can we say that a presentation will 
also correspond to other brain processes of another nature and 
intensity, and differing from the first as widely as the molecular 
motions differ from the molar motions in the pianist's fingers? 
"Surely the capability of being put into a mental state is itself 
a mental state and something actual, and is moreover a differ- 
ent something when the state to be reproduced is different 
. . . ; there must be something actual to justify the phrase 
'latent power.' " Most certainly; but the assertion remains 
unproved that such 'actual' thing is an 'actual presentation,' any 
more than in the material world the molecular motions are 
identical with, or similar to, molar motions, or any more than 
a slight persistence of 'some' function and some molecular move- 
ment in the pianist's finger is a slight persistence of the piano- 
playing function, or similar to it. 

How JVe Know Psychical Dispositions. 
The conclusion of the preceding pages is that all dispositions, 
physiological as well as psychical, are obscure. Doubtless the 
notion of psychical disposition seems more obscure than the 
other because we have no concrete means of representing it to 
ourselves. But we have seen that even physical dispositions in 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 99 

the organism are far from being explained. Ribot acknowl- 
edges it explicitly; after showing that memory requires special 
'modifications' received and preserved in the nervous elements, 
he declares that it is impossible to explain the nature of these 
modifications; but facts and reasoning prove their existence.^ 

We may multiply illustrations and figures, use more or less 
accurate metaphors, describe even the smallest details in a man- 
ner which is highly imaginary; when all that is done, have we 
said what a physical disposition really is? No; a disposition, 
wherever it is, implies, it is true, an actual state which is its 
basis, but it is also essentially a correlative term. It is only in 
the abstract that we can speak of a disposition simply. All dis- 
position is necessarily a disposition to, a tendency to, something. 
Therefore to a disposition corresponds necessarily some effect 
to which it tends. It is precisely by studying that effect that 
we can acquire some knowledge of the disposition. This does 
not manifest the disposition itself, but it may help us to frame 
theories. It is by considering what the organism does, by 
studying the effects of organic dispositions, that physiologists 
have been led to explain their actual basis by various hypotheses. 
When we speak of mental dispositions, the question is more 
difficult because its solution depends on the solution given to the 
larger problem of the nature of the mind. It leads us at once 
to the highest metaphysics of mental philosophy ; and it is only 
after the question concerning the entity of the mind is answered 
that we can give a full answer to the question : What is a psy- 
chical disposition? 

The attempt to limit ourselves to experience in psychology, 
and even in all other sciences, must necessarily prove to be a 
failure. "Just as in physical science, we account for observed 
facts by assuming unobserved conditions, so in mental science, 
we must transcend experience in order to explain experience. 
Only part of the factors which determine mental processes are 
definitely recognizable in consciousness. "- 

' " II est impossible de dire en quoi consiste cette modification. Ni le micro- 
scope, ni les reactifs, ni I'histologie, ni I'histociiimie ne peuvent nous I'apprendre; 
mais les fails et le raisonnement nous demontrent qu'elle a lieu." Maladies de la 
mcmoire, ch. I., §i, p. 14. 

''Stout, Analytic Psychology, p. 16. 



lOO CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

The use of physical expressions to express non-empirical 
concepts in the language of experience gives them indeed an 
empirical appearance. But we must not deceive ourselves; a 
tendency, a facilitation, a disposition, wherever it is, and in 
whatsoever order of things, is a notion which is above expe- 
rience. Dispositions are known from their effects in the same 
manner as we know a law from the observation of the phe- 
nomena. We can no more explain a disposition apart from its 
effects than we can explain a law apart from the phenomena 
which it is assumed to govern. To transfer into the physical 
order that which we can know only as belonging to the mental 
order is no help in psychological sciences. 

Wundt therefore is right when he says that we can never 
have the immediate perception and knowledge of psychical dis- 
positions; they are and must remain inaccessible to consciousness. 
Baldwin also is right when he denies the possibility of knowing 
the unconscious disposition from the conscious facts which pre- 
cede and follow it, since it is not conscious ; or from analogy with 
the physical disposition, since the psychical disposition cannot 
be conceived as resulting from an arrangement of material parts. 
However the general conclusion that no knowledge at all of 
mental dispositions is attainable does not seem to be justified. 
What we do not know from experience we frequently know 
by reasoning; what we cannot reach directly in itself we may 
perhaps reach indirectly by inferring the nature of the unob- 
servable cause from the nature of observed effects. What is 
not perceivable by the senses and by imagination is not always 
unintelligible for our reason. If it were otherwise, what would 
become of all inductive sciences ? We do not perceive a law of 
nature in se, but only in its effects and in the phenomena which 
it governs. Whenever we perceive the law, we perceive it in 
actii, i. e., together with the effects which it produces. In the 
same way we never perceive the disposition itself, but we see it 
at work when it is actualized or aroused. We know it — as 
far as it can be known — simultaneously with the effect which it 
explains. 

We must admit that our knowledge of psychical dispositions 
remains vague and imperfect, that it cannot be complete so long 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. lOi 

as we do not have a clear, perfect, adequate knowledge of the 
nature of the mind; that therefore It will remain incomplete for 
a long time yet — if not forever. But this is no reason to reject 
the existence of psychical dispositions, or to despise the little 
knowledge we can have of them. 

Without entering into the metaphysics of the human mind, 
we shall attempt briefly to define a little more the concept 
of psychical disposition, by a process of induction and compar- 
ison. We shall consider the effects of psychical dispositions 
and examine the analogy which these dispositions bear to cer- 
tain other notions. A part of the work has been done already 
in establishing the existence of psychical dispositions, since they 
are based on facts which they are required to explain. More- 
over some further considerations which may throw a little light 
on the subject will find their place in the next chapter. 

3. Further Determination of the Concept of 
Psychical Dispositions. 

The common effect of all habits and dispositions is an apti- 
tude to reproduce a given process, and to modify following 
actions to a degree which varies with the strength of the dispo- 
sition and the nature of the action performed. We can con- 
ceive of the possibility of a life in which every action once per- 
formed would disappear forever and leave no trace of itself. 
Such a life would be like a succession of views projected on a 
canvas, one view being seen for some time and then disappear- 
ing completely and influencing in no way those that follow. 
The same view may be reproduced several times, but there Is 
no connection between any two productions; the fact that It 
has been exhibited already does not make it easier for it to be 
exhibited a second time. If other views have been projected 
meanwhile the canvas keeps no impression which would mod- 
ify the reappearance of a former view. In the same way, in a 
life without dispositions and habits, the same causes would give 
rise to the same processes, but these would be entirely new for 
the mind and would have no connection with other processes. 
Man would begin his existence with certain powers and activi- 
ties, but these would always remain the same; actions would 



I02 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

be repeated but not remembered, not made easier; exercise 
would not improve our faculties nor increase our mental power; 
progress would be absolutely impossible. But we know that 
such is not the case ; we accumulate experiences, increase our 
knowledge and develop our faculties. 

Dispositions and Consciousness. 

We need not now insist on this aspect of the question ; it has 
already been touched upon where we have spoken of reproduc- 
tion and recognition. A psychical disposition is not conscious; 
yet it is an intermediate step between two conscious states. It 
is a kind of substitute for the mental process which it enables 
the mind to reviv^e and recognize. Mental states succeed one 
another very rapidly; to keep an idea before the mind for a 
long time, by what Locke calls contemplation, is not possible. 
The effort and tension which are necessary cannot be long suc- 
cessful; the Idea vanishes and gives place to another. But If 
it disappeared utterly and completely, without leaving any after- 
effect in the mind, consciousness would be a succession of dis- 
connected scenes, all new, all beyond the influence of those that 
have preceded. The disposition Is thus an essential factor in 
the mental series. 

It is not only a direct link between two similar mental states, 
and is not necessary to memory only; it has a much wider 
influence and reaches a multitude of conscious processes, which 
it contributes to produce and which It modifies In many different 
ways. A mental state is always complex and the disposition 
partakes of this character. An idea, besides its representative 
aspect, is oftentimes connected with affective and conative states. 
The disposition which it leaves retains these relations and ex- 
tends Its own influence to different groups of operations, by 
resemblance, contrast, association, etc. An apparently slight 
and in itself unimportant experience is sometimes the turning 
point of a whole life and changes Its course entirely, because 
the disposition left by it has been allowed to acquire a strong 
and general influence. 

Our own common experience shows that one idea, especially 
if it Is of an emotional nature, greatly modifies for some time 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 103 

our views, the direction of our attention, and our own mental 
life. A deep affliction produced by the loss of a dear friend 
will greatly change the mental attitude, although the idea may 
not be actually in consciousness. Objects and conversations, 
which at other times would be of great interest, are now 
entirely devoid of it. On the contrary, other objects which 
before would have passed unnoticed take an unwonted impor- 
tance, especially if they are related in some way to the lost 
friend. Other ideas will produce other effects, but all will have 
a certain degree of influence on other conscious states. This 
influence is greater when the disposition has been strengthened 
by frequent actualization, when it belongs to a more important 
mental faculty, when it has produced a habit, a strong and last- 
ing tendency of the mind. This effect is what we must now 
consider. 

Facilitation. 

A disposition is a modification of mental activity, by which 
the mind acquires an aptitude to repeat the same process. 
Repetition has for its effect facilitation, i. e., 'increased ease 
of function, or of disposition for it, resulting from stimulation 
of any sort.'^ It is an increase of effectiveness which has refer- 
ence to the overcoming of the obstacles which oppose the action 
and consequently diminishes the effort necessary to the produc- 
tion of that action. 

Effort supposes some difficulty, obstruction, resistance, and 
means an intensification of activity in order to overcome these. 
Facilitation includes both the reduction of the resistance and 
the increase of energy. Hence facilitation implies readiness 
to act and ease in performing the action. The obstacles being 
removed, the obstructions leveled, the process must take place 
more easily and be accomplished in less time. Energy being 
increased, or at least being given a certain direction rather than 
another, will issue in action more readily. 

If I must go to a certain place towards which there is no 
road, in a country little known to me, I am likely to find many 
obstacles which will delay me. Hills, fences, fields, the uncer- 

' Baldwin and Stout, in Diet, of P/til. and Psychol. 



I04 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

tainty of the direction to be followed, losing my way, etc., are 
all so many difficulties which on the one hand will impede my 
progress, and on the other will exhaust my strength. I may 
reach my destination, but the process will be slow, and on my 
side the result will be fatigue and exhaustion. This travel can 
be facilitated in two ways. First, a road can be made, smooth 
and level, thus doing away with the impediments and hin- 
drances. Then instead of walking I may use other means of 
traveling which will dispense with the exertion required in the 
former case, and will not necessitate the expenditure of so much 
energy. Both the making of a good road and the improve- 
ment of the means of transportation or the increase of locomo- 
tive energy combined will give the best result: rapidity of transit 
with less effort. 

In our opinion, we ought to conceive of mental facilitation 
in a similar manner. The mental series cannot, it is true, be 
reduced to the physiological series, but still it is certain that 
both are in close dependence. Not all nervous processes are 
correlated with consciousness, not all have a mental side; but 
all conscious activity has a correlate in the organism, all mental 
process has a corresponding physiological process without which 
it could not take place. It seems that a great number of obsta- 
cles must come from the organism. It is needless to insist on 
the fact of physiological habituation which we have already 
mentioned. Our daily experience shows clearly that the repe- 
tition of certain movements makes them easier. Skating, 
dancing, fencing, swimming, piano-playing etc., become me- 
chanical actions. Movements which at first were difficult and 
required continued effort and attention become automatic. The 
limbs acquire dexterity and suppleness; the nerves and muscles 
are ready to perform without hesitation certain coordinated 
movements. What is the exact nature of that facilitation we 
can hardly determine in the present state of physiological sci- 
ence. Metaphors of paths becoming level and smooth, of 
roads opened wider, of obstructions being removed, are good 
illustrations, but cannot be taken literally. As we have said 
above, we are obliged to use these analogies to explain facts 
that are absolutely certain. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 105 

Exercise not only removes the obstacles, it also increases the 
strength of the exercised organ. The muscles of the working- 
man are much stronger than those of the man who takes little 
exercise; the energy of which the organism disposes seems to 
accumulate there as a consequence of the repeated exercise. In 
the same way the brain acquires greater facility, greater en- 
ergy by repeated functioning. Hence the facilitation of mental 
processes is explained partly by the acquired properties of the 
brain. 

But on the mental side itself there are obstacles. Ideas may 
conflict with one another ; previously acquired or native tenden- 
cies may oppose the recall to consciousness of a certain process. 
The mental process is real, although it is not similar to, or 
produced by, the physical process. Then why should not its 
production determine and modify the mind itself? The notion 
of a mental energy distinct from the energy of the brain is not 
acceptable to a great number of psychologists, and as we cannot 
discuss it here, we shall not speak of the possible increase of 
mental energy. Yet no one will deny that we have the power 
to perform mental work and that exercise greatly modifies that 
power. There is a development of our mental life, there is an 
increase of power to perform certain actions. By attention we 
apply ourselves to certain actions, and little by little the activity 
of the mind takes one special direction rather than another. 
As our mental power is limited, this tendency will probably 
affect other processes and make them more difficult. 

In short, as in all living beings exercise of function means an 
increase of facility in the performance of that function, so in 
man the exercise of mental activity modifies the tendency of the 
mind, gives it a special direction towards those acts which have 
been frequently repeated. 

Disposition and Habit. 
The word disposition is frequently given a very broad and 
extensive meaning, referring to all tendencies whatever be their 
origin and their object. Sometimes also, the word is used in 
the Aristotelian sense of a weak, easily changeable habit. Or 
again the terms habit and disposition are used as synonyms. 



Io6 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Thus, in the question of memory, many psychologists speak 
indifferently of the theory of mental habit or of the theory of 
psychical dispositions. In this dissertation both words have 
been used and will again be used one for the other; yet a closer 
examination, without excluding the many points of contact, 
might show some differences between habits and dispositions 
in so far as these explain memory. 

A disposition is left in the mind after only one experience, 
and it is probable that we never have an experience without 
preserving some trace of it. How many things can we not 
remember which we have seen, heard, perceived only once. 
Habit, on the contrary, is not so easily acquired. A man who 
performs an action once is not said to have the habit of it, and 
in order to become habitual the action must generally have been 
repeated many times. It is true that habit must begin with the 
first act in the series of those actions which we call habitual, but 
no one would call it a habit while it is at that stage. 

Another difference is that while the psychical disposition 
sometimes, namely in memory, tends to bring back an idea to 
consciousness, habit always tends to weaken consciousness. 
Actual memory, or the image based on psychical dispositions, 
is the actual reproduction in consciousness of what had formerly 
been conscious. Habit renders less and less conscious the action 
which at first required a distinct conscious effort for every one 
of its elements, and tends to make it automatic. We may ask: 
What do we mean then by mental habit? When we speak of 
a good memory we mean the habit of easily, automatically 
retaining and reproducing past impressions. In what does this 
differ from psychical dispositions? We must distinguish two 
elements which make up a good habitual memory. There is in 
the first place the disposition which an idea has left and which 
tends to reproduce that idea in consciousness. But this dispo- 
sition needs to be stimulated, actualized either by a new percep- 
tion of some external object, or by an internal stimulus such 
as the presence of an idea in consciousness, according to the 
laws of association. In some cases this stimulation is not 
effected without conscious effort; we have to exert our mental 
activity, endeavoring to recall an idea of which we have only a 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 107 

faint recollection. There are therefore in the disposition two 
things to be considered, the disposition itself and what Stout 
appropriately calls its excitability. An idea which can recur 
to consciousness because it has left a disposition does not 
always recur easily; there may be obstacles and difficulties; the 
disposition may be weak and need greater effort and stronger 
stimulation to be aroused. Repetition will strengthen it and 
make it more readily excitable. Habit has for its effect the 
ease with which the reproduction will be effected, the absence 
of conscious effort, the rapidity and certainty of the process. 
The disposition itself was present after the first action, even if 
it was not accompanied by attention; but the habit has required 
many a repetition, many an excitation of that same disposition, 
and now it consists in the easy, automatic, unconscious stimu- 
lation of it, and the consequent reproduction of the idea in 
consciousness. 

According to the general tendency and attitude of the mind, 
to the nature and usefulness of the process, to the conditions and 
frequency of the revival, the idea is referred to the past in 
memory, or simply revived more easily in the present in the case 
of habit. This question, however, belongs to a more general 
problem of psychology : the relations of memory and habit. 

■ Disposition and Potential Energy. 
Dispositions are not unfrequently likened to potential energy, 
which tends to become kinetic or actual under proper circum- 
stances. Thus Hoffding: "^hen one speaks of traces, residua, 
dispositions, which remain after the sensations and presenta- 
tions have vanished from consciousness, one takes for the basis 
of such an assertion the assumption that in the mental field 
something must take place analogous to the conservation of 
energy in material nature."^ Stout mentions the excitability of 
psychical dispositions: 'All change and transition depend on 
the excitement of dispositions previously unexcited, or not ex- 
cited in the same manner and degree.' Revival depends 'on 
the excitability of a preexisting disposition.'- We have already 

^ Psychologie, p. 194. 
^Analytic Psychology, p. 23. 



lo8 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

mentioned Lipps, according to whom 'every disposition conceals 
in itself a latent presentation-force (Vorstellungskraft) , or 
mental energy-of-motion (Bewegungsenergie) which is released 
when the disposition is excited by the stimulation (Bewegungs- 
anstoss) coming from other presentations.' A disposition must 
not be understood merely as a transmission of energy, but it 
has an energy of its own and by means of this contributes 
to the final result. Finally Wundt compares psychical disposi- 
tions to the molecular arrangements of chlorine and nitrogen 
in their compound, nitric chloride. The disposition is no more 
of the same nature as the activity to which it tends than such 
molecular arrangements are of the same nature as the explosion 
which may result from them.' 

When such comparisons are used they must not be carried too 
far. Both potential energy and dispositions suppose a perma- 
nent state, and a potential element or tendency to some effect. 
Both tend to actualization, exercise, kinetism, when the neces- 
sary conditions are fulfilled. Lift a pendulum and you thereby 
give to the weight a certain amount of potential energy. Let 
it fall, its energy becomes kinetic. By winding up a watch you 
store up in the spring potential energy which it will give forth 
in moving the whole mechanism. Gunpowder has in itself 
potential energy which results In the explosion. But it must be 
remarked that potential energy, when it becomes actual, reverses 
the process by which it had been accumulated. Open an ordi- 
nary door, it acquires no potential energy. But If the door is 
furnished with a spring that closes it automatically, the result 
is that when I open the door the spring Is at once given a certain 
quantity of potential energy; it unbends when I release the door 
and thus closes it. Bend a stick or a steel bar, the potential 
energy communicated to It will tend to straighten it again. 
Throw a stone in the air, its potential energy will make It come 
down. The potential energy of gunpowder when released 
gives back the various energies which had been accumulated in 
it. We see from these examples that the actualization of 
potential energy consists In a reversing of the energy which had 
been stored up. And thus, if we take a simple ideal case, we 

' GrundzUge zu der physiol. Psych., III., p. 330. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 



109 



can say that if the accumulation of potential energy took place 
according to several processes a b c d e, its release will consist 
of e d c b a. In reality it will be far more complex, at least in 
many cases, and the physicist has to take into consideration the 
various transformations of energy which may have occurred. 

With dispositions we have something different. Exercise the 
arm, it acquires a disposition to repeat the same movement in 
the same order. The fingers acquire by practice a facility for 
repeating the motions necessary to play the piano or the violin. 
The ear, by listening attentively to various sounds, acquires the 
power to discriminate them more easily and more accurately. 
Memory brings back to consciousness a process similar to a pre- 
vious process which had left a disposition. Recognition is the 
reproduced cognition of an object, referred to a previous 
perception. 

We must not overlook this difference when we speak of dis- 
positions as potential energy. Both are a storing up, a reten- 
tion, but they differ as to the actual end towards which they 
tend. One is a tendency to action, to the reproduction of a 
process, the other tends to the production of an Inverse process, 
to reaction or counteraction. 

Main Characteristics of Dispositions. 

If we now try to reduce to a few points the analysis of a dis- 
position, we shall find the following : 

I. It Is a modification, a change of some kind in the being 
which we call 'disposed.' It really adds something, namely, a 
power, a tendency which was not there before. It directs the 
activity towards a given end. It Is impossible for the man born 
blind to form any idea of color. However keen his other 
senses may be, they can never by associating and combining their 
different products give rise to a color-Image. If we can bring 
back to consciousness images of colors previously perceived, if 
we can associate those Images so as to form various colors and 
tints which we have never really perceived, it is because our 
sensations of sight have left in us some traces which enable us 
to revive the past Impressions. All disposition must therefore 
be understood as a change produced by, and corresponding to 
a previous state. Even where we use the word in a more gen- 



V 




J 



IIO CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

eral sense, for any tendency original or acquired, primary or 
secondary, it is always true that the present disposition is the 
remains of a past state of consciousness, or of a series of accu- 
mulated experiences. 

2. Such a modification is not transitory like the state of which 
it is the result, but it is permanent and lasting. It connects 
transitory states of consciousness, and thus enables us to revive 
the past and even to a certain extent to foresee the future. 
Expectation evidently supposes a disposition left over from past 
experience. The shortest conscious process may give rise to the 
most lasting disposition. Notwithstanding the unceasing or- 
ganic changes, and the successive tearing down and rebuilding 
of the whole body; notwithstanding the variety and flux of our 
states of consciousness; in spite of the constant change and suc- 
cession of all these, the disposition remains although it may not 
manifest itself. After a whole life of apparent oblivion, events 
of childhood may come back to the consciousness of the old man. 

3. Permanent though they are, ever present, and ever ready 
to produce their effect, yet dispositions are latent. Traces of 
conscious states and tendencies to reproduce them are them- 
selves unconscious. No direct knowledge of them is possible, 
and we can never be aware of them except when they actually 
produce their effect. It is by observing what a disposition does 
that we are brought to admit its existence. 

4. A disposition is the power which a subject possesses as a 
result of past activity, to reproduce the same process, to rec- 
ognize the present state of consciousness as identical with or 
rather similar to a previous state. But such a power is mod- 
ifiable; it is in the first place susceptible of increase and decrease. 
Generally speaking, in ordinary life, inactivity will diminish the 
aptitude of a disposition to revive a process, and in proportion 
to the length of time that has elapsed the fainter and the less 
vivid will be the new process. On the contrary, repetition 
strengthens it, makes it readier to be actualized with less stimu- 
lation. The ratio of this increase cannot be determined; so 
numerous, so complex, so little known are the factors which 
contribute to the revival of a past impression, that we cannot 
even make an attempt to determine the relative importance of 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. m 

the factor which we call disposition. If conscious processes 
themselves as such are immeasurable, if we have no means of 
referring them to a common mental unit, much more is such 
determination impossible when we deal with unconscious fac- 
tors. Weber's and Fechner's laws are in the present case of 
no avail in giving us the slightest clue towards an appreciation 
and a measurement, since the stimulus of a disposition is fre- 
quently within ourselves in the form of an image, and therefore 
eludes our control. 

5. Increase and decrease are not the only variations which 
a disposition is capable of undergoing. Its direction can be 
changed. It affects other dispositions and is affected by them. 
It spreads out as it were into several channels, and influences 
states with which it has some relations of similarity, contiguity 
and the like. The dispositions combine in such a way that we 
can produce in consciousness states which we have never before 
experienced as such, but which are results of associations among 
the residua of past states. And as among the factors of con- 
scious processes some are primary and fundamental, others sec- 
ondary and derived, so also among dispositions some have a 
far greater importance and exercise a more widely spread in- 
fluence than others. The psychologist, for instance, knows 
well that a subject who has been trained for a certain class of 
experiments will be much better even for another class than a 
new, untrained subject. Although experiments on the sense of 
vision have not improved his ear or his sense of touch, yet, 
when such experiments have to be performed, he has acquired 
the necessary and indispensable qualities of attentive observa- 
tion, quickness of response and others, which wield an influence 
over all other senses. 

In conclusion we may say that if the foregoing considerations 
have not given us a direct insight into the nature of psychical 
dispositions, they have manifested the most important of their 
conditions and eftects. As we have already remarked, in order 
to proceed further and acquire a deeper knowledge, it would be 
necessary to consider the nature of the mind itself in which the 
dispositions are found, the nature of that series of psychical 
events which the dispositions explain and unify. 



CHAPTER V. — Logical Aspect of the Theory of 
Psychical Dispositions. 

In the third chapter of this dissertation it was shown that 
many of the most prominent psychologists of our time admit 
the existence of psychical dispositions. They believe that 
without them a satisfactory interpretation of mental processes 
cannot be given. The trace left in the brain can account only 
for the repetition of some movement or vibration in the brain. 
It is the after-effect of an organic process and a disposition to 
an organic process. But consciousness is not a. form of move- 
ment, it is not a function of matter. The physical disposition 
can never explain the reappearance in consciousness, and espe- 
cially the fact of recognition. 

A question remains to be examined. Psychical dispositions 
themselves may require certain conditions without which they 
cannot be admitted consistently. Are there not certain requi- 
sites the neglect or rejection of which makes the theory an 
impossible one? 

I. The Mind Series Theory. 

Prevalent Conception of the Mind in Modern Psychology. 

In examining the opinions of modern psychologists on the 
nature of the mind and of its relations to the organism, we find 
that, although they differ on many points, there is a feature in 
which they generally agree. It is the tendency to regard the 
mind as the sum of the successive manifestations of conscious- 
ness. Some exceptions are to be found, but by the majority of 
thinkers the concept of a substantial principle distinct from the 
body is abandoned. The mind becomes a collective term, syn- 
onymous with the totality of the mental states. It is what 
Taine calls 'la trame des evenements,' and contains nothing but 
these events and their relations (liaisons) . 

112 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 113 

Epiphenomenalism considers consciousness as an incidental 
effect, a superfluous accessory of certain brain processes. Con- 
sciousness is compared by Dr. Shadworth Hodgson to a 'spark 
thrown off by the engine,' to the 'foam thrown up by and 
floating on a wave,' to an 'aura or melody arising from the 
brain,' etc. Others, on the contrary, compare it to a shadow. 
Hence the conscious processes which constitute the mind are 
only epiphenomena ; 'there is no real reaction of consciousness 
upon nerve, and no real action and reaction of states of con- 
sciousness upon each other.' The theory can be represented as 
follows : P standing for physical, M for mental, and the arrows 
indicating the relations of Influence or causality. 

Mj Mj M3 M, M, 

I M 111 ill I _ 

^i~ "i~ "z~ * '^C "5 

We only mention this theory and do not have to consider it 
further, as it is but a disguised or mitigated form of material- 
ism, in which psychical dispositions find no place. 

Other psychologists admit interaction. There is a mutual 
Influence of mind and body. A cerebral process can produce 
a state of consciousness, and a conscious process can produce 
changes in -the organism. There are causal connections not 
only within each series, the physical and the mental, but also 
between them, thus : 



M 


s-^ M^s-^ MjS:-^ M^=-*- 


M, 


J 


M\U 




P: 


s-^ P^®-^ Pj®^ P,»-> 


■Pa 



and In the same causal series it is possible to have successively 
mental and physical elements, thus : 

p =^ M =-^ M =-v p B^ M etc. 

The theory of interaction can be held In a materialistic sense 
if the mental energy be understood as a special form of physical 
energy. Or it can admit a real, substantial mind, source of 



"4 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

mental energy, acting on and acted on by the organism. Or 
finally it may admit that the mind is nothing but the series of 
mental states which accompany the brain processes, and which 
can in turn modify them. 

Psychophysical parallelism, the theory in favor with most 
psychologists, holds that physiological changes are determined 
exclusively by physiological antecedents. In this parallelists 
agree with epiphenomenalists. But they deny that the psy- 
chical processes are secondary and that they are powerless 
shadows of the organic processes. The psychical and the phys- 
ical form two parallel series which are not causally related to 
each other, but it is more commonly admitted that there are 
causal connections within each series. If these be denied in the 
mental series, we really have nothing but a special form of 
epiphenomenalism. There is therefore a mutual correspond- 
ence, a concomitance of two series of facts, but no interaction. 
Both series develop in parallel directions without ever coming 
in contact. Each is complete in its own line and goes along 
by itself, thus : 



P3 



The correlation of mental and of physical states is not ex- 
plained by either series, nor by the mutual relations of both 
series. The parallelist, in order to give an account of it, holds 
that both series belong to a more comprehensive system. In 
metaphysics the psychological theory of parallelism is expressed 
by the Spinozistic theory of identity or psychological monism. 
One and the same reahty, one and the same substance manifests 
itself according to a double mode, the mental and the physical. 
We have only one fact with two 'aspects,' 'sides,' or 'views.' 
Considered from the inside, it is mental; from the outside, it is 
physical. This ultimate reality may be conceived, with Ebbing- 
haus, as something different from both the mental and the 
physical. Or, with Stout, it may be conceived as more ade- 
quately revealed in the mental. "One thing seems clear — that 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 115 

we are nearer the truth in speaking of it as consciousness, than 
in spealcing of it as matter."^ 

In general, modern psychology is not materialistic; but 
neither can it be called spiritualistic. It does not admit any 
substantial mind as subject and cause of the mental states. 
Some of the expressions which are used signify primarily a 
certain unity of manifold elements. With Hume, we may 
speak of the ego as of a 'bundle of impressions,' or with IVIill, 
as of a 'series of mental states.' Others criticize such expres- 
sions and insist on the continuity, the uninterrupted succession 
of mental processes. States of consciousness are not units sep- 
arated from one another; we have not so much a succession as 
an unbroken, unremitting flow. Thus Professor James speaks 
of the 'stream of consciousness.' Others bring into prominence 
the idea of dependence of one process on another, and the idea 
of order and cohesion. The mind, according to Ebbinghaus, 
must not be conceived as the 'Summe,' but as the 'Gesammtheit' 
of the mental states. 

Whatever be the special point of view one takes, or the 
special idea on which stress is laid, the fundamental admission 
is that there is no mind distinct from the mental states.- We 
are justified therefore in speaking of this view generally as the 
mind-series theory. The mind is the actual sum of the coex- 
isting contents of consciousness at any given time, and the series 
of successive mental states. The insistence on the continuity or 
the mutual dependence of those states is only a modification of 
the general view. ^ 

' Manual of Psychology, p. 54. 

^ " Unsere Seele ist nichts anderes als die Surame unserer inneren Erlebnisse 
selbst." Wundt, Meuscheii- und Tliierseele, S. 492. 

" Wir nehmen vorlaiifig das Wort Seele nur in demselben Sinne W\e das 
Bewusstsein, den Ausdruclc fiir die Einheitlichlieit unserer gesammten inneren 
Erfahrungen (Empfindungen, Gedanlten, Gefiihle und Entschliisse)." Hoff- 
ding, Psychoto^te, S. 41. 

And Jodl still more explicitly says: "Die Seele hat nicht Zustande oder Ver- 
mogen, wie Denken, Vorstellen, Freude, Hass, u. s. w., sondern diese Zustande in 
ihrer Gesammtheit sind die Seele, gerade so wie die physiologischen Processe in 
ihrer Gesammtheit eben das sind was wir ' Leben ' nennen, ohne dass dies als 
eine besondere Kraft oder Substanz neben ihnen existirte." Lehrbucli der Psy- 
chologic, Erster Teil, K. II., S. 31. 

Quotations from other authors could be multiplied. 



"6 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Series in General. 

A series always requires several conditions: i. There can 
be no series where there is no multiplicity. One thing consid- 
ered by itself, or even several things considered as a whole, as 
a unity, cannot form a series. This unity can be only a part 
or an element of a series, when it is conceived as connected with 
other things and bearing certain relations to them. A series 
implies therefore in all cases a plurality of objects. 

2. It implies also a succession, a following of one thing after 
another in time or in space. Kings who have succeeded one 
another on the same throne, successive events, actions, etc., can 
form a series. But a bundle of things, a heap, is not called a 
series, because the several objects are all together and not in a 
successive order. This succession is not necessarily real; it may 
be simply the work of the mind classifying its concepts of things 
according to a certain order. 

3. This is not yet sufficient. The most important condition 
of a series is the connection, real or logical, of the several units 
that compose it. This Is indicated by the etymological meaning 
of the word itself (lat. sero), which signifies a binding, a 
joining together. A series Is not a succession of disparate or 
disconnected objects; it requires a certain unit}' arising from the 
relations which those objects bear to one another. Thus in 
mathematics we have arithmetical series, the terms of which 
increase or decrease according to equal differences; geometrical 
series, the terms of which increase of decrease by equal ratios. 
We speak of a series of persons, things, events, because they 
are connected by relations of causality, equality, similarity, etc. 

Mental Series. 

We find in the mind the elements that are common to all 
series. The multiplicity of mental states, their succession. Is 
the most obvious fact that reveals itself to any one who con- 
siders them attentively. They are in a constant flux, always 
changing. Ideas, feelings, conative states, with their infinite 
variety, occupy in turn the field of consciousness. Their mutual 
connections also are facts of direct evidence; the presence of 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. nj 

an idea in consciousness may give rise to other ideas or emo- 
tions. Images associate, and the revival of one is the cause 
of the revival of another or of a whole group. There is a 
close dependence of one state on those that have been expe- 
rienced before, and this dependence is explained by the psy- 
chical dispositions which persist through the successive changes 
in consciousness. 

The series of mental states has special characteristics which 
we must notice. It is not composed of homogeneous units, but 
of states of different nature : cognitive processes, feelings, motor 
impulses. In each of these groups again, we find a great diver- 
sity, and never a complete likeness, since every act influences 
the following in different degrees. 

The intensity of mental states also varies greatly. Some- 
times it is such that they force themselves upon our attention. 
Even if we try to turn them aside, we are unable to do so. 
Their intensity may decrease, and repeated efforts may be re- 
quired in order to keep an idea in consciousness, or to recall it 
after it has vanished. It may fall from distinct to obscure con- 
sciousness, then to subconsciousness, and finally, as far as we 
can know, depart altogether from the field of consciousness, 
leaving only an unconscious mental disposition. 

What is true of individual mental states is also true to a 
certain extent of consciousness itself. It varies in intensity. 
Sometimes everything seems to be evanescent, to go away from 
us. Consciousness becomes fainter and fainter, and even seems 
to disappear altogether. I? it possible for consciousness to 
cease entirely? Can the mental series be discontinued for some 
time? Many psychologists give a negative answer. Even in 
the most profound sleep, in cases of swooning, fits of epilepsy, 
the use of anaesthetics, and the like, consciousness becomes 
weaker, but is never interrupted. This position is evidently 
beyond the possibility of empirical proof. Nor can the adverse 
position claim for itself any certainty but this: that we have no 
memory of uninterrupted conscious states at all times of sleep. 
We have dreams which we do not remember. It is also well 
ascertained in many instances that when we are aroused, if we 
at once reflect on ourselves, we have a faint and quickly van- 



"8 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

ishing memory of some feeble state of consciousness which has 
just been interrupted. Hence it is possible to dream all the 
time without remembering it in the state of wakefulness. But 
from the fact that we do not remember all our dreams must 
we conclude that we dream during the whole sleep ? And from 
the fact that we find ourselves dreaming when we wake up in 
the morning can we infer that we have been dreaming the 
whole night? Is not the very fact of awaking sufficient to 
produce dreams? Uninterrupted consciousness is possible, but 
it cannot be shown to be a fact. Therefore, until the necessity 
of it is proved from other considerations, it is more prudent to 
limit ourselves to the data of experience. The problem is one 
of those that remain insoluble.^ In consequence if we use such 
an expression as 'stream of consciousness,' it ought to be with 
the distinct understanding that the constant flowing of the 
stream is not proved. 

If in the series of mental states we compare the present with 
the past, we find that it is an increasing series. Not that it can 
be compared to arithmetical or geometrical progressions, which 
increase according to definite and regular differences or ratios, 
for we cannot measure in what degree a mental state influences 
following states, and we know that this degree varies. Some 
processes are more important than others; some, after they 
have vanished from consciousness, leave a deeper and more 
durable trace, and have a far greater influence than others on 
our mental life. Mental experience always increases; ideas 
are preserved, not as idle entities, but as a 'circulating capital' 
which never ceases to be of use. The field of consciousness 
widens with each act, because all leave a modification which 
becomes a factor of following processes. Increase in the men- 
tal series is not so much a multiplication of the actual contents 
of consciousness at any given moment as a complexity of the 
factors which constitute or modify them, a perfection of the 
processes, and a facility in producing them. It is a power to 
revive the ideas which have left in the mind a permanent 
disposition. 

' Cf. among other writers, James, Principles of Psychology, I., 199 ff. Hamil- 
ton, Metaphysics, lect. XVII. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 119 

Another peculiarity of the mental series is that its course 
depends on many factors, intrinsic and extrinsic. It does not 
proceed evenly, mechanically, but in a somewhat capricious 
manner. Its direction is liicely to be changed at any time so 
as to take a course totally different from that which was expected 
or intended. An impression from the outside, an idea volun- 
tarily or involuntarily recalled, may interrupt the train of 
thought which one had begun and substitute another in its place. 
It is impossible to determine the line which our thoughts will 
follow even for a comparatively short time. 

The mental series depends largely on psychical dispositions. 
These form a permanent connection between the mental states ; 
they explain their reappearance and the influence of one on the 
other; and they are important factors In the course which con- 
sciousness follows. 

2. Psychical Dispositions in the Mind Series Theory. 

Knowledge of the Existence of Psychical Dispositions. 

If the mind is nothing but its successive states, we could, first 
of all, question the possibility of its knowing itself as a series. 
We believe with J. Ward that this paradox, as Stuart Mill him- 
self calls it, is not possible, although Bain takes the contrary 
view.^ If'the series of mental states cannot be aware of itself 
as a series, it would follow that it cannot know the existence 
of dispositions. For the dispositions connect the various units 
of the series, and they explain the memory of the past states 
which constitute it. Let us, however, briefly examine the ques- 
tion on its own merits. 

What conditions are necessary in order to Icnow the existence 
of psychical dispositions? We must in the first place be aware 
of a change, of something that passes away. If the actual state 
of consciousness remains present, there is no need of a sub- 
stitute, of a vestige. We cannot recall to mind that which has 
not disappeared; we cannot revive in consciousness that which 
has not vanished from consciousness. Secondly, when the re- 

' Of. Vi'ard in Encyclopedia Briiannlca, XX., p. 39. Bain in Mind, XL, p. 459. 



I20 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

vival takes place, we must perceive the relations of the present 
state to the former. If it appears as entirely new and not as 
a reproduction depending on, and facilitated by, a former 
process, we can never be led to suppose that there has been a 
disposition left between the former and the present process. 
Thus, thirdly, we infer that although there have been changes, 
still something has remained permanent which enables us to 
perceive the relations of the present with the past. 

Now if the mind is nothing but its successive states A, B, C, 
D, E, it cannot actually be anything but the present contents of 
consciousness E. The others, J, B, C and D, are past; they 
have disappeared, and so far as we directly and immediately 
know, they are absolutely non-existent. The present state E, 
does not contain A, B, C and D, and knows nothing of them, 
since^ they are at present out of consciousness. When E itself 
disappears and is succeeded by F, there can be no conscious- 
ness of change; not for E which has vanished, nor for F which 
is new and could not have known E. 

Neither can it be said that, at any given moment, the contents 
of consciousness being complex, and their renewal taking place 
gradually, a part of /^ has really coexisted with£, or at least with 
a part of£. We can take the mental states at days, weeks, years 
of distance, and separated by numerous conscious states of differ- 
ent nature (perhaps separated by complete interruptions of con- 
sciousness). If my mind is actually the present mental state, 
e. g., the hearing of a musical composition, together with the 
surrounding circumstances in consciousness, how is it that I can 
recognize this composition as the same which I heard several 
years ago? How can I compare one with the other? By what 
means can the present be referred to the past which perhaps 
has never before been recalled to consciousness? Without some 
spectator distinct from both E and F, this seems impossible. 
Without something permanent under the constant changes, we 
cannot explain the knowledge of those relations which oblige 
us to postulate psychical dispositions. Consciousness of repro- 
duction, i. e., recognition, consciousness of identity or difference, 
of facilitation, of causality, suppose something besides the ever 
changing mental states. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 121 

But it will be objected: What use is there of all such specu- 
lation? It is a fact that we do know these relations between 
our mental states. Even if the fact were unexplainable it 
would be no less certain. But it is easily explained precisely by 
the dispositions which all mental states leave in the mind; they 
are that permanent something which is required. We speak 
of the units that compose the mental series, but it must be 
observed that these units are all, by their very nature, re- 
lated to one another. Consciousness is not represented as it 
should be when we make of it a series of separate states of 
different nature, A, B, C, D, E, for there is really no inter- 
ruption, but a close succession of all these, and a dependence of 
one on the others. Moreover, ex hypothesi, we admit the exist- 
ence of psychical dispositions, and the mind ought to be repre- 
sented as follows : AaBabCahcDahcdE, the capitals standing 
for the actual conscious states and the small letters for the dis- 
positions which they leave. When E appears in consciousness it 
comes with all the characters of dependence, and with all its 
relations to the past. 

This leads us to examine another question. Can we con- 
ceive the mind in this way? Can mental dispositions exist if 
the mind be reduced to the series of the mental state ? 

Existence of Psychical Dispositions. 

If in the course of the same mental series there are complete 
interruptions of consciousness — and we have seen that perhaps 
such is the case in sleep or other less frequent conditions — how 
can we explain the connection which is experienced by the mind, 
of the section of consciousness that precedes sleep with the 
section that follows it? Where are the psychical dispositions 
during that lapse of time? They are supposed to be con- 
tained implicitly in the conscious state — which together with 
them is the whole actual mind — and now consciousness has 
ceased. Yet when I am aroused in the morning, their effects 
are manifest; I remember what I did the day before. They 
have endured therefore even during the period of sleep. Where 
and how, in the absence of all conscious process? 



122 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Is it not this consideration which has led many psychologists 
to admit the uninterrupted continuity of consciousness, although 
there is no direct evidence for it? But supposing that con- 
sciousness never disappears entirely, and it may be so, will there 
remain no difficulty in admitting the existence of psychical 
dispositions ? 

The mental series is not homogeneous; the units that com- 
pose it are of different nature. They can be opposed to one 
another, or be so disparate that they hardly seem to have any- 
thing in common besides the general feature that they are all 
perceived in consciousness. As far as we are aware, the hear- 
ing of a sound does not influence, in some cases at least, a fol- 
lowing visual process, a sensation of smell, the intelligence of 
complex problems, etc. Reasoning on mathematics does not 
apparently modify my appreciation of a picture or of a musical 
performance. To make every state of consciousness the accu- 
mulator of all past experiences seems to be an unwarrantable 
assumption. If we take the case of the revival A^ of a process 
/J , we may have between J and z/j a multitude of other con- 
scious states; we may have a whole life of experiences during 
which J has been forgotten. When it is recalled, it must be 
by virtue of the psychical disposition rt. It is impossible to 
see where and how a has persisted through all the changes 
that have taken place; how, e. g., a visual disposition has been 
transmitted down to the present time by successive sensations, 
emotions, conative states, etc., which are supposed to be and to 
have been the whole mind. 

I may recall to my mind the idea of a song which I was 
taught twenty years ago. I remember vividly the circum- 
stances of place, persons and effort. Most of the details are 
still present to my mind. Yet to the best of my knowledge 
this is the first time this idea has ever been revived; for twenty 
years it has been absent from consciousness. There was in the 
mind a disposition hidden and unnoticed which now produces 
its effect. How has it been preserved? Many ideas have occu- 
pied the field of consciousness: studies of French and English, 
of Latin and Greek, of history and poetry, of mathematics and 
geography have in turn required the whole attention of the 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 123 

mind. Serious and ludicrous thoughts have succeeded one 
another; reahties and fancies, in the waking condition and in 
dreams. The greatest variety of sensations have been expe- 
rienced. At times the mind has been entirely absorbed in 
emotions of grief or of joy, of love or of anger. Let one 
reflect on all this for a moment, think of this multiplicity and 
variety, and supplement from one's own experience that which 
has only been indicated imperfectly above. If the mind means 
nothing but the successive mental states; if under these incessant 
changes there is nothing permanent, how can the disposition be 
preserved? How can it be transmitted? How does it produce 
Its effect now? It is difficult, if not Impossible, to understand 
how this can take place. 

In addition there is an important principle which seems 
to be forgotten when such a theory is proposed: mental states 
are processes, functions, not substances. ' Die Vorstellungen 
sind nicht Wesen sondern Functlonen,' says Wundt. St. 
Thomas had already made the same remark: 'Esse intelligens 
vel sentlens actu non est esse substantiale sed accidentale ad 
quod ordlnatur intellectus et sensus.'^ No psychologist would 
think of denying this principle. How then is it possible to 
admit the persistence of psychical dispositions without a sub- 
stantial mind distinct from the mental states? Can functions 
and processes contain and transmit psychical dispositions? In 
the organism the functioning of an organ does not leave a dis- 
position In the subsequent function, but in the organ itself. A 
brain process leaves a pern;ianent after-effect in the brain, but 
we cannot say that it transmits it directly and immediately to 
the following cerebral process. When we assert the existence 
of psychical dispositions, and yet hold that the mind Is the 
series of mental states or functions, we are in danger not only 
of giving substantiality to the conscious processes, but even of 
'hypostaslzing' the dispositions themselves which unite those 
processes. 

A disposition cannot be found in the conscious states that 
succeed one another; nor can It exist by itself; we cannot con- 
ceive of It except In a permanent, stable subject. A disposl- 

' Quist. disp. De anima, art. XII. 



124 



CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 



tion is no less a disposition of, than a disposition to, something, 
and as it is supposed to be psychical, we are not allowed to 
make matter its subject. If there are psychical dispositions, 
there must be some real being in which they are and of which 
they are modifications. The mind cannot be represented as 
above AaBabCabcDabcdE . . . , which makes of conscious 
processes and of psychical dispositions something substantial, 
some real fVeseu, but it must be represented as 



B 



or perhaps better as 



fi. 



c 

Fig. I. 

t 



;--jfi£.i 



■<_;.- 



Fig. 2. 



We have here something permanent, some real being, repre- 
sented by the continuous line (in Fig. i ) , in which the dispo- 
sitions a b c d e are received; or by the central point (in Fig. 
2) in which all conscious elements are brought to unity. We 
have a permanent mind, from whose activity mental processes 
can come. It can also receive the dispositions left by them. 
That which is modified by a disposition is not so much the fol- 
lowing processes as the activity whence they proceed and the 
agent whose functions they are. We can understand that an 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 125 

active subject is modified by exercising its activity, and that such 
a modification has a more or less marked influence on following 
operations. We can understand that a permanent being pre- 
serves a permanent disposition. That without such a being, 
in the series of mental processes, psychical dispositions can be 
preserved and produce their effect we cannot understand. 

Bradley's Phenomenalisin. 

F. H. Bradley proposes an easy way out of the difficulty. 
To the objection that 'in the soul, at any one time, there 
will be for phenomenalism nothing but what is experienced 
at that time,' he answers:^ " Not so, and this Is a sheer mis- 
take. For phenomenalism the soul Is at any one time what is 
experienced at that time, but it is also more. For it Is qual- 
ified also by the past which really belongs to it, and that past 
belongs to it not merely as what it has been, but as what it now 
is. The soul in other words is the dispositions which it has 
acquired. And if It Is objected that with this we have gone 
beyond phenomenalism, I reply that once more the objection 
rests on a mistake. For the dispositions are simply statements 
about the happening of events within the phenomenal series, 
assertions as to what will happen, or rather would happen, under 
certain conditions more or less unknown. . . . Phenomenal- 
ism . . . uses these tendencies as facts, and in this it follows 
the example of every limited science. The dispositions are not 
phenomena, but they are legitimate fictions used to explain the 
happening of phenomena" (29, 30). A disposition In psy- 
chology Is therefore "a mere way of stating that when some 
things have happened, there will be a 'tendency' for other 
things to happen" (34). We want mere statements of laws, 
and "It does not matter for your purpose, so long as these laws 
work, whether they possess ultimate truth or are more or less 
fictitious and false. . . . What, In short, we want In psychology 
are explanations that truly explain, and above all things, we do 
not want true explanations" (35). 

What are we to think of this view? The soul, we are told, 
is not only what is actually experienced, because it Is qualified 

' ' A Defence of Phenomenalism in Psychology,' Mind, N. S., IX., 1900, p. 26 flF. 



126 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

by the past which really belongs to it; it is the dispositions 
which it has acquired. This hardly removes the objection 
which was to be solved, that at any one time the soul is nothing 
but what is experienced at that time. For since dispositions are 
only statements and Actions, and since we have no right to con- 
sider them as real, it follows that the soul is what is experienced 
at the present time, plus certain laws and statements 'more or 
less fictitious and false.' One must confess that this mere way 
of stating is a very small addition to the actual state of con- 
sciousness, and that the soul is very little more than the present 
experience. We have here a rendition of Stuart Mill's 'thread 
of consciousness supplemented by believed possibilities of con- 
sciousness.' But where do such possibilities come from? Why 
it is that 'when some things have happened there will be a ten- 
dency for other things to happen'? 

Furthermore, 'the soul is qualified by the past which really 
belongs to it; and that past belongs to it not merely as what it 
has been, but as what it now is.' From the world of fiction 
we pass to the world of reality; but it is difficult to see how the 
past as such, the past '^5 what it has been' can now 'really' 
belong to the soul at all, the soul being, ex hypothesi, the present 
experience, plus the qualification which it receives from the past. 
That which has been can no longer be; that which has passed 
from consciousness cannot come back to consciousness; the past 
as past can never be found in the present. A process similar to 
or analogical with a previous process can take place; the same 
identical process once performed cannot come back. The past 
therefore does not and cannot belong to the soul as 'what it 
has been,' but only as 'what it now is.' But now it is only a 
tendency, a disposition, /. e., something which can be used only 
as a law, some 'mere way of stating' the sequence of processes, 
something 'more or less fictitious and false' . . . 'legitimate 
fictions used to explain the happening of phenomena.' How 
then can we speak of a past which 'really belongs' to the soul? 
The soul is 'the dispositions which it has acquired.' By this 
statement the soul Is evidently reduced to a minimum of reality. 
Moreover, what does 'it' stand for? Is there any phenomenal 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 127 

•subject acquiring dispositions? The soul acquires dispositions, 
and yet is the dispositions themselves ! 

When we have real facts to explain, we want — as far as 
possible — real, though perhaps not ultimate, explanations 
of them. Frequently, it is true, we have to be content with 
imperfect and temporary theories, when a better one is not at 
hand. 'Working' hypotheses may be found very useful, but 
■can we draw the distinction between true explanations and ex- 
planations that truly explain? Can a statement, a law, if it be 
recognized as fictitious and false, be assumed as an explanation 
that truly explains ? An explanation of real facts by something 
which we know to be a fiction is no explanation at all. Male- 
branche's occasionalism, Leibniz's preestablished harmony — to 
give only two instances — certainly account, and perhaps better 
than any other theory, for the ' phenomenal sequence.' Why 
are they rejected, if not because they are too fictitious and 
imaginary? 

The theory of psychical dispositions is proposed to account 
for certain real facts, and it is proposed as a real explanation. 
Let us now see whether and on what conditions It can account 
for them. 

Dispositions as Explanations of the Facts. 

The theory of psychical dispositions in modern psychology 
is proposed in order to explain the causal sequence in the mental 
series, the retention and revival of mental states, the facts of 
recognition and facilitation, the unity and continuity of con- 
sciousness. For the psychologist who on the one hand rejects 
the doctrine of materialism, and yet on the other does not admit 
any permanent substantial mind, these problems present a 
special difficulty which psychical dispositions are called upon 
to solve. 

Ebbinghaus holds that the same necessity which obliges us 
to admit after-effects of nervous processes obliges us also to 
admit after-effects of their corresponding conscious processes. 
This is the necessary position of parallelism. The nervous 
processes are in causal relations with one another; so also must 
their mental 'equivalents' be causally related within the mental 



128 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

series. We cannot deny that causality applies to the mind; 
conscious processes do not originate from nothing and do not 
end in nothingness.^ 

We fall here into the above mentioned difficulty of perma- 
nent mental dispositions without a permanent mental subject; 
of causal relations without a substantial agent. Dispositions 
are effects and causes of directly observable conscious states. 
As permanent effects, they require something besides the 
mental states to explain their preservation and transmission. 
As permanent causes, they must be given a certain power and 
energy, and this supposes a permanent agent, source and accu- 
mulator of energy. If the same necessity which makes us 
admit cerebral dispositions leads us to admit mental disposi- 
tions, can we not add : The same necessity which obliges us, in 
order to explain physiological dispositions, to consider the or- 
ganism as an agent, permanent and substantial, obliges us also, 
if we admit psychical dispositions, to consider the mind as 
active, permanent and substantial? Whatever be the ultimate 
metaphysical theory one holds, when we speak of brain disposi- 
tions we do not consider the brain as the sum or collection of 
brain processes, but as something real, some Wesen underlying 
them, of which they are functions. The cerebral dispositions 
are in the brain, and not in the successive transitory brain proc- 
esses. The same logic must apply to the mental series, and 
consequently psychical dispositions require more than the suc- 
cessive mental states. 

The primary effect of ps)'chical dispositions is retention, 
which is the basis of revival. Stout insists on this aspect of 
the theory. Retentiveness is an indispensable condition of 
progress and development. "It is impossible to formulate in 
words from the introspective standpoint the most ordinary facts 
of retentiveness and memory, without implying that past expe- 
riences leave behind them after their disappearance persistent 
traces on which their revival depends.'" "Advance would be 
impossible unless the results of prior process persisted as the 

' Grundziige tier Psychologie, Erstes Buch, §5, p. 53. 
'Analytic Psychology, p. 22. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 129 

basis and starting-point of subsequent process. . . . Mental 
development would be impossible unless previous experience left 
behind it persistent after-effects to determine the nature and 
course of subsequent experience. These after-effects are called, 
in psychology, traces or dispositions, and the psychological law 
of retentiveness may be stated as follows : when and so far as 
mental development takes place through mental conditions, it 
does so because specific modes of consciousness leave behind 
them specific traces or dispositions, which determine the nature 
and course of subsequent process, so that when they are modified 
it is modified."^ 

This explanation, true and valid as it is, cannot claim to be 
ultimate; the permanence of dispositions must be made possible, 
and we have seen that to this end certain conditions are neces- 
sary. 'Specific modes of consciousness leave behind them spe- 
cific traces or dispositions,' on condition that the mind shall not 
be reduced to the mere collection and sequence of mental proc- 
esses. The 'basis and starting-point of subsequent process' is 
not the disposition in itself, per se, but the disposition as a per- 
manent modification of the permanent mind. If the 'nature 
and course of subsequent process' is modified, it is because the 
mind, whose process it is, has been modified by the disposition.^ 

Recognition, which, as we have said, depends essentially on 
the existence of psychical dispositions, shows also the impossi- 
bility of a simple .series of processes without anything perma- 
nent and stable. Recognition is the judgment that the present 
idea is similar to an idea which is now past. Who can form 
such a judgment? Not the actual state, which has just come 
to consciousness, and could not have known its antecedent which 
perhaps has disappeared long ago. The present process can- 
not recognize its identity with the past. There must be some- 
thing else that has been modified and affected in a certain man- 

' Manual of Psychology, p. 76. 

^ " Nella memoria non sono propriamente le immagini clie si conservano nella 
forma perfetta con cui appaiono alia coscienza, ma cio che si conserva e lo spirito 
identico a se medesimo, lo spirito che dura con la forma che ha ricevuta dalle 
esperienze quotidiane, e le habitudini diverse che i suoi atti gli hanno lasciato." 
L. Ambrosi, ' L'immaginazione e I'inconscio nella vita pratica e nella scienza,' 
Rivista Italiana di Filosofia, Anno 1891, Vol. 2, p. 353. 



13° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

ner, and perceives that it is now affected in the same manner. 
Recognition is not only the perception of similarity between two 
processes, it is also ipso facto the perception of self-identity. 
"What I remember recognitively I know as in the past of time 
and as belonging to my past, to the past of the same Self that 
I now am. This memory therefore involves not only ideation 
and comparing activity, but Time-consciousness, consciousness 
of Self, and consciousness of Self-Identity." ' 

It also involves in many cases a special effort, as when we are 
looking for an idea which has already been in consciousness, 
when we are trying to revive it by directing our associations, or 
when we endeavor to find in our past the idea similar to that 
which is actually present to the mind. In all these cases we are 
conscious of effort and activity. We sometimes say that owing 
to an acquired disposition, a phenomenon has a tendency to 
come back. This is an imperfect expression; a phenomenon, 
a process has no tendency; the subject alone tends and makes 
efforts. So immediate experience not only gives us the knowl- 
edge of the present conscious states, but also in many cases 
makes us perceive a subject active in their production, one amid 
their multiplicity, permanent under their perpetual flux, iden- 
tical notwithstanding their constant change. 

Frequent repetition produces facilitation and habit. We are 
aware that some states of mind, some ideas recur more fre- 
quently than others because they have been recalled more fre- 
quently. Mental attitudes, mental processes can be repeated 
without effort and naturally. By repetition they have become 
habitual. We have seen that Stout attributes to the disposi- 
tions various degrees of excitability. Revival depends 'on the 
excitability of a preexisting disposition.'" Lipps speaks of the 
'explosive character of reproduction,' of the energy of the dis- 
positions themselves which is released when they come in contact 
with other representations. A disposition would not deserve 
the name if it did not contribute to the final result from its 
own energy. ^ 

' Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 343. 

^Analytic Psychology, pp. 23, 24. 

' Grundthatsachcn dcs Seelenlebens, p. 107. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 131 

Such expressions cannot be condemned and excluded, but it 
must be kept in mind that properties which are attributed to the 
dispositions belong properly to the subject which Is disposed by 
them. As we cannot conceive of physical energy without a 
material reality, so also we cannot conceive of mental energy 
without a mental reality distinct from the mental processes. If 
a disposition can modify subsequent processes, it is in virtue of 
the energy of the agent. 

The most evident testimony of consciousness manifests to us 
the unity of our mind. All our conscious states are connected, 
and all are referred to one and the same central subject. This 
also the theory of psychical dispositions is made to explain. "A 
mind is the unity of manifold successive and simultaneous modes 
of consciousness in an individual whole. But further scrutiny 
of the nature of the unity in which the manifold modes of con- 
sciousness are combined to form a mind, shows that this unity 
necessarily Implies conditions which are not themselves modes 
of consciousness. In the very conception of an individual mind 
it Is implied that present conscious process is throughout condi- 
tioned by prior conscious process, and this is only intelligible if 
we suppose that past experience leaves persistent after-effects, 
which continue when the corresponding consciousness has 
ceased. . . . The introspective psychologist finds that he can 
give no connected account of conscious process, without trans- 
cending the data of introspection."^ 

This solution, so far as it goes, Is certainly good and must be 
admitted; but here again we must remark that It can itself be 
made acceptable only by admitting all the conditions which are 
necessary to make it possible. When the mind Is understood as 
the unity of diverse conscious states 'In an individual whole,' it is 
true that we account for this unity by admitting the persistence 
of after-effects of conscious processes, and the conditioning of a 
process by a past one ; but this In turn must be accounted for, and 
we have seen that it cannot be without a permanent subject. The 
danger is In the neglect of this condition. "Modern philosophy, 
both empirical and transcendental, has manifested a growing 
hostility toward all doctrines that may be labeled 'scholastic' 

'Stout, Analytic Psychology, pp. 1, 2, 20. 



132 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Substance in general, and soul-substance in particular, are con- 
cepts that are peculiarly and essentially scholastic, and as such 
they have fallen into pretty general discredit with the thinkers 
of this century. . . . There are ... no end of substitutes for 
the old substantial soul, 'formal unities,' 'concrete totals of 
experience,' 'unique centers of perception and activity'; besides 
all sorts of 'Egos,' transcendental and otherwise; but none of 
these has either the virtues or the vices of the mediaeval soul- 
substance."* For some writers, the psychical disposition 
theory replaces the old substance theory in some of its functions, 
and yet the former is hardly possible without the latter. It is 
a postulate which certainly has its justification; the interpreta- 
tion of evident and undeniable facts is impossible without it. 
But the postulate itself must be a logical one, and we must 
admit all the conditions which will make it a real explanation. 
" Real explanation assigns definite conditions through which, 
by the operation of definite laws, definite results must arise. 
Where we cannot thus resolve a fact into its factors, such words 
as potentiality, faculty, susceptibility, are mere masks for our 
ignorance, and ought to be acknowledged as such. Now, the 
distinctive tendency of the faculty psychology was to treat a 
naked possibility as if it were something, as if, in fact, it were 
identical with its own realization, hidden away in some mys- 
terious fashion."" 

We agree entirely with Dr. Stout and admit the criticism of 
the faculty theory in the sense in which he understands that 
theory. (We will show later that it has a more acceptable 
meaning.) But we cannot help thinking that in the theory 
of psychical dispositions we are exposed to the danger of falling 
into the same defect which is pointed out here, and which we 
cannot too carefully guard ourselves against, namely, that of 
giving a merely verbal instead of a real explanation; that of 
treating dispositions as if they were real things; and that of 
resting content once we have given the immediate explanation 
of memory and habit, without examining how far this expla- 
nation itself is legitimate. This, we say, is a danger. Not, 

' W. p. Montague, ' A Plea for Soul-substance,' Psychol. Rev., 1899, p. 457. 
^ Stout, .4nalytic Psychology, pp. 18, 19. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 133 

indeed, that we blame the psychologist who does not handle the 
metaphysical problems concerning the nature of the mind. He 
does not need their solution for his experiments in the labora- 
tory; neither in fact does he always need dispositions. But 
assumptions which can be dispensed with when we stand on a 
certain plane of investigation and consider a subject from a 
special point of view, may be necessary when we consider the 
same subject under another aspect. The psychologist, who in 
his explanations stops at psychical dispositions, may be justified 
in doing so, but he must realize that this theory itself requires 
conditions which cannot consistently be rejected. Another psy- 
chologist, or metaphysician if we choose to call him by that 
name, has the right to examine the value of the theory and to 
consider it from a different or higher standpoint. 

The theory of psychical dispositions has enough difficulties 
and obscurities in itself and from its very nature; let qs not 
make it more difficult and even impossible by denying the basis 
on which it must rest. 

So far we have in a general way discussed the logical con- 
sistency of the theory of psychical dispositions if the mind is 
assumed to be nothing but the mental processes. We have 
used the word series in a general sense to signify the sum or 
succession of the mental states. We must now add a few words 
concerning two special views which are further determinations 
of the mind-series theory, and which are held by two of the 
most prominent psychologists of our time. This will com- 
plete the preceding considerations by bringing out more clearly 
a few points which have been neglected or touched upon too 
summarily. These two theories are Professor Ebbinghaus' 
'Gesammtheit,' and Professor James' 'stream of thought.' 

Ebbinghaus' Gesammtheit. 

According to Professor Ebbinghaus^ the soul is not the sum 

(Summe) of mental states, but what we may call their totalit}', 

collection, assemblage, ensemble, in so far as these words can 

be used to translate the German word ' Gesammtheit.' Imme- 

' Grundziige der Psycliologle, §2. 



134 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

diate experience tells us that our mental states are not inde- 
pendent and isolated, but always accompanied by other states, 
and thus are only members of a 'complex.' It also tells us that 
all these states and operations are supported by, and attributed 
to, a subject, the ego, which is distinct from the organism and 
which is immediately perceiv^ed with each idea. Changing 
thoughts leave the ego unchanged, and therefore are distinct 
from it; thus the ego manifests itself as simple, identical with 
itself and permanent. ' For the plain man (fiir den natiirlichen 
Menschen) such immediate experience is assumed to correspond 
to the reality; for him, and also for 'the theoretical psychol- 
ogist,' the mind is really a substance, distinct from mental 
states and abiding identical under their successive changes. 

The arguments in favor of a mind-substance, however, are 
not cogent nor convincing. They are even weaker than the 
arguments against it, so that the permanence and unity of the 
mind are really illusory.^ How in fact a thing can be inherent 
in another which is its support, without being distinct from it, 
can be illustrated by an example. A plant is composed of 
various parts: roots, branches, leaves, cells, flowers, etc. All 
these are united and form one whole; each one is supported by 
the others and depends on them, but there is no subject distinct 
from their aggregate. The leaves belong to the 'complex' 
root-stem-bark-branches. . . . The roots are the roots of the 
'complex' stem-bark-branches-leaves. ... So that the subject 
to which every one of these is attributed is the 'complex,' not 
the mere sum or addition, but the 'Gesammtheit' of the others: 
we must take in consideration all their various conditions of 
relative dependence.^ 

The same holds good for the mind: it is the Gesammtheit 
of the mental states. The ego is but a complex, in the same 
manner as the plant or the animal. A thought which is In the 
foreground of consciousness is attributed to the ego. When 
another takes its place, the former becomes a part of the ego 
itself, and contributes to constitute it. Hence the self, which 

iPp. 9-1 1. 
2 Pp. 12, 13. 
spp. 13-15. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. I35 

at first sight appears to be unchangeable, permanent and iden- 
tical, upon further reflection proves to be changeable, and no 
more identical with itself than the tree of the forest; it is con- 
stantly undergoing change. The soul is therefore a Gesamm- 
theit of many parts, a 'system' of numerous closely united and 
causally related realities-of-consciousness.' 

To the general criticism already presented we can here add 
a few special remarks. A metaphysician might doubt the 
accuracy of the description of the plant as made by Ebbinghaus. 
The question to be solved was this : whether besides the inherent 
being (Getragenes) there was a supporter (Trager), 'a special 
being in the metaphysical sense.' We are asked to go through 
a process of physical dissection; the various parts of the plant 
are taken apart and considered separately, and we find nothing 
else, no special substance. Quite naturally ; remove all the com- 
ponent parts of a whole and every thing disappears, since the 
whole is equal to the sum of its parts. If the question was to 
find a substance 'in the metaphysical sense,' one should use one's 
reason and its power of abstraction, not the ax, the saw or 
the knife. 

But even in a physical sense, the two cases of the plant and 
the soul are widely different. The plant is a complex of the 
parts which compose it; it is neither the stem, nor the roots, 
nor the leaves . . . taken separately, but the union of all 
these; the plant is actually a complex of those parts which it 
actually possesses. One would hardly be listened to if he said 
that the present tree, now in winter, is actually composed of the 
leaves or of the flowers which it produced last summer, or of 
the branches which were cut off some time ago. In the case of 
the mind, we are asked to admit that it is made up of transitory 
states. The appearance of one means the departure of the pre- 
ceding, and as far as consciousness informs us, no trace of it is 
to be found. It is only by reasoning on the facts of memory 

' " So wird hier . . . von der Seele gesprochen ^verden ; nicht als von einem 
besonderen, unteilbar einfachen Wesen, sondern als von einer eigentiimlich ge- 
gliederten und einheitliclien Gesammtheit, einem selbstiindigen System zahlreicher, 
eng verbundener und in vielfaclien Wechsehvirkunsren stehender Bcwusstseins- 
realitaten." Pp. 15-18. 



136 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

and reminiscence that we infer the persistence of some dispo- 
sition. How can we say that the actual state is attributed to 
the ego, and that when it has disappeared, when it is past, then 
it becomes a part, a constitutive element of the ego itself? 

Moreover it must be noticed that the parts which compose 
the plant are material and capable of supporting one another, 
of acting upon one another with the various chemical, mechan- 
ical, physical forces which they possess. Not only while it is 
a member of the plant-complex, but even when it is separated 
from it, the stem can be used as a support for other material 
things, as beams for a house, props for a tree, etc. Although 
the twig is severed from the stem, it can none the less remain 
the subject which supports the leaves and the blossoms. If the 
plant be divided into its various parts, every one of these 
remains a substance, capable of existence and activity. But 
when we speak, of ideas, of presentations, of mental states, we 
speak of processes and functions. To make them support one 
another, act on one another, unite so as to form a complex, is 
to give them a substantiality to which they have no right. A 
plant also and its various organs have functions to perform. 
Can we say that these functions unite so as to form a complex, 
simply and immediately by themselves, and not rather through 
the union of the organs of which they are the functions? The 
plant is a complex of parts, not of functions. In the same 
manner the mind, whether it be composed of parts or not, can- 
not be a complex of functions. We must say rather that the 
mental processes are united in and through the unity of the 
subject whose functions they are. 

Finally the questions arise: For whom and of whom is the 
present state of consciousness an experience? For itself, or 
for the ego-complex? And when the present state is recog- 
nized as similar to the past, who recognizes it? Is it the whole 
complex, or the present state alone? The complex is but an 
aggregate of states, of functions, which we cannot suppose to 
be acquainted with all the others individually. Moreover all 
are now past, since the present is not a part of, but attributed to, 
the ego. Shall we say then that two similar states simply 
happen to make a mutual acquaintance, and perceive that out 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 137 

of SO many states they bear to each other a special resemblance? 
In the mental Gesammtheit where are the psychical dispositions 
which Ebbinghaus admits? Not in the past states that consti- 
tute the ego, since they have disappeared, and the dispositions, 
though unconscious, remain permanently present. In the pres- 
ent process? Then all the above mentioned difficulties come 
back. Mind-series and mind-gesammtheit seem equally insuffi- 
cient to receive, preserve, transmit psychical dispositions. It 
sometimes happens that those who despise the 'theoretical psy- 
chologists' hold themselves the most 'theoretical' views. 

James' Stream of Thought. 

Professor James' rejects the conception of the mind as a 
series of 'substantive psychoses, sensations and their copies and 
derivatives, juxtaposed like dominoes in a game, but really 
separate.'^ The theories of Hume, maintaining that the self 
is nothing but a bundle or collection of successive perceptions; 
of Taine, for whom the ego is a continuous web of conscious 
events; of John Stuart Mill, with his series of feelings aware 
of itself as a series, and his inexplicable tie which connects the 
present consciousness with the past; these theories are shown 
by James to be utterly unintelligible, devoid of consistency and 
opposed to facts.^ The refutation is presented with that 
strength, interest and fascinating exposition which characterize 
the Principles of Psychology. 

With no less vigor and animus is the spiritualistic theory of 
a substantial soul rejected. The final conclusion is that the 
soul 'explains nothing and guarantees nothing'; it is superfluous 
'for scientific purposes.' "It is at all events needless for ex- 
pressing the actual subjective phenomena of consciousness as 
they appear." These facts are formulated "without its aid by 
the supposition of a stream of thoughts, each substantially dif- 
ferent from the rest, but cognitive of the rest, and 'appro- 
priative' of each other's content."'* 

' Principles of Psychology, Vol. I., ch. IX. 

"P. 245. 

»P. 350 ff. 

*Pp. 342 ff., 344, 350. 



13S CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

James' theory can be briefly summarized as follows: 

Consciousness is not a series, but a stream; thought is 'sen- 
sibly continuous, without breach, crack or division.' It is not 
'chopped up in bits ... it is nothing jointed; it flows.' It 
is not however an even and smooth stream. Sometimes the 
rate is slow, and then 'we are aware of the object of our 
thought in a comparatively restful and stable way.' Sometimes 
the rate is rapid, and then 'we are aware of a passage, a rela- 
tion, a transition from it or between it and something else.' 
We can call the 'resting places' the 'substantive parts,' and 
the 'places of flight' the 'transitive parts' of the stream of 
thought. "It then appears that the main end of our thinking 
is at all times the attainment of some other substantive part 
. . . ; and the main use of the transitive parts is to lead us 
from one substantive conclusion to another.'" 

"The I is a thought at each moment different from that of 
the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with 
all that the latter called its own." The ego is therefore nothing 
but the 'real, present, onlooking, remembering, judging 
thought, or identifying section of the stream.' The 'title' of 
a collective self is passed from one thought to another, so that 
'each thought is thus born an owner and dies owned, trans- 
mitting whatever it realized as its self to its own later pro- 
prietor.' In a word, the whole problem of our mental life is 
solved by the assumption of the present thought appropriative 
of the past." 

With regard to this theory, a few remarks must be made. 
The term itself 'stream of thought,' however great be its merits 
and superiority over other expressions, if it be proposed as an 
adequate rendering of reality, is open to several objections. A 
stream necessarily implies a source from which it derives its 
supply of water; when we apply this term to the mind we have 
not given an account of mental life until we have indicated its 
origin. Professor Ladd goes so far as to call the expression 
'stream,' as applied to the mind, 'a complete misuse of the 
figure of speech,' because "a stream implies permanent banks 

' Cf. esp. pp. 239, 243. 

* Cf. esp. pp. 338 ff., 400 ff. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 139 

that, really existing, give direction to and make possible the 
existence of the stream. Moreover every stream exists as an 
actual succession of simultaneously existing parts; it exists all 
at once as a stream consisting of sections with varying depths 
and different disturbances of the surface throughout its entire 
length." But in the so-called stream of consciousness, "each 
section, each wave, comes into being only as the next preceding 
ceases to be; so too did that next preceding one come into its 
being; so will the next and yet the next succeeding wave begin 
to be. Where then shall we find, no matter how closely we 
search, any reality answering to this fiction of a permanent sub- 
ject of changing states, — that is, of a real being, for the mind; 
something more than, or over and above, the passing being, in 
ceaseless succession, of the conscious states?'" 

James acknowledges that the question whether there are 
interruptions of consciousness in sleep, epilepsy, etc., cannot be 
answered with certainty, and that 'on the whole it is best to 
abstain from a conclusion.'" If there are such interruptions, 
what becomes of the stream? James answers that we mentally 
'reach back and make connection' with our own stream of 
thought. After sleep, 'the past thought of Peter is appro- 
priated by the present Peter alone.' He remembers his own 
states ; his present thought appropriates and owns them all, and 
'this community of self is what the time-gap cannot break In 
twain, and is why a present thought, although not ignorant of 
the time-gap, can still regard itself as continuous with certain 
chosen portions of the past.'^ But we ask: How then is 
such a transmission possible? How can the first thought of 
the awaking man at once take possession of a thought which 
was present several hours earlier, but has since entirely van- 
ished? The present thought cannot appropriate it unless it 
first revives it, and how is the revival out of nothingness pos- 
sible? Something able to exist by Itself must have remained 
to link the two interrupted sections of the stream. 

Even if we granted that the stream of thought is unlnter- 

^ Philosophy of Mind, pp. 91, 92. 
2 P. 199 fi- 
»P. 239. 



HO CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

rupted, the 'appropriation' by the 'present thought' of all past 
mental experience, the 'transmission of title' remains very 
obscure. We can imagine, it is true, 'a long succession of 
herdsmen coming rapidly into possession of the same cattle by 
transmission of an original title by bequest';^ but we can hardly 
imagine that the title of a collective self 'is passed from 
one thought to another in some analogous way.' The herds- 
men and the cattle coexist; the cattle are permanent objects, 
distinct from their owners; they really exist when they are 
transmitted; they are things that can be owned; and the herds- 
man is a person who can own them. On the contrary, states 
of consciousness are functions, transient, successive. To speak 
of them as 'substantive parts,' as 'substantial,' and as 'sub- 
stances' {e. g., p. 345) is to use metaphors which perhaps more 
than one psychologist would find objectionable. The possessor 
and the possessed object never coexist, and a 'segment' of the 
stream begins to be owned only when it ceases to exist as a 
conscious state. 

What is the nature of the appropriated state? We cannot 
say that it is mental, and yet unconscious, because James denies 
the existence of mental unconscious states.- The past states are 
appropriated as 'faint' states. "They are eternally as they 
feel when they exist, and can neither actually nor potentially 
be identified with anything else than their own faint selves. . . . 
It is the destiny of thought that on the whole our early ideas 
are superseded by later ones, giving fuller accounts of the same 
realities. But none the less do the earlier and the later ideas 
preserve their own several substantive identities, as so many sev- 
eral successive states of mind."* What are those faint selves 
preserving their identity? Conscious states of mind? Then 
how is it that we are not aware of their presence? Uncon- 
scious states of mind? This also is impossible, according to 
James. Further determinations and explanations are wanted. 
Moreover, as remarked above, shall emotions, cognitions, voli- 
tions, with their numberless varieties, include one another? 

'P. 339- 
sp. 162 S. 

»p. 174. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 141 

How my present emotion of fear or anger actually owns, in- 
cludes, appropriates my geometrical or algebraic demonstra- 
tion of years ago is more than obscure. This seems the more 
impossible for James who is so stanch an advocate of the sim- 
plicity of our mental states. Does the present contain all the 
past and yet remain a simple, indivisible state? "No possible 
number of entities (call them as you like, whether forces, mate- 
rial particles, or mental elements) can sum themselves together. 
Each remains in the sum what it always was; and the sum itself 
exists only for a bystander who happens to overlook the units, 
and to apprehend the sum as such."^ Who is that bystander 
distinct from the mental units? 

James himself in another place^ seems to forget his accumu- 
lation of the whole past by the present thought. "The knowl- 
edge of some other part of the stream, past or future, near or 
remote, is always mixed in with our knowledge of the present 
thing." Successive thoughts ought to be represented as 

J B C D E F G 
B C D E F G H 

C D E F G H I etc. 

"the lingerings of the past dropping successively away, and the 
incomings of the future making up the loss." If all experiences 
are included in the present thought, why not include J in the 
second thought, and A B m the third? Why speak now of a 
'dropping away,' of a 'loss,' since past ideas preserve their 
'own several substantive identities'? 

And by what magic power is the faint, weak idea now and 
then aroused in consciousness? How does it acquire the habit 
of reappearing? How is it recognized? The 'judging 
thought,' owner of the past, must refer its own appropriated 
states to other states in the past, know the similarity between 
the two. All this is arbitrary, to say the least, if there is 
nothing permanent under the present and the past thoughts. 

In brief, to formulate all the facts by the supposition of a 

'P. 158. 
"P. 606. 



142 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Stream of thought seems impossible. 'The passing thought 
itself is the only verifiable thinker,' says James, ^ and hence the 
substantial soul is to be rejected. Yes, the passing thought 
alone is verifiable; to make it appropriate the past, own pre- 
ceding faint states and selves, transmit its titles to its successor, 
be born an owner, and die owned, etc., all this is not verifiable; 
it can neither be proved empirically nor shown to be a sufficient 
explanation of the facts. 

Conclusion of the Preceding Arguments. 

From what precedes, we can now summarize the following 
conclusions. Psychical dispositions require something besides a 
series of mental phenomena, in whatever manner it be pro- 
posed. Professor Baldwin testifies to this logical necessity 
when he says of the theory of psychical dispositions that it is 
'more philosophical' than the theory of a storing up of images, 
and that 'if we were able at this point to make the assumption 
of a substance called mind ... we would be justified in resting 
in the law of habit in respect to it, as v/e are in resting in the 
physiological law of habit.'" Psychical dispositions require a 
subject which can be disposed by them, and of which they are 
modifications. Recognition requires a permanent being, a 
judge, a witness of the past and of the present, able to know 
their similarity, analogy, difference. Facilitation requires an 
active principle whose necessary effort toward a given opera- 
tion is diminished by repeated exercise, and whose energy can 
be given a special direction. The unity of the mind is more 
than the uninterrupted stream of thought. We need a sub- 
stantial being which can own, be proprietor, look for its stray 
possessions, search for its forgotten ideas, refer and attribute 
to itself as its own the various states and activities by which 
it manifests its existence. For this reality is perceived only 
when acting, and known through its operations. In this sense, 
Descartes' 'Cogito ergo sum' must be accepted; we do not 
know an empt}', idle soul; we perceive it only by its actual 
operations. In the same manner we do not know a disposition 

■P. 346. 

''Senses and Intellect, p. 155. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. H3 

in itself, but only in its effects. St. Thomas also makes the 
same remark: 'In hoc enim aliquis percipit se animam habere, 
et vivere, et esse, quod percipit se sentire, et intelligere, et alia 
huiusmodi vitas opera exercere.'^ 

The same principles which lead us to postulate psychical dis- 
positions lead us also to postulate a soul; the former do not 
seem possible without the latter. If in the brain series we 
assume some reality underlying the cerebral processes and dis- 
positions, we must also assume under the mental processes a 
mental reality. Psychical dispositions are necessary to explain 
■certain facts, but they themselves must rest on something else. 
A substantial mind does not make the nature of the dispositions 
known to us, but it gives them a support without which they 
could not stand. A disposition is not merely a connecting link 
between processes; it has a deeper significance. If It unites 
processes, it is because it affects the one agent from which they 
proceed. 

Briefly, we cannot take the term psychical disposition which is 
used by modern writers, as a mere verbal explanation, an empty 
word meaning nothing real, and expressing simply an abstrac- 
tion. Such a use is to be banished from a serious treatment of 
the facts. There has been enough abuse of words, and modern 
thinkers are right in waging war against it. We do not want 
to rest satisfied with names and abstractions when we have real 
facts to explain. It is also impossible to use the term psychical 
dispositions as meaning organic dispositions in so far as these 
would be the cause of conscious states. This would be nothing 
but materialism, the mind becoming a function of the organism. 
Moreover those who admit psychical dispositions oppose them 
to physiological dispositions, in the same manner as they admit 
the irreducibility of the mental to the physical series. Conse- 
quently psychical dispositions must mean real dispositions in the 
mind, and then a view of the mind has to be admitted which 
will be consistent with the theory of dispositions. 

' Quaest. disputatae, De Veritate, q. X., art. VIII. This is but an echo of Aris- 
totle: "'0 <r 6pov bri 6pij: alaBdvsTai Kat 6 aKuiav ort aKoiiei . . . aiaOavoifieda av 
oTi ala6av6/jt6a' Kal vool/jev bn voovjiev rb d' bri alaBavdfisda fj voovfiev^ bri ea/iev." 
Ethic, ad Nichom., 1. IX., c. IX., iiyoa, 29. 



144 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

Parallelism. Psychophysical Identity. 

We have said in the beginning of this chapter that psycho- 
physical parallelism and the identity theory were frequently 
admitted by modern psychologists as further determinations of 
their views concerning the mental series. We will not attempt 
to discuss the value of these theories, but we must make a few 
remarks which pertain to the present subject. 

In the theory of parallelism it seems evident that psychical 
dispositions are absolutely necessary. Organic traces cannot 
be assumed as explanations of the facts of memory and mental 
habit. What efficacy can such traces have toward the repro- 
duction of a mental process? They belong exclusively to the 
physical series; and as the physical can never come in touch with 
the mental series, they cannot account for facts belonging to the 
mind. Each series is complete in itself and parallel with the 
other, but independent of it; it would proceed in the same 
manner even if the other were not there. Each series conse- 
quently must have in itself, and cannot find in the other, the 
reason of its successive processes and of their relations. No 
brain disposition will account for conscious memory. How 
then can a parallelist consistently base his theory of memory 
and of the various relations of the mental processes on the law 
of physiological habit? 

But if the psychical dispositions are needed, we must remem- 
ber that the parallelism as it is presented is somewhat defective, 
and this on an important point. On one side we have simply 
mental processes without any substantial mind ; on the other we 
have physiological processes of what we always conceive as a 
material substratum, /. e., processes of the brain. This differ- 
ence is sufficient to break the parallelism by making the exist- 
ence of psychical dispositions impossible. 

Granting that they could exist, the term parallelism — objec- 
tionable already for other reasons, for how can we call parallel 
two series of utterly different nature? — would not be a satis- 
factory expression of the facts. Not all brain process is cor- 
related with a conscious process, and as a consequence not all 
brain disposition has a corresponding mental disposition. All 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. HS 

the parts of the brain have functions and acquire dispositions. 
But only processes of the brain cortex are supposed to have par- 
allel conscious processes; and processes in the brain cortex can 
be determined by dispositions left In other parts of the brain 
with which it is related. To these no mental disposition corre- 
sponds; yet some mental disposition, not parallel to the organic 
disposition, Is needed to explain the mental series. 

Another objection is that the physical series is mechanical; 
efficient causes suffice to determine Its course. The only effect 
of a disposition is to modify a certain organ or part of an organ, 
so as to prepare it to receive the action of these causes. The 
mental series Is teleological; It derives an impulse from the end, 
the purpose one has in view. The psychical disposition enables 
the mind to turn toward the past by memory in order to find 
therein new motives for future action ; it prepares future effects 
not always directly, but sometimes indirectly through the con- 
sciousness of the past. 

That In certain cases and for certain investigations paral- 
lelism may be useful as a 'working hypothesis' no one will 
deny. But it is equally clear that it does nothing but formulate 
the facts, without offering any explanation of them. It is not 
a solution, and even frequently its working will be found defi- 
cient. Unless we deny that words are intentionally used to 
express ideas; that the bodily gestures and attitudes of others 
manifest the existence of their mind, and to a certain extent the 
nature of the conscious processes which they experience; that 
certain conscious states, espetially pleasure and pain, are factors 
in the organic evolution of the Individual and of the race; that 
there is a moral law, and that men are responsible for their 
actions, etc., — unless we reject all this, we must admit that par- 
allelism, even as a working hypothesis, has a limited field of 
application. 

The Identity or double-aspect theory is presented as a com- 
plement of parallelism, as the final Interpretation of the facts 
formulated by it. Both series are parallel because they are two 
different manifestations of the same substance. There is only 
one reality with two aspects : the exterior or physical, and the 
interior or mental. This, however, docs not remove the diffi- 



146 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

culty. Each series must be accounted for independently of the 
other, and we must admit conditions which will enable each 
series to preserve dispositions. The absolute disparity and irre- 
ducibility of the physical and of the mental series have been 
emphasized especially by parallelists and monists. The two 
series are 'on utterly different platforms'; they 'have very little 
in common'; their difference 'transcends all other differences.' 
The term itself parallelism or double-aspect denotes that no 
meeting is possible. 

And yet they do meet in a certain sense, if not during their 
course, at least in their starting-point, since both originate from 
the same substance. They have something in common, since 
they are appearances of the same reality. Parallel processes, 
which are of too different a nature to act on each other and exer- 
cise a mutual influence even in the slightest degree, can never- 
theless be reduced to aspects of the same reality. 

It is also a little strange that both aspects should be known 
to one of them only. The mind alone knows both the con- 
scious processes as the interior side, and the material processes 
as the exterior side of reality. I understand that two parallel 
faces of a cube may be different in appearance; one may be 
white and the other black, and both may have their own indi- 
vidual qualities. The same curve may be looked at from 
within or from without, and it will present two aspects, one con- 
cave, the other convex. The same fact can be expressed in two 
different languages. In these comparisons frequently used by 
monists there is a general defect. One of the two languages 
does not express the same fact for the other, and the man who 
understands only one language will have only one expression 
of the fact. The two faces of the cube or the two aspects of 
the curve are knowable only to a third consciousness which can 
pass from one side to the other, compare the two, perceive their 
difference, change its own position so as to take successively 
two points of view. Suppose the white surface of the cube and 
the view of the curve from the interior to represent conscious- 
ness, they will never come to know anything of the black surface 
or of the convex appearance of the one reality. 

In the identity theory the one reality manifests itself in two 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 147 

ways; but both are aspects only for one, for the interior, the 
conscious aspect. How is it possible for the mind to be aware 
of both its own and the other, the material process with which 
it can have now no point of contact? In order to know it at 
all must it not first reach and meet it? And if we give the 
mind that special prerogative, we make it more than an aspect 
or appearance, more than a series of processes. 

Then how many questions arise. Does the double-aspect 
extend to all beings? Shall we like Paulsen admit an Allbesee- 
lung; what signs of it have we? Or is the mental aspect lim- 
ited to some beings, as Bain and Spencer claim? Then where 
does it begin, and how is it that it appears at all? Within the 
same being, how is it that only some brain processes have a 
corresponding mental process? 

But to confine ourselves to our subject, what is a psychical 
disposition ? The same disposition must be physical or psy- 
chical according to the point of view one takes of it. "As 
conscious process in general is correlated with nervous process, 
so psychological traces and dispositions may be regarded from 
another point of view as physiological facts. They are per- 
sistent modifications of nervous structure. Their existence, 
interconnection and mode of operation are in the first instance 
revealed to us by purely psychological evidence. But there are 
many advantages in also considering them from a physiological 
point of view."^ "For the sake of clearness it is very often 
necessary to separate unambiguously the purely psychological 
evidence concerning the interconnection and mode of operation 
of residual traces from corresponding physiological data and 
hypotheses. When and so far as this is the case, it is best simply 
to use the term 'psychical disposition' without any physiological 
reference. When on the other hand we desire to consider exclu- 
sively the physiological side, the term 'physiological disposition' 
is in place. When both are simultaneously to be taken into 
account, it is appropriate to speak of a 'psycho-physical dispo- 
sition.' Only by such a nomenclature as this is it possible to 
avoid clumsy circumlocution and artificial attempts to state from 

' Stout, Manual of Psychology, p. io2. 



14S CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

one point of view what can only be satisfactorily stated from 
a different point of view."^ 

Monism, as Professor Pringle-Pattison remarks,^ "while pro- 
fessing to harmonize materialism and spiritualism, occupies a 
position of somewhat unstable equilibrium between the two, and 
shows a tendency in different expositors to relapse into the one 
or the other." The one substance may be conceived as matter 
— and mind reduced to it; or as mind — to which matter is 
reduced; or as some third unknown reality. It is clear that 
to speak in the first hypothesis of psychical dispositions, and in 
the second of organic dispositions, may perhaps be a useful 
terminology, but nothing else; the words denote nothing real. 
If matter and mind are only manifestations of some reality 
different from both, can the monist speak of psychical dispo- 
sitions? That he can speak of physical and of conscious proc- 
esses is evident; but psychical dispositions are not conscious. 
Are they nevertheless the other side of what we know as phys- 
ical dispositions? If the same process can be viewed from 
within and from without, it is more difficult to apply this to the 
disposition. We can hope, says Wundt, to understand later 
that which is obscure now in the physical order; but we have no 
such hope for psychical dispositions, because the limits of con- 
sciousness are also the limits of our inner experience. 

If neither matter nor mind are substances, but only phe- 
nomena, dispositions can be in neither series. Stout himself 
speaks of the dispositions as modifications of nervous struc- 
ture, and of 'brain substance.' This is the only way accord- 
ing to which we can consistently think of them. They are in 
a substance, and the same applies to mental dispositions also. 

3. Psychical Dispositions in the Mind Substance 
Theory. 

Descartes. Interaction. 
According to Descartes, man is essentially a soul, a simple, 
spiritual being, the essence of which is thought.^ The body 

' Stout, Analytic Psychology, p. 23. 

' In Baldwin's Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, s. v. ' Double Aspect 
Theory.' 

^ " Sum igitur tantum praecise res cogitans, id est, mens, sive animus, sive 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 149 

is but a 'machine,' or a 'statue,' and is compared to 'clocks, 
artificial fountains and other similar mechanisms.' All its func- 
tions are purely mechanical.' 

In this Descartes opened the way to what has been called more 
recently the automaton-theory. But in Descartes it is not abso- 
lute; only in a certain number of its movements does the body 
act as a pure mechanism. The will, faculty of the spiritual 
soul, has a certain control of the body and can produce motions 
in it or check natural impulses.^ For there is, notwithstanding 
the absolute disparity in nature of body and soul, an interaction 
between them. The 'animal spirits' communicate to the soul 
located in the pineal gland various impressions which produce 
in it thoughts or ideas; and they transmit to the organism the 
commands of the soul. We have already reviewed this theory 
as far as It is used to explain memory and habit. We have 
seen that Descartes admits two kinds of memory, one depend- 
ing on traces left in the organism, the other spiritual, depending 
on the soul alone and accounted for by traces left in 'thought 
Itself,' the nature of which cannot be explained. 

The difficulty of the theory in both cases Is apparent. It Is 
difficult to see how a spiritual substance, the whole essence of 
which is actual thought, can preserve impressions in an uncon- 
scious form. "Cogitationis nomine intelligo ilia omnia quas 
nobis consciis in nobis fiunt, quateniis eoriim in nobis conscientia 
est."^ Thought, therefore, being what we are immediately 

intellectus, sive ratio. . . . Sed quid igitur sum? res cogitans; quid est hoc? 
nempe dubitans, intelligens, affirraans, negans, volens, nolens, imaginans quoque 
et sentiens." Meditat., II. 

In another place he adds: " Haecque optima via est ad mentis naturara, eiusque 
a corpore distinctionem agnoscendam: Examinantes enim quinara simus nos . . . 
perspicue videmus nullam extensionem, nee figuram, nee motura localem, nee 
quid simile, quod corpori sit tribuendum, ad naturam nostram pertinere, sed 
cogitationem solam." Principla philosophicc, P. I., No. VIII. 

' " Je desire que vous eonsideriez que ees fonctions suivent toutes naturelle- 
raent en eette machine, de la seule disposition de ses organes, ni plus ni moins 
que font les mouvements d'une horloge ou autre automate, de celle de ses eontre- 
poids et de ses roues." De I'homme., ed. Cousin, Vol. IV., p. 347 ff. ; cf. 427, 428. 

^ " Etiamsi nulla in eo mens existeret, eosdem tamen (corpus) haberet omnes 
motus qui nunc in eo non ab imperio voluntatis, nee proinde a mente procedunt." 
Medit., VI. 

'Principia Philos., I., IX. 



15° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

conscious of, and the soul being essentially thought, how can 
we say that there are in the soul traces which are unconscious? 
How can we find something that really belongs to the soul, and 
yet is unperceived and unconscious? 

The theory of organic traces is subject to the general diffi- 
culty of an interaction between a spiritual and a material sub- 
stance. It is impossible to understand how a spirit can come 
into contact with an extended substance so as to move it. Nor 
can we understand how a certain movement in the organism can 
act on the spirit so as to produce a conscious state. This is 
one of the objections urged against the theory of Descartes and 
his followers, the interactionists. Occasionalism, preestab- 
lished harmony, with their modern successor, parallelism, are 
attempts to explain the relations of mind and body without 
admitting any interaction. 

Malebranche and Leibniz. 

Both Malebranche and Leibniz deny the interaction of soul 
and body. According to the former, God Himself, on the 
occasion of a movement in the organism, produces in every 
instance a corresponding impression in the soul, and vice versa. 
No natural causes are true causes; they act only by the force 
and efficacy of the will of God.' "The alliance of body and 
soul, as far as we can know, consists in a natural and mutual 
correspondence of the thoughts of the soul with the traces in 
the brain, and of the emotions of the soul with the motions of 
the spirits."- 

According to Leibniz, body and soul are like two clocks that 
are made in such a way as to keep exactly the same time. Each 
is given by God from the beginning a first impulse and motion 
from which all following actions necessarily result. As God 
gives to both body and soul such an initial movement from 
which he foresees that all subsequent actions will be in perfect 
harmony, it follows that organic processes and mental states 
will always take place in strict correspondence.^ It is worthy 

' Recherche de la verite, L. VI., P. II., ch. 3. 

'Ibid., L. II., ch. v., §1. Cf. Entretiens sur la metaphysique, ye Entretien, II. 

"Systeme nouveau sur la communication des substances, 14 ff., Monadologie, 7. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 151 

of remark that Leibniz bases his criticism of Descartes on a 
principle which resembles very closely the principle of the con- 
servation of energy, which is so frequently adduced to-day 
against the theory of interaction and the theory of free will. ^ 
The theories of occasionalism and preestablished harmony 
need not be discussed here. In so far as they affirm a coinci- 
dence of events they are, like modern parallelism, simply a 
statement of the facts. The explanation which they offer is 
the denial of the facts to be explained, i. e., the relations of 
mind and body. To have recourse to God is beyond the range 
of the philosophical sciences and against the testimony of 
consciousness. 

Aristotelian and Scholastic Theory. 

I. Unity of Man and Duality of His Constitutive Prin- 
ciples. — Descartes' psychology was a complete departure from 
the theories that had been accepted before his time. His 
splitting of man into a thinking soul and a mechanical organ- 
ism; his opposition of mind and matter, which was made after 
him an irreconcilable antagonism; this was an innovation and 
a breaking away from the traditional views hitherto held. For 
the schoolmen following Aristotle, what consciousness mani- 
fests to us in the first place, what we are directly aware of, is 
not the duality of man, but his unity. Man is one, and feels 
that he is one; conscious states are his, organic processes are 
no less his. Man's arm is moved, man's eyes perceive colors, 
man's intellect perceives the abstract reasons of things. Man 
is the undivided subject npt only of the higher mental opera- 
tions, not only of the processes of sensitive knowledge, but even 
of the lowest functions of the organism. This substantial 
unity is the fundamental view of man. 

But man is not a simple substance. As all material beings 
are composed of matter and form, so also man is a 'compos- 

' " Descartes a reconnu que les ames ne peuvent point donner de la force aux 
corps, par ce qu'il y a toujours la raeme quantite de force dans la matiere. Ce- 
pendant il a cru que I'ame pouvait changer la direction des corps. Mais c'est 
parce qu'on n'a point su de son temps la loi de la nature qui porte encore la con- 
servation de la meme direction totale dans la matiere. S'il I'avait remarquee, il 
serait tombe dans mon systeme de I'harmonie preetablie." Monadologie, n. 80. 



152 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

itum' of two principles, incomplete in themselves, which stand 
in mutual need of each other. Body and soul, united as matter 
and form in one complete essence of man, are the principles of 
the various properties and activities of the human 'compositum.' 
They give us the reason of the double series which we observe in 
man. They act not so much on each other as together; their 
combined action is one because it flows from a substance which is 
really one; their union does not consist in their reciprocal activ- 
ity, but in their perfect communication. St. Thomas positively 
rejects interaction in the Cartesian sense: "Incorporeum non 
potest immutari a corporeo. . . . Nihil corporeum imprimere 
potest in rem incorpoream."' Hence there are operations 
which are performed by body-and-soul united in one common 
principle of action. This would be impossible if they were two 
distinct substances. Two individuals can cooperate; they can 
unite their efforts to produce an effect which each by himself 
is incapable of causing. In such a case the action may be called 
one if we consider the end to which it tends; but it is twofold 
if we consider the principles from which it proceeds.^ If man 
is conscious of the unity of his action, it is because he is really 
one principle of action, one complete substance. 

To develop at greater length the preceding doctrine is neither 
necessary for our purpose, nor possible within the limits of 

^ Summa t/ieol., P. I., quaestio 84, art. 6 

We shall quote only two passages from St. Thomas to show how man's sub- 
stantial unity was conceived. " Non enim corpus et anima sunt duae substantiae 
actu existentes, sed ex eis duobus fit una substantia actu existens; corpus enim 
hominis non est idem actu praesente anima et absente, sed anima facit ipsum actu 
esse." Contra Gent., 1. II., c. 69. 

" Ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas, naturae 
et person!. Naturae quidem secundum quod anima unitur eorpori formaliter 
perficiens ipsum, ut ex duobus fiat natura, sicut ex actu et potentia, vel materia 
et forma. . . . Unitas vero personse constituitur ex eis quantum est unus aliquis 
subsistens in carne et anima." Summa theol., P. III., quaest. 2, art. i, ad 2. 

^" Impossibile est quod eorum qua: sunt diversa secundum esse, sit operatio 
una; dico autem operationem unam, non ex parte eius in quod terminatur actio, 
sed secundum quod egreditur ab agente; multi enim trahentes navim, unam 
actionem faciunt ex parte operati quod est unura; sed tamen ex parte trahentium 
sunt raulta; actiones quia sunt diversi impulsus ad trahendum. Cum enim actio 
consequatur formam et virtutem, oportet quorum sunt diversae formae et virtutes, 
et actiones esse diversas." Contra Gent., II., c. 57. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 153 

the present work, as it would include the study of the whole 
theory of matter and form or hylemorphism. We simply 
remark that the unity of man is a most direct experience and 
a primary fact of consciousness. Hence the essence of the soul is 
not actual thought, but it is to be the "substantial form" of the 
human body, according to the classical definition of Aristotle : 
" elSo'i or evre\e-)(€ia T] irponri adi/JiaTO'; tpvcriKOV hvvdfxei ^corjv e^oz/TO?.'" 
2. Faculties. — In man the soul, like the' forma substantialis' 
in all material beings, is the principle of activity,^ and its en- 
ergy is spent through several channels or faculties. The fac- 
ulties are not merely groups of operations, or general terms 
which we use for a purpose of classification, but they are 
various modes of energy. The opponents of the faculty theory 
have represented them as distinct entities, as powers Independ- 
ent of the soul and of one another, as 'hypostasized possibil- 
ities,' and it was an easy task to refute this conception. But 
such has never been the faculty theory as presented by the 
scholastics. A faculty Is but a mode according to which the 
soul acts; It is like a channel conveying the soul's energy in 
various directions. The source itself of energy is one and the 
same. It is not the faculty that acts, but the soul that acts 
through the faculty, as the architect in building makes use of 
his knowledge, "Operantur virtute animse." They are not 
'essential parts' of the soul, but 'potential parts' because the 
soul possesses a manifold energy.' That which performs acts 
of intellection is not so much the intellect as the soul through 
the Intellect: "Intelligere proprie loquendo non est Intellectus, 
sed anlmffi per Intellectum."* That which is free is not so 
much the will as man himself. Locke lays great stress on this 
point, but the schoolmen before him had understood the ques- 
tion in the same way, and do not fall under his criticism. In 

1 De anima, 1. II., c. i, 412a, 20 and 27. 

2Cf. Aristotle, De anima, II., c. IV., 415b, 8 ff. 

'"Potentia nihil aliud est quam principium operationis alicuius, sive sit actio, 
sive sit passio; non quidem principium quod est subiectura agens aut patiens; 
sed id quo agens agit, aut patiens patitur; sicut ars aedificativa est potentia in 
sedificatore qui per earn aedificat." Qucest. disp. De anima, q. XII. Cf. Summa 
theoL, P. I., quiEst, 77, art. i. 

* Quiest. disp. De veritate, q. X., art. 9, ad 3. 



154 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

the four places where St. Thomas treats of the subject ex pro- 
fesso, the fundamental questions are always referred to man: 
Utrum homo sit liberi arbitrii? Utrum homo ex necessitate 
eligat vel libere? Utrum homo habeat liberam electionem 
actuum aut ex necessitate eligat?' 

The faculties are also compared to the various offices which 
are a participation of one and the same royal power in the 
administration of the kingdom, e. g., the bailiff would have no 
authority if he did not hold it from the king.^ When there- 
fore St. Thomas teaches that the faculties are really distinct 
from the soul and from one another, nothing more is meant 
than this. The water springing from one and the same source 
can run into several channels really distinct from the source and 
from one another. It can run in several directions and be 
used for several purposes. The direction of a stream, although 
inseparable from it, is nevertheless distinct from it and can be 
altered. It is true that the direction or the swiftness of a cur- 
rent cannot exist without the current, nor the current without 
a certain direction and rapidity; but this, according to the 
schoolmen, is no sufficient reason to identify as one and the 
same thing the stream and the modes according to which it 
flows. Similarly the source of all energy and activity in man 
is the soul; but this energy is spent in several directions, through 
different 'potentiae.' These are distinct from each other and 
from the soul itself, although neither the soul can exist without 
faculties nor the faculties without the soul. 

The faculties are divided into two great general groups, not 
according to their 'principle,' which in all cases is the soul from 
which they all derive their energy, but according to their 'sub- 
ject.' Some are organic and others are inorganic or spiritual. 
In all the actions of the body the soul cooperates; but the soul 
has operations of its own which it does not share with the body. 

To the organic faculties belong not only the 'vegetative' 

^ Summa theol., P. I., q. 83, art. i; la Ilae, q. 13, art. 6; Quasi, disp. De veri- 
tate, quaest. 24, art. i ; De malo, quffist. 6. 

^" Potentias animje dicuntur partes non essentia; animje, sed totalis virtutis eius; 
sicut si diceretur quod potentia ballivi est pars totius potestatis regias." Quasi, 
disp. De spiriiualibus creaiuris, art. XL, ad 19. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. i55 

faculties, which contribute to the development of the organism, 
but also all sensations, internal and external, all sense-products, 
as imagination and memory. These do not belong to the soul 
alone, but to the 'compositum.' The nerve is not a mere means 
of transmission of an external impression to a soul located in 
a special part of the brain; sensitive perception is the function 
of the animated organ. Although our sensations are simple 
and indivisible, yet it cannot be denied that, at least in some 
cases, they have a character of extension and divisibility; this 
Is clearly felt in the tactile sensations. Such characters are 
explained by admitting that the subject of sensation is neither 
the body alone, nor the soul alone, but the 'compositum' of 
both. Hence, 'there is no sensation In beings that have no 
soul.' But sensation belongs neither to the body nor to the 
soul alone. Both sensation and memory are mentioned as 
being 'common to the soul and to the body.'^ 

A multitude of passages could be quoted from the scholastics, 
showing that they held the same views. "The principle of the 
sensitive faculties Is the soul, but their subject Is the compos- 
itum." Sensation is a function of bodily organs which derive 
their power from their union with the soul.- Memory is called 
'the act of some organ. '^ The reason of all this has been given 
already, that nothing material can act on that which Is imma- 
terial. Thus there Is no need of a bridge between the organ- 
ism and the soul ; no need of asking the insoluble question : How 
can a material stimulation determine a conscious perception In 
a spiritual mind? 

The intellectual faculties on the contrary are Inorganic and 
spiritual in themselves. Their object is the universal, the 

'Aristotle, De anima, II., ch. 4, 415b, 25. De somno et vigilia, ch. i, 454a, 7. 
De sensu et sens, ch. i, 436a, 7. 

'^ " Manifestum est quod nulla operatic partis sensitiva: potest esse animje tan- 
tum ut operetur, sed est compositi per animam. . . . Compositum igitur est videns 
et audiens et omnia sentiens, sed per animam. . . . Potentia; partis sensitive sunt 
in composite sicut in subiecto; sed sunt ab anima sicut a principio." Quast. disp. 
De anima, art. 19. 

" Qusdam operationes sunt animae quae exercentur per organa corporalia, sicut 
visio per oculum, auditus per aurem . . . , et ideo sunt in coniuncto sicut in sub- 
iecto, et non in anima sola." Summa theol., P.I., quEst. 77, art. 5. 

'Summa theol. , P. I., quaest. 79, art. 6, ad i. 



*56 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

abstract, the moral, etc., which do not exist as such in nature, 
and consequently cannot act on a material faculty. "It is not 
reasonable, says Aristotle, to hold that the intelligence is mixed 
with the body . . . for it would have some organ, as sensi- 
bility, but there is none." Indeed, 'sensibility does not exist 
without the body, but the intellect is separate from it." It is 
needless to insist that this was also the scholastic teaching; we 
find numerous passages telling us that ' the act of intellection 
cannot be the act of the body.'- 

But the intellect depends on the senses which furnish it with 
the materials on which it can work. 'The soul never thinks 
without phantasms,' and 'the phantasy is but a weak sensation.'* 
St. Thomas in many places teaches the same doctrine of the 
dependence of the intellect on imagination and on sensation. 
Hence it is that disturbances of the imagination or of the 
memory necessarily affect the intelligence although it is in itself 
a spiritual faculty.^ 

Not only for the acquisition of intellectual ideas are the 
senses necessary, but even for the exercise of the intellectual 
memory. "'H Se fivijfir] koI tj tmv vorjrcov ovk dvev (ftavTaafiaTOf 
iariv." ° We have seen in our second chapter that, according 
to St. Thomas, the intellect can preserve the 'species intelligi- 
biles' in habitii. But it needs some sensuous image to recall 
them actii, to revive them. The rule is general that the intel- 
lect has no actual knowledge without using some image, 'nisi 
convertendo se ad phantasmata,' and it holds even for the 
revival of ideas which have been acquired previously. (This 
image or phantasm, however, is not necessarily the image cor- 
responding to the idea itself; it is any image that can suggest 
the idea.) The proof given is empirical, based on the fact 

' De anima, III., c. 4, 429a, 24 ff. 

2 Summa theologica, P. I., quaest. 50, art. i. 

'Aristotle, De mem. et rem, c. i, 449b, 31. Cf. De anima. III., c. 3, passim. 
Rhetor, I., 11, 1370a, 28. 

* " Intellectus ex necessitate accipit ab inferioribus viribus apprehensivis ; unde 
turbata vi imaginativa, vel cogitativa, vel memorativa, ex necessitate turbatur 
actio intellectus." Summa theoL, P. I., quaest. 115, art. 4. Cf. qujest. 75, art. 2, 
ad 3; quaest. 84, art. 7; la Ilae quasst. 51, art. i. 

'Aristotle, De mem. et rem., c. i, 450a, 12. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. I57 

that when the senses are not in their normal condition, intel- 
lectual memory itself is disturbed.' 

These quotations indicate sufficiently what judgment we must 
pass on Bain's assertion, that 'the dependence of purely intel- 
lectual operations, as memory, upon the material processes, has 
been reluctantly admitted by the partisans of an immaterial 
principle; an admission incompatible with the isolation of the 
intellect in Aristotle and Aquinas.'^ 

Because all the faculties proceed from one and the same soul 
and derive their energy from the same source, it follows that 
they influence one another; the exercise of one may either cause 
or prevent the exercise of the others. As the energy of the 
soul is limited, if the operation is too intense it prevents the 
exercise of another activity. "Una operatio cum fuerit intensa 
impedit aliam, quod nullo modo contingeret nisi principium 
actionum esset per essentiam unum."^ Owing to the intimate 
union of body and soul, and of the unity of the principle of 
energy in man, we understand that there must be the closest 
relation between bodily and mental states, since the function 
of one faculty can modify that of another. Mental states 
affect the blood circulation and consequently the heat of the 
organism. They can produce health and disease and even 
death. Insanity and other abnormal states of mind depend 
on the organic conditions.* 

' " Manifestura est quod ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat, non solum 
accipiendo scientiam de novo, sed etiam utendo scientia iara acquisita, requiritur 
actus imaginationis et caeterarum virtutum. Videmus enim quod impedito actu 
virtutis imaginativae per Ijesionem organi, ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito 
actu raemorativE virtutis, ut in lethargicis, impeditur homo ab intelligendo in 
actu etiam ea quorum scientiam praeaccepit." Summa tlieol., P. I., quaest. 84, art. 
7. Cf. Ila Ilae quasst. 49, art. i, ad 2. Qutcst. disp. De veritate, quESt. X., art. 2, 
ad 7. 

'Mind and Body, p. 130. 

'Summa theol., P. I., q. 76, art. 3. On the subordination of the faculties; 
cf. ibid., q. 77, art. 4. 

*This reciprocal influence is described in the following passage. "Sciendum 
est quod secundum naturs ordinem, propter colligantiam virium animas in una 
essentia, et aniraae et corporis in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, 
et etiam corpus, invicem in se effluunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundat; et inde 
est quod ex apprehensione animE transmutatur corpus secundum calorem et frigus, 
er quandoque usque ad sanitatem et segritudinem, et usque ad mortem: contingit 



158 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

3. Dispositions. — The exercise of any mental faculty implies 
a change, a modification of that faculty whether it be organic 
or inorganic, and therefore also, in a more remote manner, of 
the mind itself. The impresssion (species) produced on the 
faculty by its object, and the activity of the faculty in response 
to the stimulation, cannot take place without altering more or 
less deeply, more or less permanently, the subject that receives 
the impression by which its own operation has been determined. 
A trace is left, an after-effect, which is the principle of memory 
and of habit. The intellect, for Instance, after eliciting a cog- 
nitive act, remains the same faculty, but not in the same con- 
dition.' 

In order to understand how an operation or successive opera- 
tions can influence the exercise of a faculty, we must notice that 
faculties mean essentially a relation to a certain function, or 
rather to a certain group of functions. "Oportet quod (anima) 
habeat plures et diversas potentias correspondentes diversitati 
suarum actionum : potentia enim ad actum dicitur correlative." - 

Modern psychologists use exactly the same language. Thus 
Hofler, to quote only one: "Psychical dispositions are, as all 
forces, faculties, powers, distinguished and divided according 
to the real, actual psychical processes for which or to which 
they dispose. In this sense to every disposition corresponds 
an actual correlate. ( Jeder Disposition kommt in diesem Sinne 
ein actuelles Correlat zu.)"^ 

enim aliquem ex gaudio vel tristitia, vel amore mortem incurrere. . . . Anima 
coniuncta corpori eius complexiones imitatur, secundum amentiam vel docilitatem 
et alia huiusmodi. . . . Similiter ex viribus superioribus fit redundantia in in- 
feriores; cum ad motum voluntatis intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, 
et ex intensa contemplatione retrahuntur vel impediuntur vires animales a suis 
actibus; et e converse ex viribus inferioribus fit redundantia in superiores; ut cum 
ex vehementia passionum in sensuaii appetitu existentium, obtenebratur ratio ut 
iudicet quasi simpliciter bonura id circa quod homo per passionem afficitur." 
Quasi, disp. De veritate, q. 26, art. 10. Cf. De spirit, creat., art. 11. 

' " Intellectus ... ex hoc quod recipit species intelligibilium, habet quod possit 
operari cum voluerit, non autem quod semper operetur; quia et tunc est quodara- 
modo in potentia, sed aliter quam ante intelligere, eo scilicet modo quo sciens in 
habitu est in potentia ad considerandum in actu." Summa tlieol., P. I., q. 79, art. 6. 

^ Quasi, disp. De anima, art. 12; cf. art. 13. 

' Psychologie, p. 20. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 159 

Since a faculty is a special mode of energy of the soul, it 
has from its very nature a certain class of objects which it can 
reach, to which it tends. The eye perceives colors, the ear 
sounds, the intellect abstract and universal essences, etc. "Po- 
tentia visiva est ordinata ad cognoscendum omnes colores. 
Cognoscere immaterialiter convenit intellectui ex ipsa natura 
potentiee.'" This general aptitude the faculty obtains from the 
very fact that it is such a faculty, acting in such a manner, 
through such an organ. Further than this the faculty of itself 
is not determined, but it has a manifold virtue, and can per- 
form many different actions. Thus the eye can perceive all 
colors, the ear can distinguish many sounds. " Potentia est 
multiplex virtute secundum quod ad multos actus specie differ- 
entes se extendit.""^ 

But the dispositions which are left in the faculty after exercise 
are a more special determination of it to perform one operation 
rather than others, to perform It more easily and rapidly. 
They narrow down the tendency of the faculty to a more re- 
stricted field. "Potentia est Indetermlnata quantum est de se, 
et per habltum determinatur ad hoc vel illud."^ A disposition 
may be absent where the general faculty is present. A man 
who has never studied mathematics has no disposition to under- 
take the solution of mathematical problems; he does not feel 
Inclined to do it, nor has. he the aptitude to succeed even if he 
tried. Yet we cannot say that he has not the general faculty 
to do it, since he has the faculty of intelligence. If he sets to 
study, there is no dou^bt that he can acquire those dispositions 
to a certain extent. His intellectual faculty will receive a new 
tendency, a new ability. Whereas it has been hitherto engaged 
In other lines of study. It can now be brought to concentrate Its 
energy on this special point. Success will vary with the Indi- 
viduals, and depends on many other factors, but it Is certain that 
exercise will always modify the faculty'. 

When we have said that dispositions narrow down the tend- 
ency of a faculty. It must be understood of such dispositions 

' Quiest. disp. Dc veritatc, q. 20, art. 2 ; q. 24, art. 4, ad. 4. 
'Summa theol., la He, q. 54, art. i, ad 2. 
^ Quiest. disp. De virtutibus, art. 3. 



l6o CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

as have already reached a certain degree of intensity. The 
first acts, although they produce some modification, for other- 
wise the acquisition of habits would be impossible, do not, at 
least generally, have a noticeable effect on subsequent actions 
of the faculty. It is by repetition that habit is acquired and 
strengthened, while on the contrary it is weakened by abstain- 
ing from action, or by performing contrary actions.^ The 
same is true of the body; exercise of an organ makes it more 
powerful and skilful; idleness, on the contrary, weakens it. In 
a similar manner, exercise strengthens one faculty of the mind, 
and as the energy of the soul is limited, it also tends to diminish 
the power of other faculties. 

A disposition therefore is selective; in proportion as it grows 
it tends to exclude other forms of consciousness and activity. 
It concentrates the soul's activity and gives it a special direction; 
if it is strong enough it may even endanger the natural order 
and harmony of the faculties, and cause abnormal states of 
mind. It also follows that for each action, those forms shall 
prevail which have been more frequently in the faculty. The 
same object, especially if it is complex, will be represented in 
the minds of several individuals by very different ideas. The 
statesman and the citizen, the rich and the poor, the educated 
and the ignorant, the man of the city and the man of the coun- 
try, may all be delighted at the same stage performance, but 
no two individuals will view it in the same light and find exactly 
the same motives for being satisfied. The same edifice will 
not excite the same ideas in the mind of the architect, of the 
builder, of the carpenter, of the bricklayer, of the occupant 
and of the neighbor. Each one has his own point of view 
determined largely by the dispositions which previous actions 
and mental states have left in his mind. 

The faculty which draws to itself the soul energy acts in 

a more intense manner; it needs less and less stimulation in 

order to act. As soon as the idea is suggested, immediately, 

mechanically, the faculty performs its action, without effort, 

and frequently without distinct consciousness of what it is doing. 

' Cf. Aristotle, Ethic. Nicom., II., 2; III., 8. St. Thomas, Summa theol., la 
Has, q. 51, art. 2; q. 52, art. i, 2, 3 ; q. 53, art. i, 3. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. i6i 

It even escapes more or less perfectly the control of a higher 
faculty that might check its tendency. It may reach a point 
where the will is unable to exercise its power, where habit is 
too strong and cannot be resisted. Hence habit is rightly 
termed a second nature.^ 

All these effects had been reduced by St. Thomas to the three 
following: (i) Uniformity; habits strengthen the natural tend- 
ency of the faculty. (2) Perfection and ease; a man without 
habit would have to examine the advisability of every one of 
his daily actions.- (3) Pleasure; habits make the action easy, 
natural, and hence agreeable.^ 

Dispositions affect immediately the faculty; they are more 
than the mere faculty, and are not yet the operation; they are 
'medium quoddam inter potentiam et actum.' ^ And thus by 
modifying the faculty, they also modify the soul.° A faculty 
may be nearer and nearer to its operation; it may be 'proxima' 

^ Cf. Aristotle, Rhetor., I., ii, esp. 1370a, 7. St. Thomas, Qutest. disp. 
De •ueritate, q. 20, art. 2 ; De mrtuiibus in communi, q. i, art. i. 

''Cf. James, Principles of Psychology, p. 122. "There is no more miserable 
human being than one in whom nothing is habitual but indecision, and for whom 
the lighting of every cigar, the drinking of every cup, the time of rising and 
going to bed every day, and the beginning of every bit of work, are subjects of 
express volitional deliberation. Full half the time of such a man goes to the 
deciding, or regretting, of matters which ought to be so ingrained in him as 
practically not to, exist for his consciousness at all." 

'"Habitibus virtutum ad tria indigeraus. Primo ut sit uniformitas in sua 
operatione; ea enira qua; ex sola operatione dependent facile immutantur, nisi 
secundum aliquam inclinationem habitualem fuerint stabilita. Secundo ut operatio 
perfecta in promptu habeatur; nisi enira potentia rationalis per habitum aliquo 
modo inclinetur ad unum, oportebit semper cum necesse fuerit operari, prjecedere 
inquisitionem de operatione ; sicut patet de eo qui vult considerare, nondura 
habens scientias habitum, et qui vult secundum virtutera agere, habitu virtutis 
carens, unde Philosophus dicit (in V. Ethic, c. III.) quod repentina sunt ab 
habitu. Tertio ut delectabiliter perfecta operatio compleatur; quod quidem fit 
per habitum, qui cum sit per modum cuiusdam naturze, operationera sibi propriara 
quasi naturalem reddit, et per consequens delectabilem." Qutest. disp. De virtu- 
tibus in communi, q. i, art. i. Cf. De veritate, q. 20, art. 2 ; Summa iheol., la 
He, q. 49, art. 4; q. 78, art. 2. 

'Summa theol., P. I., q. 87, art. 2; la He, q. 50, art. 4, ad 2, etc. 
" Maxime habitus inveniuntur in anima, in quantum anima non determinatur 
ad unam operationem, sed se habet ad raultas. . . . Et quia anima est principium 
operationum per suas potentias, ideo secundum hoc habitus sunt in anima secun- 
dum suas potentias." Summa t/ieol., la Has, q. 50, art. 2. 



1 62 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

or 'remota,' with all the intermediary degrees between those 
two extremes. Dispositions incline it more and more to act, 
and give an always increasing facility in proportion as they are 
themselves more intense. 

The same faculty can be the subject of several dispositions, 
because it can be the principle of several different operations.' 
But it must be remarked that dispositions, like the faculties 
themselves, are not independent of, but subordinate to one 
another, 'Quanto aliqua potentia est altior, tanto ad plura se 
extendit, unde habet communlorem rationem obiecti.'" This 
explains how dispositions can combine and influence one another. 
Strength of will, self-restraint, for instance, may modify many 
operations of the other faculties, because the will is supreme 
in the mental world; it has a more or less absolute power over 
all the other faculties.^ 

We have compared the faculties to rivers or streams con- 
veying in several directions, through several channels, the water 
of one and the same source. Each river in turn may subdivide, 
and distribute the water which it carries into several smaller 
rivulets. It is clear that if some change be produced in the 
water at the source itself, the water, in whatever direction it 
flows, will undergo the same change. And if the change be 
produced in one of the higher channels, one of those nearer 
to the source, the influence will be greater than if it were pro- 
duced in one of the last and smallest brooks. In the same man- 
ner, if the highest faculties of man be modified, the modification 
extends farther than if it affected the lowest faculties. If one 
sense-organ be diseased, the others may still continue to exercise 
their functions as well and as regularly as before. But if the 
brain be diseased, it is likely that its condition will affect in a 
varying degree the organs of sense. For, according to the 
scholastics, the brain, and not the heart, as in Aristotle,'' is the 

' Cf. Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 54, art. i, ad i et ad 2. 

' Quasi, disp. De anima, art. 13, ad 4. 

'Summa theol., la Ilae, q. 17. 

' Cf. De part, anim., II., 10, 656a, 27 ff. De iwvent. et senect., III., 469a, 10. 
De animal, gener., I. II., cc. 6, 8, etc. Cf. Bonitz, Index Aristolelicus, s. v. KapSia, 
36sb, 34. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 163 

central organ, the central sense, the seat of imagination and of 
memory." This is even the reason given to explain why the 
brain of man is larger, in proportion to his body, than the brain 
of other animals. The intellectual faculties cannot be exer- 
cised without these sensitive faculties which have their seat in 
the brain." 

The brain is 'the common root' of the external senses. 
From it the other organs derive their sensory power, and to 
it as to their common center they transmit their various 
impressions.* 

The sensus communis, imagination, memory, instinct, 'have 
their organs in the brain. '^ A more precise localization is 
mentioned by Albertus Magnus as commonly received by the 
Peripateticians.^ The sensus communis has its seat in the an- 
terior part of the brain 'where the sensory nerves of the five 
external senses meet as in their common center.' This part 
of the brain is 'moist and full of marrow'; it can therefore 
receive impressions easily. To preserve the images, a harder 
substance is required; the seat of the imagination is behind that 
of the sensus communis; this part, being cooler and harder, is 
better adapted to the retention of the 'sensible forms.' The 
organ of the aestimativa Is In the first part of the middle ven- 
tricle of the brain, which 'is warmed by the movement of the 
spirits.' Memory is localized in the posterior part of the 
brain, 'a dry place on account of the motor nerves which start 

' Cf. Summa iheol., P. I., q. 78, art. 4; Quasi, disp. De veritate, q. 18, art. S, 
ad 5. 

^ " Necessarium fuit quod homo inter omnia animalia respectu sui corporis 
haberet maximum cerebrum, ut liberius perficerentur operationes interiorum 
virium sensitivarum quae sunt necessariae ad intellectus operationera." Summa 
t/ieol., P. I., q. 91, art. 3, ad i. 

'"A corde derivatur virtus sensitiva ad cerebrum, et exinde procedit ad or 
gana trium sensuum, visus, auditus et odoratus." " \'is sentiendi diffunditur in 
organa quinque sensuum externorum ab aliqua una radice communi a qua pro- 
cedit vis sentiendi in omnia organa, ad quam etiam terminantur omnes immuta- 
tiones singulorum organorum." Comment, de sensu et sens, lect. 5; et in libro 
III. de anima, lect. 3. Cf. Summa tlieol., P. I., quasst. 78, art. 4, ad i. 

*Qut£St. disp. De verit., q. 18, art. 8. 

^A similar localization is taught by the author of the Opusculum De poientiis 
anima (c. IV.). This work is attributed to St. Thomas, but its genuineness is 
not certain. 



164 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

from there'; the sign of this localization is that 'in all animals 
injury to this part destroys or impairs the memory.' Finally 
the organ of the phantasy is in the middle of the middle ven- 
tricle, between the organ of memory and that of imagination. 
The reason is that 'injury to this part of the brain always pre- 
vents the animal from coordinating its actions (non habetur ab 
aliquo animali ordinatum regimen vitae) . . . and eventually 
drives the animal to madness.'^ 

This localization and the anatomical and physiological con- 
siderations which accompany it would doubtless have little value 
in presence of modern investigations. But the principle of a 
localization of functions is recognized, and some reasons why it 
must be admitted are indicated. 

From the general idea of faculties, we undersand how that 
which affects and modifies the higher can also affect and modify 
the lower. But it is important to notice that the reciprocal is 
true, and that our comparison with a river, good though it was 
as far as it went, was imperfect and incomplete. There are 
mutual relations of dependence among the faculties. Even the 
inferior contribute to the operations of the superior. The 
brain, e. g., as we see in the text quoted above from St. Thomas, 
is not only the 'common root from which all sense energy pro- 
ceeds,' but also 'to which all impressions of the various sense 
organs are transmitted.' We have also seen that the highest 
faculties in man, the intellectual, depend on the senses as on a 
conditio sine qua non. Although they are exercised without 
organs, nevertheless, if the organs be diseased, intellectual oper- 
ations cannot be normally performed." The soul is both the 
principle and the term of all its faculties, either in itself or as 
animating the organism. They neither act of themselves, nor 
for themselves, nor, so to speak, in their own name; but they 
act by the energy of the soul, for the soul, and in the soul's 
name. Their operations are the operations of the soul, or at 
least of the 'organum animatum' ; whatever affects them affects 

' Albcrtus Magnus, De anima, L. II., tract. IV., cap. VII. 

^" Videmus enim quod impedito actu virtutis imaginativae per lassionem organi 
ut in phreneticis, et similiter impedito actu raemorativE virtutis, ut in lethargicis, 
impeditur homo ab intelligendo." Siimma theoL, P. I., q. 84, art. 7. 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 165 

also the soul; and even nothing can affect the soul except in and 
through its faculties and their operations. 

4. Conclusion. — The scholastic view of the soul seems to 
fulfill the requisites of the theory of psychical dispositions. It 
does not make dispositions themselves directly and immediately 
known to us, but it makes their existence possible.' 

We have a subject permanent and identical which is modi- 
fied in its various faculties by the dispositions which it receives ; 
a subject whose operations can be facilitated; which can really 
own its past, retain it, and recognize the similarity between the 
present and the past conscious experience. Thus is shown the 
relation between memory and habit, which was insisted upon by 
Malebranche, and is to-day emphasized so strongly by Ribot 
and Richet. The modification which any faculty receives from 
its operation is a lasting effect. In the cognitive faculties, the 
'species' remains 'ut habitus, ut disposltio,' as St. Thomas fre- 
quently repeats; it produces 'habitual' science which can be 
made 'actual'; it is 'medium inter potentiam et actum.' The 
same is applied to habit; it is also the result of previous opera- 
tion, and is also something 'inter potentiam puram et opera- 
tionem.' 

Finally the theory, while it explains the possibility of purely 
psychical dispositions, — since the soul does not communicate 
to the body its whole being, and does not share with It all its 
operations — does not, however, neglect physical, organic dis- 
positions. The body concurs even in the highest functions of 
the mind; It also preserves dispositions, which are not only 
material, but necessarily psychophysical, since the whole body, 
down to its smallest fibers. Is permeated by the soul and derives 
from It all its activity. 

Thus all faculties, dispositions and habits, the organic and 

' " In quantum habitus deficit ab actu perfecto, deficit ab hoc ut non sit per 
seipsum cognoscibilis ; sed necesse est quod per actum suum cognoscatur; sive 
dum aliquis percipit se habere habitum per hoc quod perclpit se producere actum 
proprium illiiis habitus; sive dum aliquis inquirit naturam et rationem habitus 
ex consideratione actus. Et prima quidem cognitio habitus fit per ipsam prcesen- 
tiam habitus, quia ex hoc ipso quod est prssens, actum causat in quo statim per- 
cipitur. Secuiida autem cognitio fit per studiosam inquisitionem." Summa t/ieol., 
P. I., q. 87, art. 2. Cf. Qutest. disp. De verhate, q. 10, art. 9. 



i66 CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

the mental series, body and soul, are combined in one harmo- 
nious unity by which their influence on each other is made pos- 
sible. The Aristotelian and scholastic theory takes a middle 
course between two extremes : Cartesian dualism and interaction, 
and Spinozistic monism. It admits a duality of constituent 
principles, but the substantial unity of man. There is a 'double 
aspect' of one substance, a 'two-sided cause'; body and mind 
proceed 'as undivided twins'; and this is accounted for by the 
intimate union of body and soul. 

As far as the theory of psychical dispositions is concerned, 
the system seems to gi\'e a more satisfactory answer than any 
other. If the mind is but a series of states, if there is no per- 
manent subject, we cannot understand how a disposition can 
be preserved permanently; just as we cannot understand how a 
cerebral disposition could reside in brain processes, if there was 
no brain substance. The psychologist who refuses to go be- 
yond the disposition is in danger of offering a mere word instead 
of a real explanation. 

Moreover the scholastic theory, with its distinction of fac- 
ulties, makes us understand better the role of dispositions in 
mental life. If we exercise an organ of the body more than 
another, it will acquire a greater development, a greater 
strength, a greater aptitude to be exercised again with less 
difficulty and fatigue. The faculty of the soul is a power to 
act. That power can be modified, increased by the disposi- 
tions or permanent after-effects which exercise leaves in the 
faculty. 

We have insisted on the scholastic view, more perhaps than 
was necessary for our purpose. But there was a special reason 
to do so; scholastic philosophy is very little known, frequently 
misunderstood and misrepresented, charged with absurdities 
which do not belong to it. What is the value of the system 
in itself? Has it a sufficient basis in experience? Can it face 
successfully the data of science and be adapted to the conclu- 
sions of modern psychology? We do not know. But the 
question may be worth examining; and we believe that it is 
hardly fair for the historian of philosophy to keep silent on the 
whole medieval period; and for the psychologist or the philos- 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 167 

opher, to dismiss a priori all the theories of scholasticism on 
the explicitly or implicitly avowed plea that we must do away 
with all that is scholastic. One thing seems sure, that with 
regard to the general theory of psychical dispositions, the scho- 
lastics have a merit which perhaps not all modern psychologists 
can claim: that of logical consistency. 

Conclusion. 

If we now cast a general glance over the whole field of our 
investigation, the results can be briefly summarized in the fol- 
lowing manner. 

The theory of psychical dispositions is not new. The old 
psychology also admitted it; it was proposed in other terms, 
under other names, but notwithstanding difi^erences in the de- 
tails, it was essentially the same as the modern theory, and it 
was devised in order to explain the same facts. 

Psychical dispositions seem to be necessary in order to inter- 
pret the data of empirical psychology; they are, therefore, in 
that respect, a legitimate postulate. However important for 
our mental life bodily dispositions may be, however well ascer- 
tained be the fact of nervous habituation, this nevertheless is 
inadequate to sufficiently account for all the facts of our mental 
life. , Something more is required in the mind itself. 

No system, it is true, can give us a direct knowledge of the 
existence or of the nature of psychical dispositions, since they 
are essentially outside of consciousness. They are postulates 
transcending experience, and the only knowledge that we can 
have of them, is acquired by reasoning from their eftects, in 
order to reach, so far as it is possible, the cause that produces 
them. 

But if one may and must admit psychical dispositions, it is 
not logical to do so in a system where the mind is supposed to 
consist merely of a series of conscious states, whatever be the 
particular mode according to which that series is explained. 

The scholastic system, on the contrary, with its concept of 
a substantial sou! endowed with various faculties, may and does 
consistently postulate psychical dispositions. 



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168 



THEORY OF PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS. 169 

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17° CHARLES A. DUBRAY. 

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LE My '08 



THE THEORY OF 

PSYCHICAL DISPOSITIONS 



CHARLES A. DUBRAY, S.M. 



A Dissertation 

Submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy of the Catholic 

University of America in Partial Fulfilment of the 

Requirements for the Degree Doctor 

of Philosophy 



PuBi.isHEu AS Monograph Supplement No. 30, oi' 
The Psychologjcal Revievt 



WASHINGTON, D. C. 
1905 



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